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In the study, I tried to explore how characteristics of energy supply in each of the four global 
superpowers (EU, US, Russian Federation, People’s Republic of China) influences their 
foreign energy policy, which out of the three elements of energy policy (competitiveness, 
security of supply, sustainability) primarily reflects it and how and if different forms of foreign 
energy policy regional initiatives can be explained with the theory of neofunctionalism. 
The first chapter aims to present the neofunctionalist theory as a theory of regional integration. 
It first analyzes Jean Monnet’s attempts for European integration, at that time illustrated by the 
European Communities: European Economic Community, Euratom and the European Steel 
and Coal Community. Later, it was further developed to be able to explain processes like 
territorial growth of a regional integrated area and also processes of its shrinking, i.e. Brexit. 
Neofunctionalism is a theory explaining the process of integration on a regional level with 
reference to growing reciprocal economic relationships in-between nations. It also analyzes 
capacity of a regional organization in dispute resolution and creation of international legal 
regimes, within which the supranational market rules may replace national regulatory regimes. 
It explains also integration by positive spillover effects as necessities to cooperate in sectors, 
which are indirectly related to the sector where regional cooperation first started. I briefly 
present also intergovernmentalism as an alternative theory. 
The first chapter also briefly presents 130 years of history of regulation to protect 
competiveness on energy markets, some 80 years of security of supply challenges and their 
translation into political decisions and some 70 years of history of creation of sustainability in 
modern energy policy. 
The second chapter presents the structure of energy supply and the market structure in each of 
the analyzed global superpowers. It is evident that energy markets (oil, gas, electricity) in the 
US and the EU are highly competitive and efficient. Both superpowers strive also towards 
sustainability and are constantly decreasing harmful emissions from fossil fuel power plants as 
well as transport and other energy consuming activities. While the EU is highly import 
dependent (in 2017 imported more than 55% of all energy sources), the United States in the 
last 15 years developed from the biggest importer of energy sources globally into a net exporter, 
reaching energy self-sufficiency in 2018.  
Russia has a net energy imports index at -84%. It is one of the biggest net exporters of oil (some 
10% of global production) and gas (close to 20% of global production), according to data from 
2014. In 2018, it exported almost the same amount of energy as was consumed in the country.  
Despite its energy abundance, Russia has heavily regulated and inefficient gas, oil and 
electricity markets. Among the four analyzed superpowers, it has far the least energy efficient 
use of its energy resources. The position of Gazprom, which enjoys a monopoly on pipeline 
gas exports to Russia’s neighbors, has been increasingly challenged. Consequently, pressures 
on Moscow to reform its energy (particularly gas) sector have been rising. So far, the Russian 
government has shown reluctance with regard to implementing structural reforms in its energy 
sector and has rather been trying to adjust, react and adapt to created circumstances. 
China is slowly liberalizing its gas market. Reform that attracted new private investors into 
electricity generation in the 1990s has backslid. Gas, coal, electricity generation and oil sectors 
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are primarily controlled by state-owned companies and do not allow much room for 
competition. China in 2017 consumed 22% of all energy sources globally and was by far the 
biggest energy consumer worldwide. China extracts and burns around half of all coal being 
extracted worldwide and is heavily unsustainable. Its harmful emissions from power plants 
remain high and stable, while CO2 emissions are in constant ascent. However, in recent years, 
the country has been focusing much more on services-based economy and renewable energy. 
Additionally, taking into account the combination of effects of factors like structural changes 
in the economy, growing efficiency within the energy industry and demographic changes, total 
growth of the energy demand up until the year of 2040 will be comparable to the one that China 
experienced from 2008 to 2016. Its net energy imports index is 15% and shows moderate 
dependence on import. 
The third chapter aims at analyzing the EU’s emerging foreign energy policy in a global context 
of imperfect energy relations. Energy, being an increasingly politicized sector, still remains 
closely linked with state sovereignty and national interest. Consequently, Brussels’s efforts to 
shape a coherent foreign energy policy, while sharing competences with the Member States 
and taking into account the carefully drafted compromise of article 194 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU, has proved to be increasingly challenging. Moreover, Europe, being 
highly dependent on foreign energy suppliers (among which Russia, with its contrasting vision 
of energy policy, plays the most important role) has been further undermining the EU’s 
aspirations of introducing universal, market-based norms in global energy relations. Against 
this backdrop, the EU managed to make some achievements in its foreign energy policy, 
particularly, by the means of the European Economic Area and the Energy Community, which 
was a successful example of what Europe aspired to achieve globally. In recent years marked 
by the decreased role of multilateralism and the increased role of bilateral relations, also the 
EU introduced elements of dominance into its foreign energy policy despite opposition to such 
behavior when performed by other superpowers. The neofunctionalist theory explaining 
European integration by spillover effect has proven to be usable also in explaining processes 
of creation of EU foreign energy policy in the years from 2015 on and increased role and 
autonomy of the European Commission in it.   
The fourth chapter attempts to demonstrate that US energy policy has gone through multiple 
changes throughout history. While in the beginning of the twentieth century, the US pursued 
competitive access to energy sources to sustain the strong growth of its demand, after the Suez 
Canal crisis and the subsequent oil crisis in the mid-seventies, the US energy policy became 
centered on ensuring the security of supply. Since the mid-eighties, it became much more 
multi-sided, with growing concern about environmental issues, yet without detriment to the 
importance given to security of supply and competitiveness.  
While American energy policy throughout the twentieth century has been driven by fears of 
energy scarcity, the so-called unconventional revolution of the past decade changed 
Washington’s attitude towards its foreign energy policy and also considerably impacted 
international oil and gas markets. An atmosphere of continuously growing competition for 
resources has, thus, been replaced by the age of energy abundance, where the Trump’s US 
administration has set the objective of the United States becoming energy dominant, supporting 
political interventions into the creation of prices on the oil market and moving away from 
multilateralism, which enabled global competition. Despite the fact that the US achieved the 
status of being the biggest producer of oil and gas in the world, Washington does not seem to 
withdraw the objectives traditionally pursued by its foreign energy policy. Namely, ensuring 
supplies on the global oil markets and minimizing disruptions; encouraging allies to diversify 
their own energy resources, where Europe has usually been the main focus of US efforts; and 
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using its power to punish countries and to command them to change policies, using the 
possibility of imposing sanctions on gas and oil exporting nations. With latest Biden’s 
administration US seems to reposition its focus on sustainability and multilateral cooperation 
again. Despite that sanctions play increasingly important role in US foreign policy, since it is 
more and more questionable when and if at all to deploy military force.  New energy abundant 
age enables the US to get on board other nations to collectively impose   multilateral sanctions 
easier than in previous times. ON the other side it is very possible that US decision to become 
energy dominant and start using energy exports for political purposes could work against their 
interests and ability to achieve their objectives. The US never participated in any economic 
organization that would tend to transfer sovereignty over energy policy to a supranational 
structure. 
The fifth chapter dealing with Russia explores how its vast energy resource base provides the 
fiscal basis for state spending, foreign exchange earnings, and leverage (especially for gas) in 
international relations. Thanks to the high oil prices of the pre COVID-19 pandemic decade, 
Russia managed to recover its economy and increase its geopolitical assertiveness. 
Nevertheless, due to its extreme dependence on energy revenues, following the unfavorable 
combination of low oil prices, financial sanctions of the West combined with the rising 
competition in production resulted in Russia’s gradually diminishing economic leverage. 
Russia, with unlikely prospects to become a prominent player in Asian markets in the 
foreseeable future, has turned to expanding and refreshing its energy ties with Europe. Yet, in 
parallel, Moscow has been pushing forward its competing integrationist project of the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EAEU), which aims to conflict and overlap with the European integrationist 
projects, inter alia, in the sector of energy in order to safeguard its dominant position in the 
post-Soviet space. Despite the formal similarity of the EAEU with the EU, there is no spillover 
effect since it is an association of unequal partners with strong Russian leadership. 
Country’s fast-growing economy and rapid increase in energy demand has lead China to gain 
more influence in global energy markets. The energy policy of the Chinese government has 
been strongly influenced by the increasing demand for oil and country’s dependence on oil 
imports. The oil and gas industry has remained a strategic asset for the Chinese government. 
This industry is responsible for ensuring supplies of oil and gas, for sufficient budget income 
as well as for employment. With closer integration into global markets, Chinese state-owned 
companies have been seeking to adapt their operations to global practices, yet, the room for 
maneuver has always been limited by state control.  
Under the present leadership, Chinese companies have been engaged in large-scale outward 
direct investments. This process was recently soon packed as a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). 
The fact that nearly 70 countries are participating in the BRI does not improve the perception 
that its label remains unclear.  There is still no exact definition of the qualification of a BRI 
project 
Yet, half a decade after the launch of one of the most ambitious geo-economic projects of recent 
history, some more things became clearer. To name a few, BRI is not only responsible for 
securing China’s trade routes and energy supplies, it is also accountable for the fact, that the 
country is being able to export worldwide several construction projects due to its industrial 
overcapacities. The BRI became a major component of China’s grandiose foreign policy 
agenda aimed at increasing Chinese influence in the BRI region and beyond. The past years 
have proven that the BRI project is to be understood as a long-term, global and not having only 
an economic goal.  Yet, challenges regarding to the future success of the BRI are many and of 
different nature: technical, political, financial and regulatory, to name a few. Both suspicion 
8 
 
and skepticism concerning its real motives and viability remain high, especially among those 
countries who have been the main designers of today’s global financial system and 
international trade rules. The Belt and Road Initiative is yet another form of international 
cooperation which is incomparable with the EU integration process and neofunctionalist theory 
cannot be used for its explanation. 
The thesis confirmed that characteristics of energy supply in a country are directly and with 
the same attitude reflected in the foreign energy policy. Foreign energy policy is additionally 
held up by whichever tool of dominance being available to one of the four studied cases. The 
thesis also confirmed that Haas’ theory of neofunctionalism is still supportive in explanation 
of regional integration of all initiatives proposed in and by the four global superpowers. EU is 
creating its own foreign energy policy entering externalization as the last, fourth stage of 
regional cooperation, according to Nye. 
Key words 
Neofunctionalism, energy, Energy Community, dominance, cooperation, competition, 





V disertaciji sem poskušal raziskati, kako oskrba z energijo v vsaki od štirih svetovnih velesil 
(EU, ZDA, Ruski federaciji, Ljudski republiki Kitajski) vpliva na njihovo zunanjo energetsko 
politiko,  kateri od treh elementov energetske politike (konkurenčnost, varnost oskrbe, 
trajnostnost) in zakaj vpliva na zunanjo energetsko politiko teh držav in kako lahko pobude za 
regionalne povezave, ki so jih v zadnjih letih predlagale te velesile pojasnjujemo s teorijo 
neofunkcionalizma. 
V raziskavi so zbrani in analizirani podatki o energetskem sektorju štirih svetovnih velesil. 
Raziskava temelji na študiju primera (EU) in primerjalni metodi (ZDA, Rusija, Kitajska). 
Predstavlja razlike med proučevanimi državami in prikaz njihovih samosvojih lastnosti v 
domači in zunanji energetski politiki.  
Neofunkcionalizem je teorija, ki razlaga proces integracije na regionalni ravni glede na 
naraščajoče vzajemne gospodarske odnose med državami.  
Energetski trgi (nafta, plin, elektrika) v ZDA in EU so konkurenčni in učinkoviti. Domača 
energetska politika je trajnostno usmerjena. Tudi zunanja je taka v primeru EU, ne pa v primeru 
Rusije, Kitajske. Taka je bila tudi v  ZDA pred časom administracije predsednika Trumpa in 
videti je, da bo znova taka v času predsednika Bidena.  
EU je pri dobavi energentov ranljiva. Uvozi več kot polovico vseh energentov. ZDA so se s 
plinom in nafto iz škrilavcev iz največjega uvoznika spremenile v največjega izvoznika 
energentov na svetu. Rusija približno toliko energentov kot jih porabi sama tudi izvozi in ima 
močno regulirane in neučinkovite trge s plinom, nafto in električno energijo. Njena energetska 
politika je netrajnostna. Kitajska le počasi liberalizira svoje energetske trge. Plin, premog, nafto 
ter proizvodnjo električne energije v glavnem nadzirajo državna podjetja, kar je za državo 
temelj varnosti oskrbe. Kitajska je daleč največji porabnik energije na svetu. Zaradi rabe 
premoga pri proizvodnji elektrike je močno netrajnostno usmerjena. Kitajska je zmerno 
odvisna od uvoza. 
EU počasi oblikuje svojo zunanjo energetsko politiko v zapletenem ravnotežju med svojimi 
vse večjimi pooblastili in suverenostjo držav članic ter nacionalnih interesov. EU kot celota v 
času slabljenja multilateralizma pridobiva elemente dominantnosti. Raziskava dokazuje močno 
soodvisnost notranje in zunanje energetske politike. Teorija neofunkcionalizma ustrezno 
pojasnjuje proces oblikovanja zunanje energetske politike EU. V primeru Evrazijske 
ekonomske unije pod vodstvom Rusije in kitajskih zunanjepolitičnih pobud (17+1, svilna pot) 
ta teorija ni uporabna oziroma dokazuje, da se brez enakopravnosti partnerjev supranacionalna 
institucija ne more razviti.  
Ključne besede 
Neofunkcionalizem, energija, Energetska skupnost, dominantnost, sodelovanje, konkurenca, 
trajnostnost, reforma, politika, varnost  
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Energy supply is crucial for the existence of every nation or society. In the old days, it was 
simple. People and states adapted their economies in order to attain affordable energy supply. 
Practically all of it was, as we would say in modern times – renewable. The delivery of energy 
resources was local. Apart from small quantities of coal and peat for heating, only sun, wind, 
biomass, and hydropower potential were used for economic activities. The invention of the 
steam engine changed the world. The production of steam required a caloric energy source and 
coal became a global trading commodity. Exploration of electricity and electrical machines and 
later combustion engines made the process thousands of times more intensive and 
internationally very important. Energy became part of foreign policy. Coal as an energy source 
indirectly led to trade wars and even to World War II. Modern Europe with current European 
Union emerged from the establishment of the ECSC in 1951 to the EEC, the first supranational 
governing body in modern history. 
Every nation has its own foreign policy, adapted to its needs. Energy covers an important 
portion of these needs. In relation to energy demand and energy supply, these needs change 
over time and foreign energy policy reflects these changes as well. 
The title of this text uses the term “foreign energy policy”. It is widely used in case of nation 
states. The European Union (EU) strictly uses “external” energy policy. This is because of 
sensitive discussions on sharing the competences between national member states and the EU 
as a supranational organization, which as a constitutional hybrid long created a headache to 
constitutional lawyers. The EU, having its seat in many international organizations, is clearly 
gaining competences also in external energy policy and therefore I only use the expression 
“foreign energy policy”.   
I am managing the Energy Community Secretariat for eight years. The Energy Community is 
an organization that was established in 2006 to export internal EU energy rules into its 
neighborhood but behind was always a clear foreign policy agenda of then the European 
Economic Community. I am happy it was reported as “…among the most successful policy 
frameworks of the European external energy policy.” (European Council, 2013, p.4). The 
Energy Community was since the beginning part of the emerging EU foreign energy policy 
and it is a privilege to observe this process from inside and compare it with the developments 
of foreign energy policy of other states. In aspiration to comprehensively elaborate foreign 
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energy policy of the EU and compare it to others. I focused on the foreign energy policy of 
three global economic superpowers: US, Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China.  
Energy policy of any state always reflects three elements: security of supply, competitiveness 
and sustainability. 
 “Robust energy systems “are secure, equitable and environmentally sustainable, showing a 
carefully managed …three dimensions. …: 
Energy security – management of primary energy supply from domestic and external sources, 
reliability of energy infrastructure, ability to meet current and future demand; 
Energy equity – accessibility and affordability of energy supply across the population 
Environmental sustainability – reduction in energy and CO2 intensity, transition to renewable 
and low-carbon energy sources” (World Energy Council, 2019, p.1) 
The elements are reflecting the durability/continuity, price affordability (competitiveness) and 
environmental/spatial acceptability of energy supply.  The significance of elements is changing 
through time, depending on the natural resources in the country and the progress of technology. 
Sometimes, a development is revolutionary. The best example is the invention of drilling for 
shale gas which only in 10 years changed the US from the biggest gas importer globally to one 
of the biggest gas exporters. Such changes are not reflected only in the domestic energy policy 
but also in the foreign one. Exploration of such developments are the second focus of this 
dissertation. 
The third goal is related to neofunctionalism as a theory of international relations explaining 
regional integration. This theory, first emerging soon after the establishment of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (Haas, 1958), is still nowadays a basis for European studies and 
tries to explain the development of supranational organizations. When designing the Energy 
Community, European Commission officials intentionally used the theory. This fascinating 
approach to the creation of an international organization is seen as a rare socio-political 
experiment. It stimulated me to explore how and if the theory is also applicable in explanation 
of establishment of EU’s foreign energy policy in last five years and to the forms of foreign 




1.1. Research Problem 
Foreign energy policy in each of the four analyzed global superpowers (EU, US, Russian 
Federation, People’s Republic of China) has gone through multiple changes throughout history. 
While in the beginning of the twentieth century the US pursued competitive access to energy 
sources to sustain the strong growth of its demand and the same was characteristic for the early 
days of the EU, after the Suez Canal crisis and the subsequent oil crisis in the 1970s, the energy 
policy of both superpowers became centered on ensuring the security of supply. Since the mid-
eighties, it became much more multi-sided, with growing concern about environmental issues, 
yet without detriment to the importance given to security of supply and competitiveness (see 
e.g. Riley (2015); Tapia Ramirez (2017)). A boost in integrating the internal energy market 
was given to the EU with the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 and an aspect of competitiveness became 
a major topic in internal and indirectly also foreign energy policy for several years as evident 
in the works of Damro (2012); Bonafare & Encke (2015); Leal-Arcas & Filis (2015). 
While American energy policy throughout the twentieth century has been driven by fears of 
energy scarcity, the so-called unconventional revolution of the past decade changed 
Washington’s attitude towards its foreign energy policy and also considerably impacted 
international oil and gas markets. A world of increasing competition for resources has been 
replaced by the age of energy abundance, where the Trump’s US administration has set the 
objective of the United States becoming energy dominant (Tapia Ramirez (2017), Escribano 
(2018)). President Biden sided US back to multilateralism and international cooperation. 
Russian internal and foreign policy in the energy field is based on the abundance of sources of 
energy, especially gas, and the possibility of using energy supply as a source of political 
influence in consuming countries. This simple fact is extrapolated in all foreign relations, 
including regional cooperation which pro-forma tries to copy the EU’s approach to regional 
cooperation (see e.g. Pastukhova & Westphal (2018)). 
China’s fast-growing economy and rapid increase in energy demand are two biggest reasons 
why the country gained influence in world energy markets. The country remains the biggest 
coal producer, consumer and importer globally. It is accounted for almost half of coal 
consumption globally and is holding responsibility for an enormous emission of the energy-
related carbon dioxide. However, in recent years, the country has been changing its course in 
the direction. It is focusing more on economy that is services-based and uses cleaner energy 
mix (see e.g. Rosenberger, Gordon, Maruyama & Sullivan (2016); Hillman (2017)). Under the 
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present leadership, Chinese companies, often state owned, have been engaged in large-scale 
direct investments worldwide, which were soon placed under the banner of the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI). Some five years after the launch of the most ambitious geo-economic project 
in recent history, it became clear that the BRI is about much more than securing China’s trade 
routes and energy supplies as well as exporting its industrial overcapacities to far-away 
construction projects. The BRI, instead, became a major component of China’s grand foreign 
policy agenda aimed at increasing Chinese influence in the region and beyond.  
Neofunctionalism is a theory of regional integration, first established by a German-American 
scholar Ernst Bernard Haas in 1958 who analyzed European integration, at that time illustrated 
by the European Economic Community, Euroatom and the European Steel and Coal 
Community (European Communities).   
Neofunctionalism describes and explains the process of regional integration with reference to 
how three causal factors interact (Haas, 1961, pp. 367-368) 
• Growing economic interdependence between nations 
• Organizational capacity to resolve disputes and build international legal regimes 
• Supranational market rules that replace national regulatory regimes 
Neofunctionalism concentrates on the role of the “secretariat” of a regional organization that 
provides political and administrative leadership. 
Regulatory complexity creates a need for further integration of institutions and creation of a 
higher level of decision-making processes. 
Neofunctionalism is trying to explain European integration through automatism and quasi-
automatism of spillover effects of integration. Indeed, the ever-growing endowment of central 
institutions of the European Union reflects the rising demands of member states and interest 
groups, particularly when they need to react on external impulses. However, the path is not 
straightforward and we can observe also complete reactionary movements. They are also 
reflected in the foreign energy policy. 
The main goal of this dissertation is thus to analyze the different aspects of the EU’s foreign 
energy policy in a global context of imperfect energy relations and compare it with the foreign 
energy policy of the United States, Russian Federation and China and try to explain their 
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spillover effects through a prism of neofunctionalism. Energy, being an increasingly politicized 
sector, still remains closely linked with state sovereignty and national interest.  
Based on literature review, I set the following research questions:  
1) How the characteristics of internal energy supply in each of the four global superpowers 
(EU, USA, Russian Federation, People’s Republic of China) influences their foreign 
energy policy?  
The available literature doesn’t describe the mirroring effect of domestic energy policy on the 
foreign energy policy despite it could be a logical consequence and quite obvious at a first 
glance. There is also no comparative analysis of this mirroring effect in a comparative manner 
among four global superpowers. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H1a: Characteristics of energy supply influencing the domestic energy policy are 
proportionally mirrored in the foreign energy policy. 
H1b: Every superpower tends to use any available strength in energy sources supply chain to 
implement its foreign energy policy. 
2) Which out of the three elements of energy policy (competitiveness, security of supply, 
sustainability) is primarily reflected in the foreign energy policy? 
For this research I propose the following hypothesis: 
H2: All elements of domestic energy policy are equally reflected in the foreign energy policy. 
3) How different forms of foreign energy policy with initiatives on regional cooperation 
fit into the theory of neofunctionalism? 
Following this theoretical question, I wish to test two hypotheses: 
H3a: Haas’ theory of regional integration is still relevant in explaining the current features of 
the foreign energy policy of four global superpowers.  
H3b: Nye’s theory about four steps in the regional integration is applicable in the current merits 















Source: Own compilation. 
1.2 Methodology 
To achieve the main goal of the dissertation and answer the research questions, the research 
employed a theoretical thematic analysis. The first step was data preparation. I used various 
primary and secondary sources: official documents, books and published papers.  
In the second step, I systematically organized the gathered data in a meaningful way. Such 
coding helps to reduce the enormous amounts of data into smaller chunks of meaning. Coding 
was done theoretically. 
The key methods and techniques used in the analysis of foreign energy policy in the four global 
superpowers were a case study (European Union) and a comparative method (US, Russian 
Federation, People’s Republic of China). The case study method I will use as a method which 
uses every social unit as an entirety (Mesec, 1998, p. 147) and which “collects case related data 
from different sources and with different methods; to enable description and analysis of a case; 
on that basis, designs theoretical concepts, explanations and generalization or explaining of 
cases, their development and processes in them” (Mesec, 1998, p.3). Then I will use 
comparative research as a “basic strategy of sociological research which usually describes 
configuration of similarity and variance among limited number of cases” (Ragin 2007, p. 212). 
FOREIGN ENERGY POLICY 
Characteristics of energy supply 
Security of supply Sustainability Competitiveness 
Case study: European Union 
Comparative perspective:  
United States, Russian Federation, People's 






I will use comparative research to “not only uncover differences between social entities, but 
reveal unique aspects of a particular entity that would be virtually impossible to detect 
otherwise” (Mills, van de Bunt and de Bruijn, 2016, p. 621). The research uses a qualitative 
methodology as a basic method of sociological research (Ragin 2007, p. 207). A review of the 
content of existing legal rules relevant to the development of the foreign energy policy of all 
four global superpowers was based on the method of textual interpretation and comparative 
analysis (ibid 2007, p. 212). Since it was not possible to arrive at unequivocal conclusions 
about the content, I, in my interpretation, helped myself with the historical, narrow contextual 
and teleological interpretation as well as with my own experiences being a stakeholder in 
creating EU’s foreign energy policy in the last eight years. 
1.3 Scientific Contribution of Dissertation 
 
In the thesis, I will try to:  
• present a brief overview of the theory of neofunctionalism;  
• present characteristics of energy policy in relation to the three core elements of energy policy 
as defined by the World Energy Council 
• present the stages in the development of the EU's energy and foreign energy policy and 
identify its essential characteristics over the time, particularly through the prism of 
neofuctionalism; 
• outline the energy policy and foreign energy policy of the United States, Russian Federation 
and People’s Republic of China, including their regional initiatives, observed through the prism 
of neofunctionalism;  
All these topics are the subject of several articles and studies and numerous literature is 
available. On top of that I will: 
• compare foreign energy policy characteristics among four global superpowers;  
• search for the proof that foreign energy policy directly reflects domestic energy policy 
through a prism of the three core elements of energy policy as defined by the World Energy 
Council; 
• search for elements of foreign energy policy of all four global superpowers that could fit to 
the theory of neofunctionalism and be explained by it. 
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I have not found any such research yet and I believe this will fill a gap in literature and present 
an original contribution of this study. 
1.4 Structure of Dissertation  
In the study, I tried to explore how energy supply in each of the four global superpowers (EU, 
USA, Russian Federation, People’s Republic of China) influences their foreign energy policy, 
which out of the three elements of energy policy (accessibility, security of supply, 
sustainability) primarily reflects it and how different forms of foreign energy policy fit into the 
theory of neofunctionalism. 
Neofunctionalism describes the process of regional integration due to growing economic 
interdependence between countries in the region, capacity of their institutional frame regarding 
dispute resolution as well as the creation of an international legal framework, first in market 
rules and later in more and more other interrelated topics, slowly replacing national regulation. 
It explains further integration by positive spillover effects as necessities to cooperate in sectors, 
which are indirectly related to the sector where regional cooperation first started.  
The second chapter presents the structure of energy supply and market structure in each of the 
analyzed global superpowers. Energy supply in the United States and the EU is highly 
competitive and efficient. Both superpowers strive also towards sustainability and are 
constantly decreasing harmful emissions from fossil fuel power plants as well as transport and 
other energy consuming activities. While the EU is highly import dependent, the US in the last 
15 years developed from the biggest importer of energy sources globally into a net exporter.  
Russia is one of the biggest oil and gas net exporters globally.  Despite its energy abundance, 
Russia has heavily regulated and inefficient gas, oil and electricity markets. Among the four 
analyzed superpowers, it has by far the least energy efficient use of its energy resources.  
In China, gas, coal, electricity generation and oil sectors are primarily controlled by state-
owned companies and do not allow much room for competition. China in 2017 consumed 22% 
of all energy sources globally and was by far the biggest energy consumer worldwide. China 
extracts and burns around 50% of the coal being produced in the world and is heavily 
unsustainable. Its harmful emissions from power plants remain high and stable while CO2 
emissions are in constant ascent. However, in recent years, the country has taken a different 
approach and is now focusing more on a services-based economy and intensively introducing 
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renewable energy technologies. Its net energy imports index is 15% and shows moderate 
dependence on imports. 
The third chapter aims at analyzing the EU foreign energy policy in a global context of 
imperfect energy relations. Energy, being an increasingly politicized sector, still remains 
closely linked with state sovereignty and national interest. Consequently, Brussels’s efforts to 
shape a coherent foreign energy policy, in light of the shared competence with the Member 
States and the carefully drafted compromise of article 194 TFEU (2012)1, has proved to be 
increasingly challenging. Moreover, Europe’s high dependence on foreign energy suppliers 
(among which Russia, with its contrasting vision of energy policy, plays the most important 
role), has been further undermining the EU’s aspirations of introducing universal, market-based 
norms in global energy relations. The neofunctionalist theory explaining European integration 
by spillover effect has proven to be usable also in explaining processes of creation of EU 
foreign energy policy and increased role and autonomy of the European Commission in it.   
The fourth chapter attempts to demonstrate that US energy policy has gone through multiple 
changes throughout history. While in the beginning of the twentieth century the US pursued 
competitive access to energy sources to sustain the strong growth of its demand, after the Suez 
Canal crisis and the subsequent oil crisis in the 1970s, the US energy policy became centered 
on ensuring the security of supply. Since the mid-eighties, it became much more multi-sided, 
with growing concern about environmental issues, yet without detriment to the importance 
given to security of supply and competitiveness.  
While American energy policy throughout the twentieth century has been driven by fears of 
energy scarcity, the so-called unconventional revolution of the past decade changed 
Washington’s attitude towards its foreign energy policy and also considerably impacted 
international oil and gas markets. Fierce competition for access to energy resources has been 
replaced by the age of energy abundance, where the Trump’s US administration has set the 
objective of the United States becoming energy dominant, supporting political interventions 
into the creation of prices on the oil market and moving away from multilateralism, which 
enabled global competition. President Biden seems sided US back to multilateralism and for 
the first time towards decarbonisation of energy sector as a political imperative. 
                                                          
1 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
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The fifth chapter dealing with Russia explores how its vast energy resource base provides the 
fiscal basis for state spending, foreign exchange earnings, and leverage (especially for gas) in 
international relations. Thanks to the high oil prices of the last decade, Russia managed to 
recover its economy and increase its geopolitical assertiveness. Nevertheless, due to its extreme 
dependence on energy revenues, following the unfavorable combination of low oil prices, 
financial sanctions of the West as well as the rise of competition among producers, in recent 
years Moscow’s economic leverage was significantly reduced. 
In parallel, Moscow has been pushing forward with its competing integrationist project of the 
EAEU, which aims to conflict and overlap with the European integrationist projects, inter alia, 
in the sector of energy in order to safeguard its dominant position in the post-Soviet space. 
Despite the formal similarity of the EAEU with the EU, there is no spillover effect since it is 
an association of unequal partners with strong Russian leadership. 
China is gaining more influence in world energy markets due to its fast-growing economy and 
increasing energy demand. Energy policy is strongly influenced by the country's increasing 
demand for oil and its reliance on imports. The oil and gas industry has remained a crucial asset 
for the Chinese government, being responsible for the security of oil and gas supply and also 
generating tax revenues and job opportunities. With closer integration into global markets, 
Chinese state-owned companies have been seeking to develop new approaches, that would help 
them to get closer to global standards yet, the room for maneuver has always been limited by 
state control.  
Under the present leadership, Chinese companies have been engaged in large-scale outward 
direct investments, placed under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative. The BRI became a 
major component of China’s grand foreign policy agenda aimed at increasing Chinese 
influence in the region and beyond. Yet, challenges with regard to the future success of the 
initiative are many and of different nature: technical, political, financial and regulatory, to name 
a few. The BRI is yet another form of international cooperation which is incomparable with 
the EU integration process and neofunctionalist theory cannot be used for its explanation.  
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2 Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1 Neofunctionalism 
Neofunctionalism is a theory of regional integration, first established by a German-American 
scholar Ernst Bernard Haas in 1958.2 It was analyzing Jean Monnet’s attempts for European 
integration, at that time illustrated by the European Economic Community, Euroatom and the 
European Steel and Coal Community (European Communities).   
Neofunctionalism explains and describes the process of regional integration regarding how 
three causal factors interact (Haas, 1961, pp. 367-368): 
 Growing interdependence between nations in an economic sense 
 Organizational capacity allowing to build international legal regimes and go for dispute 
resolution solutions 
 Supranational market rules that substitute national regulatory framework 
The theory of regional integration described above is based on functionalism, a theory launched 
in 1943 by David Mitrany in his book “A Working Peace System. An Argument for the 
Functional Development of International Organization”. Mitrany described a comprehensive 
solution, according to him, the “problem of our generation: how to weld together the common 
interest of all without interfering unduly with the particular ways of each” (Richardson, 2001, 
p.53). Integration, in the understanding of functionalists, foresees constantly expanding 
cooperation on technical issues without politics. Very focal idea is that solution to a common 
problem can be found only with a transnational approach. Having the results of successful 
collaboration or due to technical necessity, the countries participating in the regional 
cooperation see a need to start solving common problems also in other policy areas and thus 
developing cooperation. (Mitrany, 1943, p.33). 
Neofunctionalist theory made a step forward from technical cooperation to a political one. It 
assumed that the importance of nation states would decline and foresaw that gradually officials 
in supranational organizations, interested stakeholders, and representatives of major 
commercial interests in every country would see it beneficial to integrate politically and 
                                                          
2 Haas, Ernst Bernard (1958) The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic forces, 1950-1957, Stanford 
University Press, Stanford. 
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marketwise at a supranational level. Key for the theory is an existence of supranational 
structures (like European Commission, European Court of Justice).  
Neofunctionalism allocates to the “secretariat” of a regional organization one of the most 
critical roles. The institution shall provide both political and administrative leadership and thus 
covering a supply side of integration. Initially, these were national authorities who dominated 
with social interests and loyalties. Nevertheless, due to the development of interaction, 
supranational authority is taking over. In this connection, political elites inside the countries 
adjust their set of preferences and revise “expectations and political activities”, thus enhancing 
the development of a new political community (Haas 1958, p.16): “Political actors are 
persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new and larger 
center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” 
(ibid 1961, pp.366-377). Both technical and administrative elites play a significant role during 
the integration process. 
Regulatory complexity creates a need for further integration of institutions and creation of a 
higher level of decision-making processes. 
Despite neofunctionalist scholars gave central role of integration to the secretariat in EU an 
important role of elite socialization played the European Parliament. Members of the 
parliament are elected on national level but then grouped into multi-national political groups. 
With this they become more European and that their national allegiances begin to fade.  
Supranational governance is beneficial to:  
(1) those stakeholders, groups, and companies who run the cross-border transactions, and  
(2) those who can benefit from European rules and cannot receive advantages under national 
regulations in specific policy domains. (Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997, p.299) 
Haas predicted that positive spillover, technocratic automaticity and the transfer of domestic 
allegiances would push integration ahead. 
Positive spillover effects are necessities to cooperate in sectors, which are indirectly related to 
the sector where regional cooperation first started. The most spread neofunctional approach 
foresees that integration begins from a technical and noncontroversial policy arena, which will 
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later spread to other fields, given the secretariat’s support, ensuring that national 
representatives and experts have regular meetings and interactions. According to Rosamond 
(Rosamond, 2000, pp. 51-52), the recipe for success is to start integration in areas of “low 
politics” in one of the economic sectors and to push the integration of related economic areas 
through establishing a high authority keeping the baggage of national interests untouched. 
Within time, social interests will change their direction from national forms of authority to a 
supranational center where they will better fulfil their material interests. Economic integration 
will create depending institutional integration and political integration will be more or less an 
inevitable side effect. Spillover is a core dynamic of neofunctionalism since regional 
integration processes “dispose national actors to resolve their inevitable dissatisfactions by 
increasing both the level and scope of common institutions.” (Schmitter, 2002, p.32.) 
Also according to early works of Haas “Spillovers” occur “…quasi automatically as demands 
for additional central services intensified …” (Haas, 2004, p. xv).  Automaticity of spillover 
effects was later even by Haas declared as unrealistic.  
Transfer of domestic allegiances happens when national interest groups and associations see 
that the new institutions provide better channels to better fulfill their material interests. Based 
on observation of European integration, the integrative process starts to happen institutionally, 
functionally and environmentally (Haas, 1961, p.377).  
Institutionally, because supranational and intergovernmental bodies due to the upgrading of 
their interests tend to further build common institutions (ibid, 1961, p.377). The integration 
process brings supranational institutions power and autonomy, allowing them to support 
further integration.  
Functional integration is run by a possibility to overcome the autonomy of tasks by building 
into the institutions specific assignments, which maximize the spillover process. 
Environmental integration is run by social groups representing the rational interests of urban-
industrial society. Only strong central institutions that maximize the spillover effect can resist 




a) sectoral (functional), which foresees that activities supporting integration will be 
transferred between the sectors (e.g. from coal and steel to energy, transport etc., from 
customs union to monetary union) and  
b) political (when activities in sectors are politicized; to illustrate, when the coordination of 
monetary policies was replaced by the European Central Bank). The spillover process is 
best reflected in the Merger Treaty, signed in 1965, which successfully blended the three 
Treaties of Rome – European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC) which provided for 
a Single Commission and a Single Council of the then three European Communities. 
(Moga, 2009, p.799) 
Some are researching also other types of spillover effects – geographical (by territorial 
expansion) (ibid, 2009, p.800) and institutional (by replicating institutions – Energy 
Community - similar to existing European supranational institutions – European Commission, 
European Court of Justice) (Stuewe, 2017, p.7). 
Functionalism with learning by doing and incrementalism run by administrative elites contrary 
to federalism and comprehensive planning were for Haas the guiding forces of the integration 
process. 
Neofunctionalism was declared already as obsolete since it did not offer answers on many new 
developments. As a center of evolution, it provided an agency in which different stakeholders 
strive to receive scarce public goods based on functional distribution, which are provided by a 
regional organization (Schmitter, 2015, p.2). With the role of the European Council and a veto 
power of member states in many topics, it could not entirely explain and predict European 
integration further. 
The theory was modified and upgraded by Philippe C. Schmitter with a statement that “Any 
comprehensive theory of integration should potentially be a theory of disintegration.” (ibid, 
2002, p.4). Schmitter replaced the focal agency with a concept of “Multi-level Governance” 
reflecting the territorial dimension of integration and Poly-centric Governance as the functional 
dimension. Poly-centric Governance was characterized as “an arrangement for making binding 
decisions over a multiplicity of actors that delegates authority over functional tasks to a set of 
dispersed and relatively autonomous agencies that are not controlled – de iure or de facto – by 
a single collective institution”. (ibid, 2002, p.7) 
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Schmitter upgraded the automatic spillover logic with additional strategies that are not 
mutually exclusive and can still be encompassed in the pro-integration logic and better reflect 
stops and goes in the integration of the EU, even Brexit. These are seen in a Table 2.1: 
Table 2.1: Compilation of Schmitter’s neofunctionalist strategies  
Strategy Definition 
Spillover Regional processes call the national 
stakeholders to resolve their inevitable 
unsatisfaction through increasing the scope 
and scale of common institutions. 
Spill-around Spread of functionally specialized, 
independent, and at the same time strictly 
intergovernmental institutions. 
Institutional build-up Consent to increase the autonomy or 
capacity of common institutions in decision 
making, but keep them from entering into 
new areas. 
Retrench Enhance the level of joint consultations, but 
pull out the institutions. 
Muddle-about The regional bureaucrats can go into 
discussions, provide different arguments and 
suggestions on many issues, but their actual 
capacity to allocate values shall be kept low. 
Disintegrative spill-back Back down on scope and scale of power and 
influence, possibly returning to the status 
before integration was initiated. 
Encapsulate Mitigate the crisis by means of extreme 
modifications, state of stable self-devotion 
Source: Stuewe (2017, p.6). 
Neofunctionalism concentrates only on taking over new roles and augmentation of joint 
authority. It does not provide information on involving new members. This approach does not 
provide details on conditions and reasons when a regional organization would dilate 
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territorially. (ibid, 2006, p.255). The big wave of expansion of the European Union in 2004 
and 2007 and its impact on Brexit was not explored in literature yet. The fact is, that member 
states differ with the size of their territories and population, capacity and socio-economic 
composition and due to enlargement this diversity continues to increase. Smaller member states 
favor to delegate more authority to joint institutions, including the Commission, but at the same 
time stand firm to claim their disproportionately “fair share” of structural funds, voting 
weights, positions in institutions etc. (ibid, 2002, p.10) 
Neofunctionalism was primarily explaining European integration. Its authors always wanted 
to present it as a universal theory to explain regional integrations. Already Haas (Haas, 2001, 
pp.39-40) assessed his presumption about the deadlock of Latin American regional integration 
as an achievement of neofunctionalism. He said “that the explanatory power of 
neofunctionalism in leading to new political communities was confined to settings 
characterized by industrialized economies, full political mobilization via strong interest groups 
and political parties, leadership by political elites competing for political dominance under 
rules of constitutional democracy accepted by leaders and followers.” Also Schmitter stated 
that beyond the Western Europe the scores are expected to be quite low and nonsynchronous 
thus insufficient to significantly influence the regional processes, and, therefore provide the 
needed push “for a simultaneous leap forward in the level and scope of common institutions. 
This was a conclusion I drew from research in Central America (CACOM) and Latin America 
(ALALC) during the 1960s and I find no reason to expect anything different from more recent 
experiences in Africa. (Schmitter, 2002, p.32). 
Haas by himself (Haas, 1968, p.xiv) had contrition due to integration of national peculiarities 
in the original vision of the theory of neofunctionalism. National sentiment appeared several 
times in the past as a brakeman of regional integration. In the same work, Haas (Haas, 1968, 
p.xv) accepted that pluralism is not a fixed state and that societal expectations would develop 
autonomously. He introduced also a dimension of external choices and incentives as important 
for the process of regional integration, later upgraded by Schmitter as already explained.  
According to Nye (Nye, 1970, pp.823-828), regional integration has four steps: 
 politicization (increased controversy among participants about details that are not 
purely technical involves more stakeholders), 
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 redistribution (emerging of new forms of institutional balance, be it among institutions 
or between institutions and national states), 
 reduction of alternatives (decrease in the autonomy of national governments, decisions 
are increasingly dependent on functionalist logic of supranational authority), 
 externalization (adoption of a collective common position about everything that 
represents external relations of a system under integration: third countries, regional 
disputes, international negotiations etc.) 
An alternative theory explaining political integration is intergovernmentalism. The theory 
teaches that member states in international organizations are in possession of the decision 
making power, especially when the process of decision making is unanimous. Elected 
representatives or independent governmental appointees have only advisory function in the 
implementation process. Intergovernmentalism explains how state authorities control the 
level and speed of European integration and rejects the spillover effect. 
Neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism aimed to define and foresee regional integration 
and both were mostly focused on European integration. Followers of both theories had fierce 
debates on what explains European integration better. The European Union today is a true weld 
of intergovernmental (European Council) and supranational institutions and powers (European 
Commission, European Court of Justice). Since the scope of this paper is not to compare both 
theories but to find traces of neofunctionalist theory in the foreign energy policy of four global 
superpowers it is worth to mention a statement of Moravcsik as a leading proponent of 
intergovernmentalism: “Any general explanation of integration cannot rest on a single theory 
of neofunctionalism or intergovernmentalism, but must rest on a multicausal framework that 
orders a series of more narrowly focused theories” (Moravcsik 1998, p. 15) 
2.2 Energy Policy 
Every process of production requests apart from labor and capital also energy. Energy is needed 
for mobility and general wellbeing. Sufficient energy supply is and was therefore key for 
human activity throughout history. As long as humanity depended only on ancient natural 
energy sources (sun, wind, water flow, heat from biomass, food stock), economic activities 
were mostly determined by the availability of energy sources in close vicinity and the capability 
of people to use these resources locally. Energy policy at that time did not exist. It was only a 
natural resources policy, if at all. With the invention of the steam machine based on the burning 
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of coal in the 17th century, the massive use of fossil fuels started. First, it was about coal, in 
the late 19th century oil became relevant, and in the 20th century also natural gas and non-
fossil nuclear energy emerged.  From the 17th century onwards, it was therefore economical to 
transfer energy sources to distant places and use the energy source non-locally.   
Energy policy is a set of decisions, usually of a national government, addressing energy sources 
generation or import, distribution and consumption.  
The World Energy Council (World Energy Council, 2019, p.1) defines energy policy according 
to dimensions into secure, equitable and environmentally sustainable energy policy. This 
definition is used also by the EU in its Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with 
a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, so-called Energy Union Strategy (European 
Commission, 2015). 
More descriptive is a definition of Tosun: “Energy policy comprises rules concerning energy 
sources; energy efficiency; energy prices; energy from abroad; energy infrastructure; and 
climate and environmental aspects of energy production, utilization, and transit. The main 
theme in energy policy concerns the trade-offs between affordable, secure, and clean energy.” 
(Tosun, 2017, p.1)     
Energy has a strong influence on the everyday life of each of us and the availability of energy 
sources was always perceived as an indicator of wealth. In the early Soviet Union, in the year 
1920, Lenin even launched a campaign with an aphorism “Communism is Soviet power plus 
electrification” (Gill, 2011, pp.44, 82). Still today, practically all post socialist countries have 
a system of cross subsidization of electricity and gas prices for households (usually financed 
by business consumers, subsidies to producers or non-cost recovery generation and production 
costs) to keep political stability. A recent study published by the Energy Community showed 
that in the Western Balkans electricity prices for households would increase, ranging from 15% 
in Montenegro to 52% in Serbia, if all direct and indirect subsidies were removed (Miljević, 
Mumović & Kopač, 2019, p.21) Even several EU Member States are still regulating household 
electricity prices (i.e. France, Bulgaria, Romania). 
The European Coal and Steel Community (today known as the European Union) was 
established in 1951 aiming to set and develop a joint market for steel and such important natural 
resource as coal, among the members of the Community. The goal was to neutralize 
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competition between the states when it comes to natural resources to prevent emergence of a 
new war.  
Recent attempts of the EU and some other countries across the globe to decarbonize their 
economies in the long run are offering optimism that energy sources will predominantly once 
again become local. This would entirely change today’s energy policy and make it less 
geostrategic and sometimes less detrimental. 
 
2.2.1 Competitiveness/affordability/equitability 
Despite competitiveness, affordability and equitability have in different texts slightly different 
meanings, I am using them as synonyms when presenting one of the three major aspects of 
energy policy. Leaving aside questions of energy poverty and social inequality which could 
also be presented as a question of affordability, I concentrate entirely on the aspect of the 
market functioning when discussing supply of energy. 
In 1882, in US, S. C. T. Dodd, an attorney within John Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Co., 
established a trust to support a conglomerate of oil refiners which had all the capacity to set 
price and supply, and at the same time to avoid not only corporate regulations, but also state-
level taxation. (Philipps Sawyer, 2019, p.2). Development of trusts for industrial merging 
boosted in the 1880s. As a mitigation measure, several federal states and governments adopted 
antitrust laws called to regulate business competition with the focus on aligning and 
arrangements among companies and business tactics which were used to turn industries into 
monopolies. (ibid). 
Concentrated economic power endangered not only free competition, innovative 
entrepreneurship and benefits of consumers but also the role of the government and social 
policy. In the US at that time, it was widely perceived that competition preserves the balance 
of economic power and personal autonomy “Americans had a deeply rooted fear of institutions 
that had a potential of monopolistic power. Whether economic or political, the power had to be 
decentralized.” (Sullivan, 1991, p.5). In such public debate, the US Congress adopted the so-
called Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890. The Sherman Act permitted federal states to retain their 
regulatory power over corporations, but declared the use of federal prosecution to keep the 
trusts in check. (ibid, p.112). In 1914, the US Federal Trade Commission was formed, 
perceived as the first competition regulatory authority worldwide. 
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Antitrust legislation and practice introduced a doctrine of essential facilities. This doctrine was 
drawn up clearly for the first time by the US Supreme Court in a case United States v. Terminal 
Railroad Association. Terminal Railroad comprised of a number of railroads that maintained a 
control over all railway bridges and also switching yards into and through of St. Louis. This 
group blocked possible completion for transportation services to and out that destination. The 
court ruled that such actions constituted an attempt to create a monopoly and restrict the trade. 
(Pitofsky, Paterson, & Hooks, 2010, p.446). The essential facilities doctrine was first in the US 
and some hundred years later in the EU and several other countries around the globe a basis 
for anti-monopoly legislation which allowed third party access and independent regulation of 
natural monopolies (infrastructure). Nowadays, the essential facilities doctrine is widely used 




The first environmental attempts in energy use stemmed from health related reasons. The 
burning of coal has severe impact on lung health due to its harmful emissions. Only the so-
called Great Smog of London, caused by intensive coal use and weather circumstances, in five 
December 1952 days killed 4.000 people immediately and another 6.000 in coming months 
and years (Bell, Lee Davis, 2001, p.389). The response was introduction of the measures 
reducing air pollution through adoption of Clean Air Act in 1956. One of the measures was 
obligatory decrease of use of fuel which produces smoke pollution and Sulphur dioxide 
emissions, especially when used for household fires. To motivate the households to convert 
their coal-burning grates to smokeless fuel they were offered grants which would cover the 
corresponding costs. The Act also included measures that reduced emissions from chimneys 
and smoke-stacks. This is an early example of national energy sustainability policy. 
Back in 1960s, scientists proved that Sulphur dioxide emissions (mostly from coal power 
plants) in continental Europe are interconnected with increase of content of acid in 
Scandinavian lakes. The problem of acidification was recognized during United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment which took place in Stockholm in 1972. The 
Conference called to launch and strengthen international cooperation against acidification. The 
number of studies conducted in 1970’s proved that damage could be caused by air pollutants 
which made their way through thousands of miles (UNECE, n.d.). In 1979, the Geneva 
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Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution3 was agreed among 34 governments 
and the European Commission.  
The convention was the first international act of sustainable energy policy. It has contributed 
to the development of international environmental law and creation of a framework for 
controlling and reducing the damage to human health and the environment caused by air 
pollution. The convention has currently 51 Parties from North America, Europe and post-
Soviet Union countries. The biggest coal consumers (China, India) are not Parties.  
The EU later upgraded the convention with Council Directive 84/360/EEC of 28 June 1984 on 
the combating of air pollution from industrial plants. That one was in 1988 replaced by the 
Large Combustion Plants Directive and that Directive was replaced by the Industrial Emissions 
Directive in 2010. The latest one dramatically reduced emissions of Sulphur dioxide, nitrogen 
oxides and particulate matters across the EU. In parallel, the Fuel Quality Directive from 1998 
successfully minimized emissions from transport and the Sulphur Directive (Directive (EU) 
2016/802) reduced Sulphur oxide emissions from ships. All these developments were 
accompanied by similar movements on a global scale. 
A milestone in introducing sustainability into international law was a judgement of the 
International Court of Justice in case Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Slovakia vs. Hungary) 
from September 19974.  The majority of the Members of the Court decided that Hungary was 
in that case wrong and former Czechoslovakia was right. Vice President of the International 
Court of Justice Judge Weeramantry had a separate opinion in which he laid down all principles 
of modern environmental law:   
“the principle of trusteeship of earth resources, the principle of intergenerational rights, and the 
principle that development and environmental conservation must go hand in hand. Land is to 
be respected as having a vitality of its own and being integrally linked to the welfare of the 
community. When it is used by humans, every opportunity should be afforded to it to replenish 
itself. Since flora and fauna have a niche in the ecological system, they must be expressly 
protected. There is a duty lying upon al1 members of the community to preserve the integrity 
and purity of the environment. Natural resources are not individually, but collectively, owned, 
and a principle of their use is that they should be used for the maximum service of people. 
                                                          
3 UNECE 1979 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution. 




There should be no waste, and there should be a maximization of the use of plant and animal 
species, while preserving their regenerative powers. The purpose of development is the 
betterment of the condition of the people.” 
All these principles are the basis of a legal regime of some tinny isolated irrigation cultures that 
survived several thousands of years, till today, in China, India, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, South 
America etc., all quoted in a separate opinion of Judge Christopher Weeramantry. Sustainable 
development is one of the most ancient ideas in the human heritage. It was only forgotten after 
the beginning of the age of colonialism and newly explored at the end of the 20th century, when 
it became clear that resources of the Earth do not suffice to the ever growing standard of living 
and human population. In between, we have seen conquered and extinct native cultures, loss 
of biodiversity and habitats, desertification, etc.  
All the above mentioned the positive developments that changed the character of sustainability 
policy. Environmental policy developments caused that, at least in the EU and the US, 
sustainability was not closely related with health issues any more. Global climate change 
brought into the focus of sustainability greenhouse gas emissions.  
On 12 December 2015, 196 Parties to the UNFCCC adopted the Paris Agreement. This is a 
new legally binding framework for an internationally coordinated effort to manage climate 
change.   
The Agreement establishes a global warming target of well below 2°C compared to pre-
industrial average. To achieve this goal, all Parties to the Paris Agreement will need to 
substantially change their economies. The Paris Agreement designs a universal legal 
framework aiming to ‘strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change’ (Paris 
Agreement, 2015, Art. 2). All Parties to the Agreement oblige themselves to contribute to 
climate change mitigation and adaptation. Parties have to submit their ‘nationally determined 
contributions’ to the Secretariat of the Convention. Unlike the previous framework designed 
by Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement doesn’t stipulate country specific emissions targets. 
An approach foresees voluntary mitigation contributions and a series of processes aiming to 
ensure collective and individual progress.  
While five years after its adoption, the US under Trump’s leadership left the family of 
signatories, the EU in 2018 adopted ambitious targets for energy efficiency improvements, 
increase in use of renewable energy and decrease of greenhouse gas emissions till 2030 and 
upgraded its instruments with the Governance Regulation which obliges Member States to 
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prepare National Energy and Climate Plans in line with EU adopted 2030 targets. With that 
move, energy policy was transformed, at least in the EU, into a climate concerns driven policy. 
Sustainability became primarily climate mitigation oriented. 
Situation dramatically changed in US as well with the election of President Joe Biden. He 
returned US back to Paris Agreement on the first day of his term 
 
2.2.3 Security of supply 
Access to energy is essential to the functioning of modern economies. Uneven geographical 
distribution of energy sources among countries creates significant vulnerabilities. A threat to 
the stability of supply already instigated national actions to guarantee such a supply. Energy is 
closely related to geopolitics. When Sir Winston Churchill in 1911 realized that war with 
Germany cannot be avoided, he ordered the British Navy to convert energy source from coal 
to oil. (Schubert, Pollak, & Kreutler, 2016, p.1). With that the Royal Navy, the symbol and 
embodiment of Britain’s imperial power converted from domestic Welsh coal to oil supplies 
from Persia, far from being secure (Yergin, 2011, p.xiv). “The battlefields of World War I 
established the importance of petroleum as an element of national power when the internal 
combustion machine overtook the horse and the coal-powered locomotive.” (ibid, 2009, p. xv). 
Oil became crucial for economic development and military supremacy. Therefore, oil supply 
was driving several strategic moves before and during World War II. Hitler was obsessed with 
oil and stimulated synthetic oil production out of coal in Germany, but this was too expensive. 
Synthetic fuels provided more than half of Germany’s total oil supply during World War II 
(ibid, p. 54). A need for oil supply was a basis for alliance between Nazi Germany and 
Romania, as an oil rich country, in the beginning of World War II. A refinery in Ploesti 
(Romania) supplied 58% of the oil needs of Germany in 1940 (ibid, p. 317). A wish to possess 
oil fields in the Caucasus was a prime motive for Hitler in the decision to invade the Soviet 
Union (ibid, p.317).  In 1941, Japan used a US oil embargo as the reason to attack Pearl Harbor 
(ibid. p.58). “The Suez Crisis of 1956, which truly marked the end of the road for the old 
European imperial powers, was as much about oil, as about anything else” (ibid, p. xiv). These 
are only a few of the many foreign policy movements conditioned by energy security, which 
had a strong impact on national security. The 20th century and the last two decades of the 21st 
century are full of bloody wars and political turmoil because of energy security issues. 
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Energy security is a multitude security question – from basic competition for energy resources, 
to heavy reliance on a single supplier and its potential manipulation of that dependence, threats 
to the infrastructure allowing the import of energy sources, to political instability in energy 
producing countries.  
Security of supply was more a question for individual countries until 1973 when it became a 
global matter of concern. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Arab members of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an embargo on export of oil to the United 
States. This was a retaliation measure because of the US decision to supply the Israeli military 
forces. Arab OPEC members extended the embargo also to other countries that supported 
Israel. As a result, the price of oil per barrel doubled, and further quadrupled, resulting in 
skyrocketing costs on consumers and structural challenges to the stability of the whole national 
economies. (US, Department of State, n.d.) The US and several other countries started to 
develop strategies on how to decrease their vulnerability by increased energy efficiency and 
diversification of supply sources. New measures concentrated on energy saving and 
development of domestic energy sources, including the creation of the Strategic Petroleum 
Reserve in the US and the adoption of the Oil Stocks Directive in the EU, imposition of speed 
limits on highways, imposition of fuel economy standards, particularly in Japan etc. One of the 
responses to the oil supply crisis was also the establishment of the International Energy 
Agency, proposed by Henry Kissinger (US, Department of State, n.d.). In the years to follow, 
the threats to security of supply only increased and are nowadays a standard set of foreign 
policy tools of every country that can afford to exert pressure. I will explore this in more detail 
when analyzing the energy policy of the four global superpowers. The possession of energy 
sources allowed exporting countries to exert strong political influence. Throughout modern 
history, the first oil and later gas exporting countries often used an energy commodity as a 
political tool to achieve its interests and these attempts are ongoing. The Russian/Ukrainian 
conflict in the past years, which gave a boost to EU’s foreign energy policy, was initiated by 
gas deals. The ongoing war or conflict in Iraq, Libya and several other countries are oil related. 
Part of the tension between EU and China is related to some very rare chemical materials, so-
called rare earth elements, indispensable for the production of wind turbines and PV panels. 
As it is possible to see in Figure 2.2, China accounts for 99% of the global production of 
dysprosium. The chemical element dysprosium is a key material for the production of magnets 
for offshore wind turbines, a key future source of energy for the EU. Even renewable energy 
sources as locally available have a security of supply threat. Security of supply has many 
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dimensions and is becoming more and more complex in a globalized economy. The 
vulnerability of the majority of countries related to rare materials is well demonstrated also in 
a Figure 2.3. 
Figure 2.2 The EU’s dependence on Chinese critical raw materials 
 
Source:  Moss et al. (2013). 








3 Characteristics of energy supply in EU, US, Russian Federation and 
People’s Republic of China  
 
Natural resources are unfortunately not equally distributed among nations. Neither are 
meteorologically conditioned consumption needs. Scarcity of resources and harsh 
meteorological conditions provoke completely different industrial, cultural and political 
patterns.   
Energy statistics established a concept of total primary energy supply (TPES) and total final 
consumption referred to also as gross final energy consumption (GFEC)5. 
TPES includes imported energy, exported energy (subtracted off) and energy extracted from 
natural resources (energy production) domestically. Usually TPES is thought of as being the 
sum of all primary energy sources. GFEC is the aggregate of all of the end use energy that is 
used for providing various energy services. This total sums electricity generated and secondary 
fuels like gasoline. Since electricity is generated by power plants, of which most are heat 
engines and create a fair amount of waste heat we have to take into account the whole energy 
needed for the process. 
Total final consumption is presented by energy that can be used by end consumers to fulfil their 
energy needs, while TPES is an aggregate of all of the energy going into the energy sector.  
The relation between TPES and GFEC shows how much a country is import dependent, a 
presentation by sectors shows where exactly a country has scarcity of energy sources.  
A comparison of TPES and GFEC is usually done in the millions of tons of oil equivalent 
(mtoe). A ton of oil equivalent (toe) is a unit of energy defined as the amount of energy received 
out of burning one ton of crude oil. It is approximately 42 gigajoules or 11.630 megawatt-
hours, although it is true that different crude oils have various calorific values and the value is 
defined by convention. 
Another indicator relevant for security of supply is the import energy dependency rate which 
shows the proportion of energy that shall be imported to meet the demand of an economy. It is 
                                                          




identified as net energy imports divided by gross available energy, and is expressed as a 
percentage. 
Environmental appearance of the energy sector could be studied through sets of different 
comparisons. For the purposes of this study, I took as a basis for comparison carbon intensity, 
which shows intensity of fossil fuels use (CO2 emissions) and harmful emissions from large 
combustion plants (SO2, NOx, particulate matters) as much as they are available. All coal, oil 
and gas power plants are combustion plants.  
Competition is measured by different indexes of market concentration: Rosenbluth-Hall-
Tideman Index (RHTI), the Entropy Index (H), the Comprehensive Measure of concentration 
(CCI), the Bain Index of Monopoly (o), the Lerner Index of Monopoly Power (L), Landes-
Posner Index (LP), Concentration Ratio (CR) and the most known Hirschman-Herfindahl 
Index (HHI). The HHI measures the size of firms in relation to the industry and serves as an 
indicator of the amount of competition among them. Competition is measured on a local and 
commodity specific market and a generalized comparison among different countries for energy 
is not possible. I could list the HHI for the electricity market of Eastern China or Austria or 
California but not the HHI for the electricity market of the EU, US, Russian Federation or 
People’s Republic of China. For the purposes of this study, I will therefore only assess 
competition through a regulatory framework, i.e. is the electricity or gas grid accessible to new 
entrants to the market and similar.  
A precondition for competition among suppliers is free access to the grid. Since grids were in 
the past usually built by electricity and gas incumbents, competition oriented countries adopted 
legislation that established independent regulatory authorities competent to regulate economic 
activities of the grid operator. The European Union i.e. adopted Electricity and Gas Directives 
that prescribe an unbundling regime with three models: 
(i) the ownership unbundling model (‘OU’); 
(ii) the independent system operator (‘ISO’); 
(iii) the independent transmission operator (‘ITO’). 
All these models are subject to a certification procedure carried out by the national regulatory 
authority and the European Commission. In order to be compliant, implementation of the OU 
as well as any other model needs to be fully in line with the Gas and Electricity Directives and 
the case law of the European Commission. In particular, they need to be effective in removing 
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any conflict of interest between (electricity or gas) producers, suppliers and transmission 
system operators, i.e. the incentive for vertically integrated undertakings (or the State in case 
of public ownership) to discriminate against competitors as regards access to commercially 
relevant information, investments and access to the network. 
The Gas and Electricity Directives set out specific requirements for unbundling which include 
ownership of the natural gas and electricity transmission system by an operator and the latter’s 
(as well as the public body controlling it) independence from any natural gas and/or electricity 
production and supply activities. Moreover, a transmission system operator, regardless under 
which model, needs to perform all functions assigned to it by the Gas Directive and the Gas 
Market Law/ Electricity Directive. This includes the planning, construction, financing, 
operation and maintenance of the entire infrastructure as well as the conclusion of transmission 
and transit contracts. 
Below are some comparisons of primary energy supply and final energy consumption for the 
four global superpowers. 
3.1 Security of Supply 
3.1.1 EU 
The EU-28 dependency on energy imports increased from 52.9 % of gross available energy in 
2007 to 55.1 % by 2017 as shown in figure 3.1.  




Source: Eurostat (2019). 
 
Figure 3.2 shows primary energy consumption by fuel type in the EU and its biggest 
dependency by far on gas and oil. 
 
Figure 3.2 Primary energy consumption by fuel type 
 
Source:  European Energy Agency (2019).  
3.1.2 US 
US net imports were in 2018 negative for the first time after decades of import dependency. 
The US became energy self-sufficient for the first time after 1957 as shown in figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 Primary energy net imports of US (in British thermal unit) 1949-2018 
 
  




As shown in table 3.1 in the last 15 years, the United States developed from a big importer of 
every single source of energy into a big exporter. 































3.1.3 Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China 
The net energy imports of Russia in 2014 was -84%, while China’s stood at 15% (IEA, 2014). 
Table 3.2. shows the development of import dependency from 1990 onwards and table 3.3 total 
final energy consumption in years 2010-2018. 
Table 3.2 Net imports, mtoe 






1990 342 -23 -413,00 751,00 
1995 433 3 -315,00 736,00 
2000 606 48,00 -350,00 826,00 
2005 736 123,00 -539,00 985,00 
2010 534 377,00 -579,00 957,00 
2015 256 519,00 -621,00 906,00 
2017 174 663,00 -664,00 948,00 
2018 80 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Source: IEA (2020). 
 
Table 3.3. Total final energy consumption, Mtoe   






2010 2223.3 2491.6 669.3 1777.1 
2015 2213.2 3009.6 675.4 1652.9 
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2017 2222.5 3139.0 694.3 1691.8 
2018 2300.6 3273.5 720.7 1688.2 
Source: BP (2019).  
 
Figure 3.4 shows global coal production in the last 40 years and the position of China in it. 
 
 
Figure 3.4 World total coal production in million tonns 
 
Source: IAE (2019). 
 
In figures 3.5 and 3.6, we can see the biggest world producers of oil and gas and how the US 
overcame Russia as the number one fuel producer. 
Figure 3.5 Biggest world oil producers 
 
 
Source: IEA (2019). 
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Figure 3.6 Largest world producers by fuel in 2017   
 




The most complete large combustion plants specific and well-presented dataset that could be 
found is that of the EU. Figure 3.7 shows the trends of the three major emissions from 
combustion plants. 
Figure 3.7 Indexed emissions of Sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and dust from large 
combustion plants in EU 
 
 
Source: European Environmental Agency (2020).  
The second sustainability indicator chosen for comparison in this study are CO2 emissions. 




Figure 3.8 CO2 emissions in EU-28 in years 1990-2017 
 
Source: Eurostat (2019). 
 
3.2.2 US 
For the United States, complete and reliable statistics exists as well. Figure 3.9 shows trends 
in emissions of SO2 (dark green), NOx (light green), CO (pink), particulate matter 2,5 
microns (light pink) and particulate matter 10 microns (violet). 
Figure 3.9 PM10, PM2,5, CO and SO2 emissions in US
  
Source: US Environmental Protection Agency (2014). 
The figure 3.10 shows key energy statistics for the US, Russia and China with particular 








Source: IEA (2018). 
 
3.2.3 Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China 
Figure 3.11 Key energy statistics for Russia and China with CO2 emissions in 1990-2018 
Russian Federation  
 
People’s Republic of China 
 
Source: IEA (2018). 
Finding reliable and accurate data on emissions from combustion plants in Russia and China 
is quite challenging. In table 3.4, I am presenting 2013 data that still show the trend in SO2 
emission management.  




Source: Klimont, Smith & Cofala (2013).  
I was forced to resort to using older data as this was the most recent data that I could find for 
the People’s Republic of China. The US and the Russian Federation are also included in this 
table. The EU I obtained by adding up the EU-15, Baltic States, Western Europe (rest of) and 
Central Europe (rest of) rows. At the same time, this data is not in line with what was officially 
reported via the European Monitoring and Evaluation Program (EMEP, 2016), as can be seen 
in the table 3.5 below. In the case of US data, the discrepancy is rather small, but in the case of 
the Russian Federation, it is approximately threefold. 
 
Table 3.5 Comparison of data on SO2 emissions presented in EMEP and article from Klimont, 
Smith and Cofala 
 2000 2001 2002 2011 
 EMEP table EMEP table EMEP table EMEP table 
USA 14830 15,269 14453 14,610 13515 14,282 5791 6278 
Russian 
Federation 
1997 5928 N/A 5941 2130 6032 1250 4408 
Given the above discrepancies, the data may not be fully comparable, nevertheless, the negative 




Figure 3.12 shows trends in energy efficiency. Since the energy efficiency indicator is a relation 
of energy use and GDP per capita, the data are relevant only to show trends, not absolute values. 
 
Figure 3.12 Energy intensity of economies, 1990-2015 
 
 





The EU is from 1986 creating a single energy market in gas and electricity. Crucial was the so-
called Third Energy Package (Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC and Gas Directive 
2009/73/EC). The Third Energy Package enacted obligatory functional unbundling of 
transmission and distribution system operators and third party access to the grid. It was 
upgraded by Regulation prescribing wholesale energy market integrity and transparency 
(REMIT) from 2011, which prevents market abuses. The Third Energy Package brought the 
Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), an EU body with its seat in Ljubljana 
(Slovenia). The Third Energy Package in the electricity area was in 2019 upgraded by the so-
called Clean Energy Package (CEP), which by the end of 2020 completely replaced the Third 
Energy Package.  
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Due to day ahead market coupling, more than two thirds of European borders, involving 25 
European countries by the end of 2018, the level of efficiency in the use of interconnectors in 
this timeframe increased from approximately 60 % in 2010 to 87 % in 2018. Market coupling 
has rendered a benefit of approximately 1 billion euros per year to European consumers.  
(ACER, 2019, p.8). The adoption of the CEP in June 2019 has initiated the further creation of 
more efficient electricity markets. Since many transmission system operators were offering 
artificially low cross border capacity to traders with an excuse to have enough capacity for 
potential security of supply, the CEP requires a minimum level of capacity to be made available 
for cross-zonal trade. In particular, at least 70 % of the maximum admissible active power flow 
(Fmax) of critical network elements considering contingencies shall be made available for 
cross-zonal trade (ibid, 2019, p.6). 
The level of efficient use of interconnectors in the day ahead market (Figure 3.12.) in EU shows 
how much capacity on the borders was used efficiently, according to proper price signals. In 
order to run this analysis, definition of efficient use is the percentage of available capacity 
(NTC) used in the ‘right economic direction’ in the presence of a significant (>1 euro/MWh) 
price differential. 
Figure 3.13 Level of efficient use of interconnectors in the day ahead market in EU 
 
Source: ACER (2019).   
 
The potential convergence of global gas prices would have considerable implications on the 
markets. A strong correlation between the US and the EU was detected during development of 
wholesale gas and oil prices that took place before 2009. However, since then, prices in the US 
comparing to the ones in EU changed drastically (European Commission, 2018). Due to the 
increased competition of supply and the spread of hub-based pricing the price in US has 
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decoupled from the oil price. Identical process has shown up in the EU with some delay. In 
2016 gas wholesale prices in the EU were double of that of the US, even after a significant  
narrowing of the EU-US price difference in 2014 that followed the collapse of the oil price 
(ibid, 2018, p. 39). Costs of gas production in the US are much higher compared to the one in 
Russia and Norwegian one,  (ibid, 2018, p. 39). The price premium in EU corresponds with 
nature of the EU gas upstream sector, that is highly concentrated and include extra-EU gas 
suppliers. The major issue that the EU’s gas market development is facing in the future lies in 
the fact, that it is highly dependent on import and this dependence is still growing (in 2016 it 
was over 70 %) (ibid, 2018, p. 41). Furthermore, three major companies in state ownership 
controlled 77 % of all EU gas supply and the EU was mainly supplied through their pipeline 
systems.  Until US gas producers entered the market in EU in 2016 the LNG supplies were 
marginal compared to the whole gas consumption.   
On top of these obstacles, the gas market in the EU faces some hurdles, which is reflected on 
its pricing. The latter in the EU is different across Member States, i.e., while Great Britain has 
100 % market pricing, in around 34 % of continental Europe still in 2017 used oil indexation. 
Market pricing is taking place in continental Europe (around 61 %), yet, it is facing resistance 
from some countries, especially, from Eastern and Southern Europe (Heather, 2018, slide 19). 
Even though oil indexation is no longer relevant and the logic for gas hub market pricing is 
apparent, its implementation is related to some hurdles which are key to market development. 
Such is, for instance, the lack of: liquidity and transparency; physical connectivity, and 
importantly political willingness along with cultural attitudes to trading (which at present is 
strikingly different from North-West6 to South-East Europe) (ibid, 2018). Thus, Europe in 
comparison to the US is not one homogenous gas market, neither in terms of infrastructure, nor 
in political willingness or commercial views to provide the right framework.  
The gas market in the EU was traditionally more competitive where liquidity was bigger and 
less competitive in the south-eastern part of the EU, traditionally reliant on gas from Russia. In 
2018, 76 % of EU gas supplies were priced with a hub price reference and the total EU hub-
traded volumes increased by 7 % compared to 2017 (ACER, 2019, p.6). Gas supply sourcing 
costs compared to most liquid European gas hub TTF is presented in Figure 3.13. 
                                                          
6 The most developed part of Europe in terms of liberalized gas hubs is in the North-West but this is also the one 




Figure 3.14: 2018 estimated average suppliers’ gas sourcing costs by EU MS and Ukraine 
and delta with TTF hub hedging prices – euros/MWh 
Source: ACER (2019).  
 
3.3.2 US 
The United States is a synonym for a competitive market. The first ever competition regulation 
started some 100 years ago with the unbundling of Standard Oil.  
The electricity system in the US is a complex mechanism with different jurisdictions and 
regulatory designs interacting. We can observe two major models co-existing in the electricity 
market: the regulated monopoly model – state commissions prevent market distortions by 
regulating vertically integrated electricity providers, and the competitive model – power 
producers have open access to transmission infrastructure and freely participate in wholesale 
electricity market. Two-thirds of the US customers enjoy the benefits of competitive market. 
(Flores-Espino, Miller, 2016, p. 22). Generally, system operators are dispatching the least cost 
sources first until demand is met. The most expensive, still dispatched resource sets the 
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market’s price. Components of the market and structure of it are a result of lessons learned 
from market inefficiencies and failures through a longer evolution.  
A focal feature of policy for the natural gas sector is to regulate companies with monopoly 
power enabling them to abuse their power. This is combined with policies that support the 
promotion of competitive market forces and deregulation. Policies are established by the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and by the legislative and executive bodies of state 
governments. Ownership of pipeline transportation capacity is unbundled from ownership of 
the natural gas transported via pipeline. The US gas market is the most liquid gas market 
worldwide with Henry Hub as a global price reference and therefore most competitive gas 
market. 
3.3.3 Russian Federation 
The Russian state directly controls about half of oil production via ownership of oil companies. 
After many years of deregulation, the state has been recently intervening more frequently in 
domestic gasoline price formation (Mitrova, Yermakov,2019, p.11). 
Gazprom is a vertically integrated company. It extracts gas, transports it and sells it to final 
customers. It is a majority state-owned company under strong influence of the Russian 
President. Gazprom’s pipeline ownership and its official monopoly on gas pipeline exports 
prevents other players from increasing their market share. There is practically no market since 
domestic gas prices and pipeline tariffs remain regulated, designed on a level that allows 
significant cross-subsidization (ibid, 2019, p.12). 
Russia’s power sector is the only energy sector in the Russian Federation that went through 
market oriented reforms in years 2002-2008. It resulted in the unbundling of vertically 
integrated Unified Energy System (RAO) and the establishment of the wholesale and retail 
electricity market. Due to some market distortions, the state decided to gradually start 
regulating electricity prices again (ibid, 2019, p.12). 
3.3.4 People’s Republic of China 
China introduced several reforms in its power sector in late 1990’s and early 2000’s aiming to 
increase the sector's deregulation, competition, and market integration. Despite the national 
electricity grids are physically connected, the country’s electricity markets remain fragmented 
(Wu, 2014, p.14). Governments at various levels intervene in businesses in different ways due 
to dominance of the state owned enterprises in the market. Electricity prices and business 
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activities are consequently still tightly controlled. Also unbundling of generation, transmission 
and distribution of electricity is far from being completed. 
In terms of regulatory responsibility, the People’s Republic of China has divided the 
competences between the National Energy Agency and the NDRC – responsible for central 
planning. Vested interests make it impossible for one to have the ultimate authority in 
electricity regulation (ibid, 2014, p.14).  
In the 1990s, China’s electricity witnessed supply shortages and capital inadequacy. The 
private sector played a significant role in overcoming these hurdles. However, after China 
became a WTO member in 2001, majority of the private companies disappeared, while state 
owned companies become the dominant players. This happened mainly because their 
connection with authorities helped them to cope with large losses during economic crisis. (ibid, 
2014, p.15). 
China has introduced some price deregulation in the gas sector, third party access and is trying 
to unbundle the infrastructure. The core objective is to increase competition among natural gas 
suppliers and consumers. The natural gas price is still heavily subject to the regulated city-gate 
price. Interconnections of the infrastructure system (pipeline and liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
terminals) also impede full third party access. Long-term contracts and other reallocations of 
benefits will also need to be managed during the transition to an open market (IEA, 2019, p.1).  
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4 EU foreign energy policy 
 
From the very beginning of the European construction, energy had a central role. Two out of 
the three founding treaties of the European Union were focusing on energy, notably Treaties 
on the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. 
Additionally, one of the key judgements of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) - Costa v Enel 
of 1964, which established the principle of supremacy of EU law over national law, concerned 
the energy sector (Talus&Aalto, 2017, p.15). This is indicative of the role that energy was 
playing among various economic activities covered by EU law and policy at the early stages 
of European integration. However, the energy sector back then was as politically sensitive as 
it is today and was strictly nationally organized and monopolized by the State. It thus remained 
excluded from the EU market integration until the 1980s. The process of applying market rules 
to the energy sector first started in the United States and the United Kingdom. The liberalization 
process later spread to Western Europe where markets were gradually opening up to 
competition. The echo of these developments at the European level became the First Energy 
Package of the 1990s which introduced the first basis of common rules in the gas and electricity 
sectors. Yet, it was not enough for a functional internal energy market. Therefore, the First 
Energy Package was complemented by the Second Package back in 2003 and by the Third 
Energy Package in 2009 (European Commission, 2012). The latter introduced new rules on 
ownership unbundling, regulations on access to electivity and gas networks, new powers for 
national regulators, and the establishment of an energy authority on the EU-level called the 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER). Additionally, the latest energy 
package introduced a competence to enact additional legislation regarding issues related to the 
functioning of the energy markets. In EU energy law, this instrument became known as 
“network codes” (ACER, 2017, pp.5,6,9,21). 
Juncker’s European Commission (2014-2019) launched a flagship idea of an Energy Union 
and under this trademark the EU adopted the so-called Clean Energy Package with eight pieces 
of acquis. The Energy Union as one of the main priorities of Juncker’s Commission was based 
on the three general pillars: security, sustainability, and competitiveness. All of them represent 
the “golden triangle” of EU energy policy. The EU elaborated five main dimensions to realize 
these objectives: 1. energy security, solidarity and trust; 2. a fully-integrated European energy 
market; 3. energy efficiency; 4. climate action – decarbonizing the economy; 5. research, 
innovation and competitiveness (European Commission, 2015, p.4-16 ). The Energy Union 
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will be treated in more detail below, however, it is worth mentioning that the first concrete 
proposals under the umbrella of the Energy Union were focusing on issues related to energy 
security, natural gas and external aspects of the EU energy policy, such as gas security, 
intergovernmental agreements and LNG (along with heating and cooling) (European 
Commission, 2016). This legislative package, bearing the name of the sustainable energy 
security package, proves the importance of the external dimension of the energy sector at the 
European level in an increasingly interdependent world of energy relations.  
As we saw above, the transfer of energy to the European level is a relatively recent 
development. As a matter of fact, the Union acquired shared competences in the energy sector 
only with the Lisbon Treaty. Article 194 TFEU explicitly sets out four objectives of the EU 
energy policy: a functioning energy market, security of energy supply, sustainability and the 
interconnection of energy networks. The Treaty also introduces the requirement to formulate 
the energy policy “in a spirit of solidarity between Member States” (TFEU, 2012, art.194)7, 
thus underlining the increasingly interdependent nature of energy policy. Finally, Article 194 
leaves to the Member States several discretionary powers such as: the right of taxation in the 
energy sector, the right to determine the conditions of exploiting their energy resources, the 
right to choose between different energy sources as well as the general structure of energy 
supply in each Member State. Finally, the reference to the principle of solidarity in Article 194 
has arguably been the result of concerns of Eastern European countries (mostly Poland) over 
the security of gas supply from Russia, which will be addressed at a later stage. 
Prior to the explicit competence for energy granted to the EU by the Lisbon Treaty, progress 
in this sector was taking place based on the Union’s competences related to the internal market 
– art.114 TFEU (ex art.95 EC) and related to the environment – art.192(1) TFEU (ex art.175(1) 
EC). The Union competence for the internal market was the one used as the legal basis for the 
three legislative packages (as energy has a significant role in the establishing of the functioning 
internal market). The environmental competence formed the legal basis for the legislation 
related to renewable energy. However, with the Lisbon Treaty article 194 became a lex 
specialis legal basis for (almost) all energy regulation in the EU, which has been confirmed by 
the ECJ as well (Parliament v Council, 2012). As energy is a highly politicized sector, its 
development at the EU level was slow and gradual. This is not surprising especially when the 
sector involves multiple stakeholders with often clashing interests as a result of which the 
                                                          
7 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012).  
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transfer of competences to the EU level is always the consequence of complex negotiation and 
bargaining. Similarly, the sensitive nature of the sector is often the main motive behind 
different decisions of the European Commission when it comes to blocking or giving green 
light to different energy projects.  
4.1 The dualist nature of EU foreign relations 
Before we start discussing EU foreign energy policy, it is worthwhile to have a short overview 
of the EU external competences, as in a rules-based structure such as the European Union, all 
policies are a matter of competence.  
Back in the seventies, the Member States decided to strictly separate the intergovernmental 
European Political Co-operation (EPC) from the supranational and primarily economically 
oriented external relations of what used to be the European Economic Community (EEC). From 
the early beginning, it was clear that the procedural and institutional division between various 
aspects of EU external action would have been difficult to define in a clear-cut manner. Even 
though the Community dimension gradually spread over non-economic issues, and the EPC 
developed into a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), being integrated in the 
European Union’s constitutional structure as a separate part, the administration of this dualism 
has remained a key challenge for the EU. (Van Elsuwege, 2010. p.987) Reshuffling of the EU’s 
external competences and the attribution of a single legal personality to the Union in the Lisbon 
Treaty, created an impression of a fully integrated EU external action. However, the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy remains a topic based on “specific rules and procedures”, 
compared to others areas of the EU external action (ibid, 2010, p.988). Therefore, the Lisbon 
Treaty, in legal terms, did not solve the established dichotomy between the CFSP and non-
CFSP actions. We can even say that it increased the risk of inter-institutional clashes.  
In the original EEC Treaty, there were not many provisions expressly referring to external 
action other than common commercial policy, which was conferring to the EEC the rights to 
conclude international agreements in this field. Some references to external relations where 
found also in the final provisions of the Treaty and they concerned the competences to conclude 
association agreements and to establish cooperation with international organizations. However, 
since the beginning it was not clear if the EEC competences were limited to the above 
mentioned areas or whether they could also be extended to other fields i.e. if the Treaty also 
contained implied external powers. This confusion was clarified back in the pre-Lisbon era by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in its famous ERTA judgment of 1971, where the Court 
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established the so-called ERTA effect of implied powers in EU external relations. According 
to the “ERTA doctrine”, EU internal rules form the basis of implied external competence 
(Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities, 1971). 
In practice it meant, that there was a parallelism between EU internal and external competences 
(in foro interno, in foro externo) and the nature of internal competence could determine the 
nature of external competence. Thus, the existence of an internal competence is a prerequisite 
for the recognition of an external competence. However, it should be mentioned that, according 
to the ECJ, the exercise of an internal competence is not always sufficient for the EU to have 
the right to exercise such competence externally. In this case, the principle of pre-emption 
(whether the Union has occupied a certain field through its legislation) comes into play. As a 
result, for instance a shared competence can become an exclusive competence ‘par exercise’ 
based on the pre-emption principle.  
It should also be noted here that the Court through its judicial interpretation in the ERTA 
judgment did not expand the competences of the European Communities. The judgment was 
innovative in a sense that it recognized the power of the EC to conclude an international 
agreement in the absence of an express recognition of such power in the Treaty. The Treaty 
foresaw only the possibility of adopting “any appropriate measure” to reach the full objective 
of the provisions of the Treaty (Eeckhout, 2011, p.117). Therefore, the Court stated, that when 
the necessity was arising to enter into contractual relations in order to reach the objectives of 
the Treaty, the internal measures could not be separated from that of external relations. Indeed, 
when the EU legislates Member States lose autonomous powers to do so, including with regard 
to treaty-making, otherwise the uniform application of EU rules can potentially be undermined 
(Eeckhout, 2011, p. 118). 
Further step in a transfer of the competences over the foreign policy from sovereign states to 
the European Commission was again done by the ECJ in a case Spain v. Commission judgment 
of 23 September 20208. In this case Spain, which fiercely opposes the recognition of Kosovo 
as a state due to internal political reasons, challenged the Commission’s decision to sign an 
international agreement with Kosovo allowing Kosovo’s national regulatory authority to 
participate in the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications. Spain was of 
an opinion that Kosovo is not a “third country”, what would allow the Commission to sign an 
international agreement, since Kosovo is not recognized as a State, and that only a State can 
                                                          
8 Case T-370/19 Spain v. Commission 
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have a national regulatory authority. The General Court of the ECJ found out that TFEU 
mentions “third country” and “third state” on several places and interpreted that this was done 
intended to pave the way for the conclusion of international agreements with entities ‘‘other 
than States’.  With this the ECJ formulated the concept of third country: ‘those precautions are 
specifically intended to distinguish between the status of ‘‘State’’ and Kosovo’s capacity to 
enter into obligations under international law as an international law actor covered by the 
broader concept of ‘‘third country’. The concept of ‘third country’ in EU therefore cannot be 
equated with that of ‘third state’ anymore. With this judgement the Commission got an 
important competence to run its own foreign policy, even if opposed by some Member States 
having formally veto right in design of foreign policy. 
I will not go further into details about the legal specificities of the EU external relations as it is 
a vast topic and, indeed, subject to a new discussion, however, to summarize we can say that 
the external dimensions of the EU internal policies are always a matter of EU internal 
competences, which can be exclusive, shared, parallel or “sui generis” as in the case of the 
CFSP.  
This dualist nature of EU external relations combined with the complex interdependence 
between different EU policies, often results in “tug-of-wars” between EU institutions and 
intergovernmental and supranational methods with regard to “occupying” a certain field. In the 
energy sector, even with a shared pre-emptive competence externally, the Member States 
remain competent to enter into contractual relations bilaterally, to the extent that they are 
considered integral to deciding their national energy mixes, as stated in article 194(2) TFEU 
(2012)9. Due to this discretion attributed to them by the Lisbon Treaty, the legal certainty I nteh 
area of energy and the effectiveness of the internal energy market are often put aside due to 
national interests.  
As we have seen in the previous sub-chapter, the existence of Article 194 in EU primary law 
widens the scope of EU energy policy, which was solely market-oriented, to one that also 
encompasses the politics and diplomacy of energy security. Therefore, the central goals of the 
EU energy policy (security, competitiveness, and sustainability) are now explicitly declared in 
the Lisbon Treaty. The thread running through the three dimensions of EU energy policy, 
which are closely intertwined, is that the Union seeks to gain its secure and affordable 
                                                          
9 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012). 
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(competitive) energy through market-based mechanism, combined with a regulatory approach 
(Van Vooren & Wessel, 2014). This rules-based approach characterizes EU internal as well as 
external energy policy, and security, competitiveness and sustainability are simultaneously 
tools and objectives: as there is a strong belief at EU level that a well-functioning market 
contributes to energy security, lack of the security of supply destabilizes the whole market, 
energy efficiency decreases import dependence thus increasing security, and finally, law 
represents the instrument for attaining these cross-cutting objectives (ibid, 2014, p.444).  
However, challenges to attaining these goals are multiple. Van Vooren identifies three main 
challenges that the EU faces internally in realizing its energy policy, which according to him 
are of vertical, horizontal/substantive and institutional character. To illustrate how these 
challenges, affect the security of supply, which will be our subject of interest, we can give 
several examples for each one of them: Vertical challenges that we have briefly touched upon 
above arise between Member States mainly due to the existence of the derogation concerning 
the energy mixes in article 194(2). Such is e.g. the tendency to protect the interest of national 
champions as national interest or the lack of solidarity between Member States along with 
nationally-centered choices, which arguably undermine the duty of sincere cooperation. 
Horizontal challenges are the ones related to substantive questions, such as concerns over 
strategic acquisitions, interconnecting infrastructure, reliable flow of energy in the EU and 
decreasing EU demand and vulnerable dependence. Finally, institutional challenges are 
illustrated by the Council where Member States national interests are being strongly defended, 
along with the presence of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 
(HR) who leads the EEAS and is also the President of the Foreign Affairs Council and the 
Vice-President of the European Commission. 
The EU has tried to address these challenges at different stages. In May 2006 the Commission 
and the Secretary-General/High Representative presented to the European Council, the joint 
report “An external policy to serve Europe’s energy interests” explaining how EU could use 
its external relations, including CFSP as an effective manner to reach the three objectives of 
energy policy. According to the document: [an EU external relations policy on energy] must 
be coherent (backed up by all Union policies, the Member States and industry), must be 
strategic (fully recognizing the geo-political dimensions of energy-related security issues) and 
must be focused (geared towards initiatives where Union-level action can have a clear impact 
in furthering its interests). Apart from this I shall be consistent with other EU's broader foreign 
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policy objectives like: conflict prevention and resolution, promoting human rights and non-
proliferation (The Commission and the Secretary General/High Representative, 2006, p.1,2). 
This was unfolding the dilemma between the choice of purely market-based approach in 
external energy policy versus the geopolitical and strategic dimension focused approach which 
would be largely influenced by the relations with producer and transit countries (Van Vooren 
& Wessel, EU External Relations Law, Cases and Materials, 2014, p. 448). Thus, an energy 
policy based on political or strategic rationales compared to one based on purely economic and 
commercial considerations. At a later stage we will observe which trajectory the EU opted for 
in the search for its foreign energy policy.    
4.2 External dimension of EU energy policy 
In the beginning of this chapter, it is important to stress that the EU strictly names its foreign 
energy policy as “external energy policy”. Such a wording seems less problematic in 
comparison to competences of nation states over their foreign policy. As it will be seen further 
in the text, this external dimension is “slowly spilling over” into at least elements of pure 
foreign energy policy. 
As stated by Goran Floridan “EU Member States were actually always hesitant to create 
common European energy policy.” (Floridan 2017, p.28). Even more this is relevant for foreign 
energy policy. While the EU finds its origins in energy cooperation, the current external 
cooperation of the EU and its Member States with respect to energy is still weak. One might 
even define it as the only area where the EU could not reach the shared vision of 1950s and has 
proved to be the field of lesser integration. For a long time, the European Union did not have 
an energy policy as such. It had a competition policy for electricity and gas on internal market, 
later combined with measures aligned with the EU’s climate policy. There was no concrete 
foreign policy dimension (Andoura & Vinois, 2015, p. 21). For this reason back in 2001 in its 
Green Paper on energy security, the European Commission underlined the fact that the “Union 
suffers from having no competence and no community cohesion in energy matters” (European 
Commission, 2016), particularly compared to more unified EU climate policies. 
Two main pillars of the EU foreign energy policy, which are energy security and climate 
change, have strikingly different progress. While the EU has an increasingly leading role in 
climate change mitigation and enjoys considerable backing of Member States in setting the 
global climate change agenda, energy security remains highly problematic. The Union (being 
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the biggest energy customer in the world) still struggles to achieve tangible progress in 
reducing its vulnerability with regard to energy dependence. The main concern voiced in the 
2007 First Strategic Energy Review prepared by the Commission stressed the main concern 
related to too excessive external vulnerability to imported hydrocarbons. Even though the EU 
competences in this area are shared with the Member States, energy security (security of 
supply) considerations are still largely being framed in national sovereignty terms. That is the 
reason why the external dimension of the EU energy policy is perceived as a search of a 
common external approach how to decrease the Union’s dependence on foreign suppliers 
(Schubert et al, 2016, p.18).  
Russia has for decades been a reliable supplier of gas. Therefore, the European Security 
Strategy from 2003 mentioned gas delivery risk as a concern but far lower compared to 
terrorism and other risks. Disputes over gas prices between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 
particularly in 2009 which caused longer interruption of gas supply, brought security of supply 
to the top of EU’s energy policy agenda  (European External Action Service, 2016).  
Also further enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, moved security of supply forward in 
the list of EU’s energy policy priorities. This was largely due to the painful experience the 
newly joined Member States had while dealing with Russian energy exports. The latter, after 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, started increasingly using its energy resources as a major 
foreign policy tool. The strategy has been simple: countries agreeing with Moscow’s foreign 
policy agenda were benefitting from favorable energy prices. Contrarily to that, those who tried 
to disagree with Russian interests would suffer from energy supply disruptions. It was in the 
2000s that the Russian politicization of energy trade increased meaningfully. The number of 
politically motivated gas supply cuts was growing over the years reaching almost 40 cases 
between 2000 and 2006, which were mostly targeted to CIS and CEE countries. (Grigas, 2012, 
p.4) 
The external dimension of EU energy policy, like many other policies, emerged from the crises. 
The trigger of the principal debate on the European energy security, became the two 
consecutive gas crises in Ukraine in 2006 and 2009. Officially, the disputes took place between 
Gazprom, Russian gas incumbent and Naftogaz, Ukrainian gas incumbent over the pricing and 
usage of gas transiting through Ukraine to supply the European Union via the Brotherhood 
pipeline system (amounting to 30 % of the collective EU gas imports) (Directorate-General for 
External Policies, 2016, p. 39).  The core problem of these disputes lied in the growing 
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difference between subsidized prices of Russian gas, paid sum for transit and outstanding 
Ukrainian payments. Sensitive and deteriorating relations between Moscow and Kiev also 
added to the complexity of disputes, since Ukraine showed a dedication to have more ambitious 
relationship with the European Union. Namely, the year 2008 was marked by the launch of 
negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and the EU as well as the 
presentation of the Polish initiative of the Eastern Partnership to the EU's General Affairs and 
External Relations Council in May 2008, which tried to create the appropriate conditions to 
enhance political association and further economic integration between the EU and interested 
post-Soviet partner countries, among them Ukraine. Consequently, Moscow, worried about 
EU’s attempts to extend its influence deep into the former Soviet Union, started using coercive 
measures against Ukraine by the means of natural gas supply disruptions, in order to dissuade 
and prevent Kiev from getting closer to the European Union. This escalated in early 2009 when 
Russia interrupted the gas supply to Ukraine for two weeks, what left several EU Member 
States without gas supplies in one of the coldest months of the season. To illustrate the scope 
and gravity of the disruption in numbers, as a result of the shutdown of the Brotherhood 
pipeline system, only 20 % of Russia’s natural daily gas exports to Europe actually arrived to 
its final destination (European Commission, 2013, p. 15). 
Thus, the sought for alternative energy supply sources to reduce the dependence on Russia - 
the unreliable supplier and the insecure route of Ukraine, became the main reason in the 
development of EU-wide foreign energy policy. This was initially reflected in the Green Paper 
of 2006 entitled “A European Strategy for Sustainability, Competitive and Secure Energy”, 
where the EU for the first time suggested a “coherent external energy policy”. In the paper EU 
identified six priority areas (competitiveness and the internal energy market, solidarity driven 
crisis management, sustainable development, technological innovation, climate friendly 
diversification of the energy mix, and the common EU external energy policy) (European 
Commission, 2006, pp. 4-5). 
Unlike oil, which is not part of the EU energy policy due to less worries with regard to the 
liquidity of oil markets, natural gas supply has traditionally been constrained and defined by 
infrastructure and geographical proximity. This lack of flexibility created vulnerable 
dependencies between producers and consumers which in the case of the EU became 
increasingly apparent. Also this vulnerable dependence on Russian gas supplies, coupled with 
the predicted increase in demand for the foreseeable future, showed the Union that the 
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challenges related to energy security could not be addressed nationally. Thus, in the last decade 
the need for a unified EU external energy policy for ensuring Union-wide security of supply 
became a pressing issue. 
The Communication published by the Commission back in 2011 on security of energy supply 
and international cooperation entitled “The EU Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners beyond 
our Border” brought up four priorities to additionally develop an external energy policy (ibid, 
2011, pp.6-7). These priorities, which were later also approved by the Council were better 
coordination on external policy in the energy field, emphasizing the need that EU cooperates 
with non-EU countries, the importance of stronger energy partnerships and support to the 
developing economies. These actions, realized through different instruments by the EU, remain 
the cornerstone of today’s European foreign energy policy. The Commission achieved some 
major breakthroughs on several goals in the field of external energy policy since 2011. To list 
some, it managed to sign Association Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia where 
key energy provisions were also included. Furthermore, the Commission participated in the 
initiative to add a Protocol on electricity to the EU-Switzerland Free Trade Agreement10  It 
helped in reaching a consensus on  legal framework regarding the trans-Caspian natural gas 
pipeline system with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan (Schubert et al., 2016, p.218). On the 
southern flank, it concluded a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Algeria and back 
in 2013 opened negotiation related to the establishment of an Energy Community with the 
members of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) (Union for the Mediterranean, 2014). In 
international relationships with partners like the US, China and OPEC, the EU pursued a goal 
of strengthening the alliances. The Commission also turned to Russia with initiatives like the 
EU-Russia Permanent Partnership Council (PPC) on Energy and the EU-Russia Energy 
Dialogue (Schubert et al., 2016, p.218). Moreover, the EU has been trying to overcome the 
limits of its internal market using export of rules and diplomacy.  This was happening through 
multilateral agreements and programs like the Energy Charter, Black Sea Synergy, Euro-
Mediterranean Cooperation, and importantly, with engagement in international institutions, 
like the Energy Community, the WTO and the International Energy Agency, where the EU 
tries to pursue common standards for investment protection and deliveries (Schubert et al., 
2016, p.214). However, in such multilateral fora, the EU often faces challenges in coordinating 
common positions. Internally, the progressive inclusion of energy issues at the EU Foreign 
                                                          
10 The FTA is the cornerstone of EU-Swiss relations since 1972. As a consequence of the rejection of EEA 
membership in 1992 by the Swiss people, Switzerland and the EU agreed on sectoral agreements in various areas. 
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Affairs Council with the assistance of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and the 
European External Actions Service (EEAS) was a step forward. Nevertheless, despite energy 
policy gained an important strategic-external dimension, the latter still remains strongly 
controlled by Member States largely due to their autonomy over national energy mixes, which 
translates into independent bilateral relationships with foreign suppliers.  
The above mentioned examples sketch out the progress that the EU made in implementing its 
foreign energy policy. Below, I describe the instruments that the EU uses to realize its external 
energy policy objectives, while demonstrating the pertaining successes and shortfalls.  
4.2.1 Instruments of EU foreign energy policy  
The three main instruments of EU foreign energy policy can be identified: First, the EU internal 
market legislation which has a significant external legal and policy dimension (currently placed 
under the umbrella of the Energy Union). Second, the multilateral legally binding instruments, 
like the Energy Charter, the European Economic Area Agreement and the Energy Community 
Treaty. Lastly, the vast number of binding as well as non-binding bilateral agreements put in 
place between the EU and third countries.  
The subsequent discussion will present in further detail the three different instruments of the 
EU foreign energy policy, namely the Energy Union based on objectives such as security of 
supply, sustainability and competitiveness and on its external dimension; followed by the EU 
multilateral efforts, among which the Energy Community stands out as the most successful 
framework and finally, various bilateral instruments which remain preponderant in the EU’s 
energy relations.  
4.2.2 The external aspects of the Energy Union 
The famous five dimensions of the Energy Union begin with energy security, solidarity and 
trust which go together; followed by a energy efficiency contributing to moderation of demand; 
fully integrated European energy market; research innovation and competitiveness; 
decarbonization of the economy. The Energy Union, the flagship initiative of the Junker 
Commission and the number two priority, builds on the existing energy policy of the European 
Union, namely the three key objectives of market liberalization (since 1996), energy security 
(after the major crises: 1957 for uranium, 1973 for oil and 2009 for gas) and mitigating climate 
change (following the 1997 Kyoto Protocol) (Pellerin-Carlin, 2017, p. 69). The Energy Union 
itself as a concept first appeared in a 2010 proposal of Jacques Delors and Jerzy Buzek entitled 
“European Energy Community”. The idea was rediscovered back in 2014 by then Polish Prime 
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Minister Donald Tusk with a strengthened focus on energy security, which was the most 
problematic dimension. In his opinion paper published by the Financial Times back in 2014, 
Tusk was arguing that if the EU’s 28 members were jointly buying uranium for their nuclear 
power plants through the EU’s atomic energy agency, Euratom, they should have adopted the 
same approach vis-à-vis natural gas thus ending Russia’s energy stranglehold (Tusk, 2014). “I 
therefore propose an energy union. It will return the European project to its roots”, wrote 
Donald Tusk. Aside other ‘unions’ such as the Economic and Monetary Union, the Banking 
Union, the Digital Union and more possibly to be created, the title of the Energy Union seemed 
most relevant. However, from the outset there were considerable hesitations about the viability 
of Tusk’s proposal due to the differentiated dependence of Member States on Russian gas.  
We shall discuss the Energy Union with a particular focus on its first dimension, energy 
security, which indeed is the main trigger of its genesis and which has important external 
implications. The main subject of the energy security dimension is natural gas, as unlike oil it 
is not a fully globalized and easily transported liquid commodity. Thus, as we discussed above, 
foreign powers remain in a position to threaten Europe’s sovereignty through intimidations of 
cutting natural gas supplies. Besides these external concerns, security of supply remains the 
Achilles’ heel of Europe also internally. This is primarily due to the lack of agreement between 
the Member States on a question how to reach security of supply. The absence of common 
agreement can be attributed to reasons such as: differences between the structures of the energy 
markets of Member States, dissimilar dependence on imported hydrocarbons, varied relations 
with natural gas exporting countries or even transit fees. The latter, for instance, forms an issue 
of disagreement between Member States as for some transit countries such tariffs are a 
considerable source of revenue. Thus, the realization of the single energy market (which would 
only be possible by abolishing transit tariffs and creating a common external energy trade 
policy) would happen at the expense of their respective transit revenues. Nevertheless, this 
barrier is easier to overcome compared to challenges of geopolitical character. Namely, the 
different relations that Member States have with Russia, which also due to the fragmented 
European energy market, allowed Gazprom to indulge in price discrimination at will. For 
example, contrary to any rational commercial logic, the natural gas prices for customers closer 
to Moscow were usually higher than those farther away (with the noticeable exception of 
Belarus) (Riley A. , 2015, p. 5).  
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According to the “Energy Union Framework Strategy” published by the European Commission 
in 2015, it largely builds on the existing objectives of the EU energy policy while purporting a 
comprehensive energy strategy. The biggest novelty is a particular focus on the interests of 
consumers and the population in general, whose opinions in making energy decisions have 
largely been overlooked in the past decades (with the exception of views vis-à-vis nuclear 
energy) (Pellerin-Carlin, 2017, p. 72). Among the more concrete and deliverable goals 
identified with regard to its first dimension are increased powers of the Commission in 
negotiating intergovernmental energy-supply agreements, strengthened focus on regional 
electricity and gas markets, along with improved interconnectivity. 
The Energy Union took a lead working on energy security of EU both in its internal and 
external dimensions. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy 
for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy states that EU will pursue the following 
ideas of the Energy Union: to diversify its energy sources, suppliers and routes, especially for 
the gas (European External Action Service, 2016, pp. 22-23). Below I will present the 
implementation record of the energy security related objectives which do not seem as ambitious 
as initially the Commission declared.  
In the framework under the umbrella of the Energy Union, novel proposals were introduced to 
the first European Energy Security Strategy adopted by the Commission back in 2014. This 
concerned new rules for EU gas supply security to ensure better cross-border cooperation, new 
rules for energy agreements between EU and non-EU countries and more solidarity in case of 
crisis. Moreover, for short-term security measures, the EU managed to adopt objectives on 
storing oil and gas in sufficient quantities to avoid short-term problems, however, for long-
term security, strengthening the EU cohesion for an efficient EU energy diplomacy remains 
challenging.  
The EU has repeatedly acknowledged the particular importance of the of the Energy Union’s 
external dimension and that the objectives thereof must be supported by a corresponding EU 
foreign and energy policy action. This has been highlighted in the Energy Diplomacy Action 
Plan, launched by the EU’s foreign policy chief, Federica Mogherini in 2015, in order to ensure 
that Europe can “speak with one voice” (Council of the European Union, 2015, pp. 3,7) or at 
least deliver a single message, albeit through multiple voices. The main idea behind the energy 
diplomacy is to challenge the status quo according to which Europe falls victim to divide-and-
rule tactics pursued by major natural gas supply companies, such as Gazprom, with which 
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bigger EU countries, such as Germany, are able to secure better deals than smaller ones, like 
Lithuania. Therefore, if commonly agreed actions and messages can be put in practice, Europe, 
being a large market and of increasing interest to energy-exporting states, would have a better 
negotiating position. Many scholars, however, remain skeptical about the success of the Energy 
Diplomacy Action Plan as the EU has few means at its disposal to keep Member States in check 
diplomatically (De Jong & Wouters, 2015).  
In parallel to Joe Biden’s redefinition of energy security including threat of climate changes 
just after his inauguration also the EU expanded its definition of energy diplomacy while 
covering the energy security: “… the nature of energy security is evolving from concerns about 
access to fossil fuels at affordable prices sourced on volatile markets, towards the need to secure 
access to the critical raw materials and technologies necessary for the energy transition whilst 
avoiding new dependencies, as well as ensuring resilient supply chains, cybersecurity and the 
protection and climate adaptation …on the way towards a climate neutral world…”. (Council 
of the European Union, 2021) 
Indeed, the effectiveness of diplomatic actions seems as wishful thinking, especially when 
Member States have been circumventing EU secondary legislation (Decision 994/2012/EU) 
obliging them to set up a mechanism of sharing information related to intergovernmental 
agreements with third countries in the energy sector. The mechanism, which was initially 
introduced in 2012, was entailing a binding obligation of information and consultation 
(potentially ex ante or ex post authorization) between the Union and Member States and was 
the formal manifestation of the obligation to cooperate which is prescribed in the Treaty Article 
4(3) TEU. However, since the difference between consultation, information exchange and 
authorization is rather thin, and especially in light of the shared pre-emptive competence in 
foreign energy policy, along with the freedom of EU countries to decide on the mix of their 
energy supply, the impact of such kinds of instruments is rather debatable. Furthermore, the 
Decision was lacking clarity with regard to when the obligation of information and consultation 
was arising and also it was concerning only legally binding intergovernmental agreements, 
thus, leaving aside non-binding MoUs, which presently constitute the major instruments of 
bilateral energy cooperation.  
Due to these considerable flaws and in order to reach the Energy Union’s goal of the “energy 
security, solidarity and trust”, the Decision (994/2012/EU) was amended in 2017. The new 
Decision (EU) 2017/684 encompasses also non-binding instruments on cooperation between 
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Member States and third countries: i.e. different types of memoranda of understanding, joint 
political statements but not commercial contracts between entities. The latter are a part of  a 
renewed regulation dealing with security of gas supply (European Parliament and the Council, 
2017). Importantly, the amended directive requires ex-ante obligation of notification and the 
obligation to send a draft agreement for ex-ante verification to the Commission. The wording 
in regard to non-binding agreements remains rather weak stating that Member States “may 
notify” them to the Commission before or after the adoption, which reflects the Council’s 
attempt to leave more flexibility to Member States. The amended Decision certainly represents 
a step forward in delivering on the main objectives as identified in the Energy Union’s energy 
security dimension. However, it still remains to be seen how the Decision will influence current 
and future intergovernmental agreements with regard to ensuring their compatibility with the 
Union law as well as how far the Commission would go to effectively condemn a state that 
fails to respect EU law. 
Another important goal with regard to the Energy Union’s external dimension is to strengthen 
regional energy markets. According to the Commission’s Communication “the Energy Union 
is not an inward-looking project”. Indeed, the engagement with neighboring countries is 
inevitable to guarantee the sufficient security of supply inside the EU, as it strengthens the 
resilience of the energy system. Therefore, the Commission was putting emphasis on the 
importance to build up such regional energy markets as it can be seen in case of the Energy 
Community. This process ensured the effective implementation of the EU's acquis in energy, 
environment and competition, energy market reforms and incentivizing investments in the 
energy sector (European Commission, 2016, p. 7). Created back in 2005 by the EU together 
with its eight south eastern neighbors, the Energy Community will be discussed in more detail 
at a later stage. However, prior to that I will provide an assessment of where the Union is 
standing regarding its stated objective of deeper integration of the energy markets of Energy 
Community with those of EU. 
The European Council committed in March 2015 to “developing a more effective, flexible 
market design which should go together with enhanced regional co-operation, including with 
neighboring countries.” (Council of the European Union, 2015). This objective was once again 
reiterated by the European Parliament, which, recognizing the role of the Energy Community 
in creating a pan-European energy space (European Parliament, 2015, p. 8), stated that the 
Energy Union reflected multiple calls to establish a true pan-European Energy Community, 
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based on a strong common energy market. (European Parliament, 2015, p. 8). Therefore, the 
Energy Community was seen as an integral element of the European energy market, where the 
proclaimed Energy Union aimed to “establish a free flow of energy across EU and Energy 
Community countries.” (ibid, 2015, p.15). Finally, in the Parliament’s view, the Energy 
Community, plays in the EU’s external energy policy a pivotal arm (ibid, 2015, p.15), and 
needs to be strengthened to be able to meet the external objectives of the Energy Union. The 
European Parliament invited the Commission to put forward concrete proposals for its reform.  
Despite these ambitious objectives set in the framework of the Energy Union, the actions 
undertaken by the EU fell short of the declared goals and were even opposite as explained in 
the further text. In contrast with the initially stated Pan-European approach with regard to the 
Energy Union, the initiatives taken until today prove to be more inward-looking.  
The difficulty for the EU institutions to deliver on the declared objectives can be attributed to 
the shortcomings related to the external governance of the Energy Union. The concept of 
governance can be understood differently by different people. According to the Regulation on 
the Governance of the Energy Union (2018)11, the concept of governance is defined as a 
“process of assessment of policies and measures at various levels to establish if they are 
coherent, complementary and sufficiently ambitious”. In my understanding, governance means 
“alignment of institutions, countries and groupings to better enforce a particular policy”. Thus, 
for the Energy Union to have a true Pan-European dimension, it is important to ensure the 
coherence of relevant policies and measures at the EU level, increased coordination between 
the EU and the Energy Community institutions as well as strengthening of the institutional 
framework of the Energy Community to ensure proper enforcement of the relevant measures 
outside the EU. Yet, in reality one can easily notice a lack of these elements by looking at EU 
and Energy Community relations. The subsequent discussion will serve to illustrate this by 
different examples, such as the foot-dragging of the EU to initiate reforms aimed at 
strengthening Energy Community governance to better enforce its rules, coupled with the 
                                                          
11 Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the 
Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, amending Regulations (EC) No 663/2009 and (EC) No 
715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Directives 94/22/EC, 98/70/EC, 2009/31/EC, 
2009/73/EC, 2010/31/EU, 2012/27/EU and 2013/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council 
Directives 2009/119/EC and (EU) 2015/652 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 525/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council. Official Journal of the European Union. 
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reluctance of the Commission to ensure a level playing field - an essential condition to create 
a Pan-European energy market. 
The need to amend the Energy Community Treaty, by providing an appropriate framework for 
creating an integrated market and a single regulatory space, has been acknowledged multiple 
times by the EU institutions. Arguably the greatest weakness of the Energy Community has 
been its enforcement/dispute settlement mechanism. Already back in 2011 the European 
Commission stated that the regulatory scope needs to be supported with more effective 
implementation and enforcement (European Commission, 2011). The need of adapting the 
institutional setting of the Energy Community to future challenges has been acknowledged by 
all the EU institutions even before the Report of the High Level Reflection Group was 
published in 2014. The Group, chaired by the former President of the European Parliament 
Jerzy Buzek identified, as a major obstacle to the effective implementation of the EU acquis in 
the Contracting Parties the same absence of a functioning enforcement mechanism (High Level 
Reflection Group, 2014, p. 11). Thus, it has been argued that “a refurbishment of the 
institutional architecture [was] necessary, in particular to enable the enforcement of the far-
reaching commitments the Parties accepted under the Treaty.” (High Level Reflection Group, 
2014, p. 12). 
Indeed the current dispute settlement/enforcement procedure of the Energy Community suffers 
from multiple flaws such as the fact that decision-making under the current procedure is 
politically biased and not exercised by jurists; the inadequacy of the sanctions regime for 
deterring the Parties from violating the Treaty; the inability to provide investors with proper 
protection and reliability as well as the fact that it falls short of similar integration agreements 
(Buschle, 2016, p. 30). The discussion on the shortcomings can be further elaborated, however, 
here I will focus on one particular aspect, namely the discrepancy between the Energy 
Community institutional framework and that of similar organizations based on the concept of 
exporting EU law and expanding the internal market. The most relevant point of reference here 
would be the European Economic Area (EEA), established through an agreement between the 
EU Member States and the three EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway). Equally 
as in the case of the Energy Community, the EEA agreement, while being more wide-ranging, 
requires the participating EFTA States to commit themselves to implement the EU acquis, inter 
alia, in the field of energy, environment, and competition. Thus, rules of substance following 
from the two agreements largely overlap, however, the approach to enforcement differs 
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substantially. Unlike the EEA agreement, the Energy Community does not reproduce the EU’s 
institutional model but rather opted for common institutions with supranational powers over all 
Parties, namely, the EU and the Contracting Parties alike (Kopac & Buschle, 2017, p. 207). 
While in the case of the Energy Community the enforcement discretion was given to the 
Ministerial Council, which is both a non-permanent institution and a political one, the EEA, 
following the rejection of a common EEA court by the ECJ, opted for the creation of an EFTA 
Court for the three EFTA States with similar competences as the EU Court of Justice. The latter 
applies the same remedies as the ECJ, such as: infringement actions, actions for annulment, 
actions for the failure to act, actions for damages and preliminary references, and in order to 
ensure judicial homogeneity uses the case law of the ECJ as a point of reference. Contrarily to 
this, the Energy Community represents the sole organization exporting EU law to third 
countries and applying only one remedy – the infringement procedure, without a court 
(Buschle, 2016, p. 37). Thus, the need to address this abnormality, along with the need to 
introduce direct actions as in the case of EU and EEA law to ensure that binding measures 
affecting individuals have judicial counterbalance, becomes increasingly pertinent in light of 
the growing body of Energy Community acquis. Finally, considering the fact that unlike the 
EFTA States, the Contracting Parties of the Energy Community find themselves in a more 
fragile environment, which is characterized by embedded mistrust between key actors as well 
as a low standards of the rule of law, the enforcement on the level of the Energy Community 
should, logically, be stronger and not weaker than in the case of the EU and the EEA (ibid, 
2016, p.40).  
The creation of a court arguably seems as the boldest reform considering the foot-dragging of 
the Commission to initiate the process of strengthening the Energy Community, which was 
also raised in the framework of the Energy Union Package. However, it seems as the most 
effective measure allowing the Energy Community to accomplish the significant mission it was 
given and also ensure the Pan-European nature of the Energy Union.  
4.3 Promoting multilateral efforts in a non-multilateral world of energy  
If the EU internal energy regulatory design is largely defined by the rule of law and stable legal 
surrounding to stimulate investments, in external energy policy this translates into attempts to 
promote multilateralism, i.e. creating international legal frameworks within which market 
principles could organize supplies of energy at affordable prices (European Commission, 2006, 
p.7). However, in the world of energy relations this can seem as a herculean task mainly due 
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to the complex nature of the international energy market and the lack of a global legal 
framework organizing these relations. Thus, before moving to the discussion on the multilateral 
instruments of the EU energy policy, firstly the context in which these efforts are taking place 
is worthy of more detailed consideration.   
The international energy market is far from being perfect. It is influenced by speculations and 
clashing political interests as a result of which the prices tend to be volatile and the smooth 
flow of supply at times disrupted. Thus, every energy policy should be understood in 
geopolitical terms.  
Energy resources are not evenly distributed, therefore, geography plays a fundamental role in 
giving an insight into the greater international energy game. For a brief illustration, Australia 
and Canada are the two biggest suppliers of uranium core in the world. Major coal producers 
are US, EU, Russia, India, Indonesia and China. Most of the reserves of oil are accessible in 
the Middle East, even though large amounts of unconventional oil had been discovered in the 
US, Canada and Russia). Russia, Qatar and Iran are the countries, where natural gas mostly 
comes from (Schubert et al., 2016, p.206). 
Taking into account very limited natural gas reserves available on its own territory the EU has 
to secure natural gas reserves outside its borders (EIA, 2020). EU members such as Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom (as of 2019) together possess only 2.2 
trillion cubic meters of proven natural gas reserves and these amount to only 4 % of the world’s 
resources. To meet EU’s gas demand the pipeline networks, the quantity and capacity of the 
LNG import terminals and the competition over the resources to feed these infrastructures are 
vital. The EU’s closest gas suppliers are right outside its borders: Norway, Algeria, and Russia. 
For the EU to be able to use resources in the Caspian or even Middle Eastern regions (especially 
from Iraq and Iran), first the fourth corridor to the south-east has to be built and Trans Anatolian 
and Trans Adriatic Pipeline as its first section is already completed. However, compared to the 
acquisition of Caspian gas resources, the ones of Iraq and Iran are considerably constrained by 
political challenges (Schubert et al., 2016, p.204). 
The EU is positioned in the midst of highly competitive area over energy resources. For 
example, the Caspian region which is abundant in oil and natural gas, due to its location 
surrounded by powerful neighbors such as Russia, Iran or China is a place of constant political 
manipulation. The US is not absent from this game either as for Washington the independence 
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of the Central Asian region is seen as a way to contain Russian and Iranian influences over it. 
Similar situation is happening in Africa, where companies from China, Russia, US, India and 
EU are competing to control access to resources and secure their own energy deliveries 
(Schubert et al., 2016, p.209). Thus, energy relations are often being understood in terms of 
regional clashes and fight for domination and control. 
In addition to the geographical aspects, energy relations are increasingly political. Some 40, 50 
years ago privately owned companies controlled majority of global oil resources. Today the 
number of private energy companies controlling oil and natural gas resources is very few and, 
besides, they face competition from state owned conglomerates, such as Russian Gazprom or 
Chinese CNOOC, with whom they have to compete not only for resources but also for 
distribution facilities (Schubert et al., 2016, p.210). In this context, the activities of the state-
energy companies are aligned with the foreign policies of their respective governments and the 
competition between them is not an ordinary matter of market economics but rather of world 
geopolitics, where regionalization takes over multilateralism.   
Finally, the underlying nature of energy relations is its interdependent nature. The motivations 
of suppliers and customers are similar, as both seek to secure stable contracts. Yet, if the latter 
focus on the security of supply, the former look for the security of sales and, usually, prefer 
looser market regulation. Furthermore, countries which own and operate big energy companies 
increasingly rely on energy revenues for considerable turnout of their GDP. Their political 
elites typically share common features of corruption and lack of transparency. Hence, the EU 
as a customer, in its choice of suppliers faces ethical dilemmas related to governance standards, 
as eventually this contributes to the power and endurance of corrupt political elites in these 
countries.  
The complex environment of global energy relations described above inherently goes against 
the notion of multilateralism, where the respect of the rule of law, global norms and 
transparency is fundamental. Thus, the discrepancy between countries who attempt to create 
universal laws for dealing with exploration and trade with energy resources and those who 
prefer the status quo in order to continue using energy as a geopolitical foreign policy tool is 
clear-cut. After unfolding the non-multilateral world of energy relations, the remaining part of 




4.3.1 Direct export of internal rules    
The EU participates in different venues in order to secure its energy interests such as the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and G20 
summits, to mention some, and tries to combine bilateral and multilateral efforts in its energy 
relations. Whereas with some countries like Russia or Azerbaijan the EU employs traditional 
economic statecraft (while also striving to establish better communication), on the multilateral 
level it attempts to externalize its internal energy market rules.   
The EU has also been actively engaged in exporting its internal energy market rules abroad. 
First efforts of this kind date back to the early 1990s when in light of the post-Cold war euphoria 
the EU proposed the idea of the Energy Charter Treaty, which was a first manifestation of the 
EU’s market-based approach towards the wider world. The main idea was to bring Eastern and 
Western Europe closer in the energy sector on the basis of key economic principles such as 
open-markets, non-discrimination and access to FDI. While in general the Energy Charter 
Treaty aimed at establishing long-term East-West energy cooperation, in particular, it was a 
response to the need of a mechanism to create Western investors’ confidence for the energy 
resources exploration on the post-Soviet Union territories. In such context, the European 
Energy Charter was signed in 1991 as a political declaration by 48 countries and two 
international organizations. Three years later, the Energy Charter Treaty was adopted in Lisbon 
providing a legal framework for governmental market-based energy measures and policies, 
thus becoming the first intergovernmental agreement covering all energy forms (oil, gas, 
electricity, nuclear, renewables) and all stages of the supply chain (Bonafe & Encke, 2015, 
p.539). Considering the context and political difficulties in having an energy-specific 
international agreement back then, the Energy Charter Treaty was a success of European 
multilateralism (Leal-Arcas & Filis, 2015, p.569). The stated purpose behind the 1994 Energy 
Charter Treaty was to create a legal framework in order to promote long-term cooperation in 
the energy field (Art. 2) by the means of liberalized energy markets, chiefly, based on 
investment protection in economically depressed Eurasian countries with rich energy 
resources. The primary focus has been on investment protection and dispute resolution, 
although the framework covers multilateral cooperation over transit, trade, and energy 
efficiency. Arguably, a more critical reading of the Energy Charter Treaty suggests that beyond 
the official purpose, its actual aim was to enhance the energy security in European economies 
by, inter alia, setting the norms to promote the opening-up of post-Soviet countries and their 
energy sectors to external players exploiting the energy resources (ibid, 2015, p.569). Despite 
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the fact that the signatories are legally equal, due to the disparities between their economies, 
the benefits, like investment protection in the energy sector, are very much likely to flow 
asymmetrically and thus, favoring economies, with developed energy exploration (upstream) 
sectors (ibid, 2015, p.569). The Energy Charter Treaty represented a timely response from the 
part of the EU to significant geostrategic developments, such as the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. It was designed in order to integrate the previously heavily regulated Eurasian 
economies in a framework of energy cooperation with Western Europe. Also it managed to 
have a significant geographical reach spanning outside Europe and included members such as 
Japan and Mongolia. However, its major flaw is the absence of Russia, the key energy player 
on the European continent, which never ratified the Treaty and eventually withdrew from it in 
2009. The Energy Charter Treaty also could not attract some major energy relevant economies, 
such as Canada and the United States. Finally, by contrast to the supra-national feature of the 
EU, any substantial and geographical development in the Energy Charter Treaty requires 
unanimity. Consequently, the EU was able to go faster and deeper in terms of energy market 
integration from 1996 onwards. Arguably the EU and the Energy Community (working on the 
extension of the acquis communautaire to South East Europe and Black Sea region) thus 
succeeded to develop internal regional market, while the umbrella of the Energy Charter 
Treaty, the latter acting as the legal framework to share EU market principles and rules with 
other regions of the world (Bonafare & Encke, 2015, p. 540), allowed to share only basic 
principles.  
Currently the Energy Charter Treaty is being renegotiated. EU Member States with ambitious 
climate policy objectives were more and more often sued by fossil fuel investors for banned 
projects on the territory of EU. Apart from that, the Energy Charter Treaty, once designed to 
protect investors from the EU abroad, became a major tool to undermine EU law. The majority 
of claims are intra-EU disputes, “66 per cent of investor lawsuits were brought by an investor 
from one EU member state against the government of another member state. In March 2018 
the European Court of Justice ruled that intra-EU investor-state proceedings under bilateral 
investment treaties violate EU law as they sideline EU courts” (Energy Charter Dirty Secrets, 
retrieved on 10 May 2020). Critics also claim that the Energy Charter Treaty is misused by 
mailbox companies without real economic activity in the country against which the lawsuit is 
brought. Obligation to respect the Energy Charter Treaty remains valid even up to 20 years 
after the signatory leaves the organization due to a special “sunset clause”. This was most 
probably the reason why the EU decided to renegotiate the content of the Treaty and not drop 
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it. The European Council on 15 July 2019 adopted negotiating directives to modernize the 
Energy Charter Treaty (Council of the European Union, 2019, p.3). According to the 
negotiating directives, the modernized Energy Charter Treaty should reflect ambitious climate 
change and clean energy transition goals of the EU, clarify definitions of covered investments 
and investors, allow signatories to take measures related to the environment or public morals, 
the protection of health, social or consumer protection, safety etc. This can be understood as 
an attempt to avoid intra-EU lawsuits (in accordance to the ruling of ECJ) and to protect 
signatories from lawsuits of fossil fuel investors in cases the state bans fossil fuel projects. Such 
a reaction is understandable since EU Member States seem being in a despair. On one side they 
are accused by domestic courts because of failing to adopt sufficient measures to protect 
climate while on the other side some investors slap them with lawsuits over their plans to end 
coal power, like it happened to Dutch government (1,4 billion EUR lawsuit) by German utility 
RWE in February 2021. 
One of the EU’s proposals to amend the Energy Charter Treaty is to impose the future 
Multilateral Investment Court as a place where disputes between investors and states would be 
discussed and judged. The European Commission in 2014 pledged for the replacement of the 
‘outdated' investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system that had governed most international 
investment agreements (IIA) so far. “The main concern is the complexity and the lack of 
predictability of ISDS decisions. Also, time-lengthy and costly procedures are viewed as a 
threat to smaller respondent countries which fear to bear such costs, but also prevent smaller 
private claimants to file claims.” (European Parliament, 2020, p.1). Additional issue is the 
impartiality of arbitrators often questioned because the appointment system allows to align 
interests of multinational companies and arbitrators. (ibid, 2020, p.1). 
The prevalent ISDS system is an arbitrator-based system that enables disputes to be settled 
whenever an investor (the claimant) considers that a State (the respondent) has infringed its 
obligations under relevant IIAs. Multilateral talks started in late 2017. Canada, Singapore, 
Vietnam and Mexico have already signed investment agreements with the EU that include a 
bilateral International Court System (ICS) but the court is not established yet. A number of the 
EU's major trading partners, including the US and Japan, express little support for the creation 
of a MIC. (ibid, 2020, p.1). 
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Some of the opponents to the ISDS system fear that the MIC will also not address the major 
concern related to IIAs: to prevent that multinational firms would claim massive compensations 
from States, maintaining a threat to their regulatory power. 
With the further development of the EU foreign energy policy, some more sophisticated 
examples of the rule transfer took place. For instance, the examples of the extensions of the EU 
regulatory boundary beyond the geographical scope of its formal membership, to different 
extents, are the European Economic Area (EEA), the Black Sea Synergy or the Eastern 
Partnership. While they focus on different regions, the underlying motives are common, as all 
of them try to integrate neighboring states into the EU’s internal market though liberalizing 
trade and externalizing European norms and standards. Certainly, energy, the main driving 
force for all economies, constitutes an important part of the internal market rules.  
The biggest success in expanding its regulations the EU reached in the countries of the EEA, 
which includes the key oil and gas supplier of the EU – Norway, as well as, to the south-eastern 
neighbors, via the means of the Energy Community Treaty (ECT). However, if the European 
Economic Area remains the most developed form of cooperation between the EU and non-EU 
countries, it was also the most predictable one, as the cooperation between the Member States 
of the then European Communities (EC) and other European countries, who decided to stay 
outside the EC, necessitated a common framework. Therefore, the signing of the EEA 
agreement between the two dominant western European trade blocs - involving the EU member 
states and the three European Free Trade Association countries (Iceland, Lichtenstein and 
Norway), sharing similar values and visions of the market economy, was a logical development 
of events. The EEA besides the free movement of goods, includes the free movement of 
persons, services and capital and the Agreement specifies that membership is open to member 
states of either the European Union or the European Free Trade Association.12  
                                                          
12 The provisions of the EEA Agreement include a rephrasing of the four freedoms as they have been constituted 
in the EC Treaty. However, the EEA Joint Committee continuously updates the EEA Agreement, which is one of 
its special features. The Agreement also consists of all necessary information on provisions concerning decision-
making procedures of the EU. The EEA Agreement provides for the inclusion of EU legislation in all policy areas 
of the single market. This covers the four freedoms as well as competition and state aid rules, but also the following 
horizontal policies: consumer protection, company law, environment, social policy, and statistics. In addition, the 
EEA Agreement provides for cooperation in several flanking policies such as research and technological 
development, education, training and youth, employment, tourism, culture, civil protection, enterprise, 
entrepreneurship and small and medium-sized enterprises. The EEA Agreement guarantees equal rights and 
obligations within the single market for citizens and economic operators in the EEA. 
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In contrast to the EEA, the Energy Community Treaty signed in 2006 was an attempt to export 
EU energy market legislation to a completely different context - a war-torn neighboring region, 
where the existence of the rule of law and regional cooperation were hard to imagine at the 
time. For this reason, the Energy Community is legitimately qualified as the most successful 
example of EU’s multilateral efforts in the energy field. In the view of the Energy Union, which 
according to its strategy was designed to have a pan-European dimension and intends to 
strengthen such regional energy markets as the Energy Community, I provide a critical 
assessment of where the EU is actually standing in this regard. In the same vein, I touch upon 
some institutional differences between the EEA and the ECT, along with the pending topic of 
the reform of the latter due to the discrepancy between the mission it needs to achieve and the 
legal and institutional framework that it has. Thus, I emphasized the urgency of strengthening 
the Energy Community and the fact that in light of the growing obligations, the discussion 
cannot be swept aside any more. The subsequent section will exclusively discuss the Energy 
Community and how it became a success story of EU external energy policy.  
4.3.2 The Energy Community: a success story of EU’s regional energy rules export 
The Energy Community, back in 2013 identified by the European Council as one of the most 
outstanding frameworks of the foreign policy, is, indeed, a success story of the EU and 
exemplary of what the EU pursues in its foreign policy. The aim of this regional multilateral 
agreement, signed by the European Community on the one hand, and Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYROM (the North Macedonia), Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and 
the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (Kosovo) on the other, was to establish an integrated 
pan-European market in electricity and natural gas. When the ECT entered into force back in 
2006, it was the result of culmination of years of efforts to support the strengthening of the rule 
of law on energy matters, which represented part of the EU’s response to the bloody wars of 
the 1990s in the Balkans.  
The Energy Community with its seat in Vienna can be defined as a classic case of 
neofunctionalist integration expressly modeled after the European Coal and Steel Community 
(Van de Graaf, 2017, p. 173). It is based on a highly developed binding treaty, which is not 
merely about multilateral cooperation, but - sectoral, regional integration. The Energy 
Community is equipped with the Secretariat and autonomous decision-making bodies, a 
(limited) dispute settlement mechanism and legal instruments in order to export and extend the 
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EU acquis communautaire in the areas of energy, competition, renewables and environment, 
to its neighbors.  
According to Renner (Renner (2009), p.10), the Commission’s officials which initiated the 
establishment of the Energy Community had in their mind the theory of neofunctionalism and 
intentionally copied an approach similar to the European Coal and Steel Community. 
Therefore, the theory was used to design the practice. 
The organizational structure is to a large extent similar to the one in the EU but indeed has even 
more neofunctionalist naming. Its Secretariat is a guardian of the Treaty, assists in donor 
coordination, cares about implementation of the Treaty (including initiating infringement 
procedures) and organizes administrative support. The Ministerial Council of the Energy 
Community is structured following the same logic as the European Council and is responsible 
for setting a direction for energy policy development. It is empowered with the same role in 
decision-making process and constitutes of one representative from each Contracting Party, 
one representative of the European Commission and one from a current EU Presidency. It can 
delegate some of its powers to the Permanent High Level Group (PHLG), the Secretariat or the 
Energy Community Regulatory Board. The PHLG prepares the documents for the Ministerial 
Council, and takes measures according to its competences. It comprises of the representatives 
of each Contracting Party and the European Commission on the behalf of the European Union. 
The organization has also several Fora to allow for decentralization and involvement of interest 
groups. 
The Treaty has a formal intergovernmental design. Nevertheless, the idea behind establishing 
the Energy Community was to create an institutional structure that has a potential to develop 
its supranational character through informal integration. Unlike Coreper in Brussels which 
meets at least once per week, the members of the PHLG are situated in capitals, the frequency 
of their meetings is lower and participants are usually lower officials from the Ministries. 
Therefore, spillover of discussions into areas not yet defined by the Treaty is limited, but exists. 
From the initial electricity and gas topics the scope of work widened to oil stocks, renewables, 
energy efficiency, energy related taxation, energy derivatives on financial markets, climate etc.  
The overall objective of the Energy Community was to create a stable market and regulatory 
framework to attract investments and ensure the continuous supply of gas and electricity, which 
is essential for economic development and social stability. Therefore, the initial idea was to 
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start revitalizing the war-torn south-east Europe through one, albeit, critical area by the means 
of ‘legally binding sectoral multilateralism’ (Blockmans & Van Vooren, 2012). While the 
symbolic parallel with the origins of the European Union was evident, the successful export of 
the acquis outside EU to countries with troubled socio-economic and legal environments was 
not undeniable (ibid, 2012). 
The Energy Community has shown considerable achievements since its creation and undergone 
significant change. While Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia became EU members, the 
organization managed to expand its geographical reach by also including countries of the Black 
Sea Region (Ukraine, Moldova and recently Georgia). This development essentially redefined 
the nature of the organization, which initially was conceived more as a waiting room or a sort 
of an EU pre-accession instrument for countries intended to join the Union in future. Thus, 
while initially, the Energy Community was firmly linking two policy areas of the EU, energy 
and enlargement, with the joining of the Black Sea countries the geographical and geopolitical 
scope of the organization moved further to the region which is not covered by the EU 
enlargement policy but the EU neighborhood policy (Kopac & Buschle, 2017, p. 205). With 
the new configuration the focus was further redirected to the security of supply, where countries 
of the Black Sea Region could play an important role. This priority was to a certain degree 
present even before, namely, through the initial attempt to connect the isolated EU Member 
State – Greece, with the rest of the Union, as well as, to safeguard the Southern Gas Corridor, 
a project with significant potential for EU’s long-standing security of supply and diversification 
aspirations. (ibid, 2017, p.205).  
The expansion of the territorial framework was accompanied with an increase in the regulatory 
scope of the Energy Community. While originally involving only the EU’s second legislative 
package on electricity and natural gas markets and parts of pertaining environmental and 
renewable energy legislation, gradually, the accumulated Energy Community legislation 
started including both new pieces of EU acquis as well as the relevant updated rules. As a result 
of the shift of the regulatory framework and the subsequent incorporation of the EU Third 
Energy Package into the framework of the Energy Community, majority of the Contracting 
Parties, at least formally, completely liberalized their energy markets. Furthermore, with the 
gradual incorporation of the body of environmental and climate change legislation, the Energy 
Community came to outgrow the sector-specific nature suggested by its name (ibid, 2017, 
p.214). However, while demonstrating its increasingly dynamic nature, the organization faces 
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several challenges, inter alia, relating to the true implementation of the adopted legislation in 
practice. This is linked to the absence of a proper enforcement/dispute settlement mechanism, 
which has been the subject of a long-standing discussion and the main reason undermining its 
effectiveness, as it has already been argued above. The latter has also been acknowledged by 
the European Commission as early as 2011, when it stated that the progressively increasing 
regulatory scope of the Energy Community needed to be backed up with stronger enforcement 
measures and more effective implementation (European Commission, 2011, pp. 6-7). 
Despite this shortcoming, the organization seems to be progressively moving forward in terms 
of its territorial span, as well as substantive matters. It has demonstrated the ability to attract 
neighboring countries by successfully shifting its territorial boundaries as well as the capacity 
to keep pace with the evolution of EU law through harmonious adoption of its legal framework.  
Compared to other examples of the externalization of EU rules, the Energy Community clearly 
stands out. While the overarching multilateral agreement between the EU Member States and 
EFTA countries or packages of bilateral agreements with Switzerland and Great Britain 
represent positive examples of EU rules transfer, they took place in largely similar socio-
economic environments. Contrarily to that, the Energy Community was born in a strikingly 
different, post-war, context. Yet, it managed to become a successful case of legally binding 
sectoral multilateralism based on the area, which was the foundation of the EU itself. Moreover, 
it managed to transfer ambitious regulatory frameworks and bring considerable change in the 
Contracting Parties, whose absorption capacities greatly differed from the ones of their 
European counterparts. Finally, with the open-ended nature of the organization, accompanied 
by the gradual shift in its territorial and regulatory scopes, the Energy Community proved to 
be a clear success and a fully-fledged instrument of the EU’s external energy policy.   
In fine, the Energy Community was a shining example only as long as it was an export of true 
EU spirit and model of regional cooperation. In the years between 2015 and 2020, when foreign 
energy policy slowly drifted from EU Member States into the hands of Commission, it became 
clear that Brussels cannot tolerate partnership which would be based only on the spirit of EU 
values and not taking into account huge socio-economic difference between the Energy 
Community Contracting Parties and EU Member States. This was best seen through a proposal 
for an amendment to the Energy Community Treaty that would enable the Commission to 
trigger switch-off clause, allowing the Commission to curtail benefits of an access of a 
Contracting Party to a Pan European market as a political pressure and not based on concrete 
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violation of the rules. Ministerial Council of the Energy Community twice rejected the set of 
amendments but the Commission continues to propose them. The other example is insistence 
of the Commission to subordinate the independent Secretariat of the Energy Community 
through a so called Procedural Act on the exchange of information and cooperation between 
the European Commission, the Secretariat and the Contracting Parties in the fields of 
compliance with Treaty obligations and the reciprocity mechanism. This shift clearly shows a 
move from multilateralism towards bilateralism where dominance of market power can be 
more efficiently implemented. European Commission is skilled in harnessing the purchasing 
power of some 450 million people and this is new Realpolitik. 
4.3.3 Indirect export of internal rules    
It has been acknowledged that part of the EU’s external impact in international energy relations 
happens indirectly, as a by-product of its internal energy market. Thanks to the considerable 
size of the EU energy market and its sizeable demand for energy sources, the EU’s internal 
rules and regulations have important effects beyond its borders. This is due to the mere fact 
that the EU’s energy suppliers need to meet certain key regulatory standards set at the EU level 
to enter the European market. The above mentioned relates to Damro’s concept of Europe as a 
“market power” (Damro, 2012, p.19). 
Apart from an influence of EU’s internal energy market also the developments in its 
sustainability oriented policy have an echo in the foreign energy policy. Latest confirmation is 
an attempt to export Green Deal as a political slogan worldwide by a call for global coal power 
phase out. On 25 January 2021 Europe’s foreign ministers called for an end to coal power and 
fossil fuel subsidies everywhere around the globe including immediate end to all financing of 
new coal infrastructure in third countries (Mathiesen, 2021) 
It seems that the most far reaching global effect we can expect from the Taxonomy 
Regulation13, adopted in June 2020. This regulation establishes EU Taxonomy which redefines 
a measurement of economic success, for centuries expressed solely by a profit. It will help 
create the world’s first-ever ‘green list’ of environmentally sustainable activities.  
The EU Taxonomy is a classification tool and sets requirements which corporate activities 
must meet to be considered sustainable. Reporting under the Taxonomy Regulation will be a 
                                                          
13 Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Establishment of a 
Framework to Facilitate Sustainable Investment 
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mandatory requirement for two key groups: financial market participants offering financial 
products within the EU and large public interest companies (some 6.000 large EU entities with 
more than 500 employees, including biggest banks like EIB and EBRD).  An economic activity 
shall qualify as environmentally sustainable where that economic activity: (a) contributes 
substantially to one or more of the environmental objectives, (b) does not significantly harm to 
any other of the environmental objectives, (c) is carried out in compliance with the minimum 
safeguards and (d) complies with the technical screening criteria, which, in effect, define what 
it means to “substantially contribute” and do no significantly harm to other environmental 
objectives in the process of achieving one environmental objective (Article 3, the Taxonomy 
Regulation). Environmental objectives are: (a) climate change mitigation, (b) climate change 
adaptation, (c) sustainable use and protection of water and marine resources, (d) transition to a 
circular economy, waste prevention, and recycling (d) pollution prevention and control and (e) 
protection of healthy ecosystems.  
By virtue of globally integrated capital markets and economic supply chains, the disclosure 
obligations on financial product issuers and corporations in the EU will create implications for 
international actors. International influence of the Taxonomy Regulation will exist despite 
there being no intention to bind third countries on EU’s sustainability activities.  
4.4 Bilateral instruments: back to basics 
Shared competence is often an obstacle to coherent EU external action as it remains mainly led 
by individual Member States. This is particularly the case for the carefully drafted compromise 
of the article 194 TFEU (2012)14 between national sovereignty governing the three core 
components of any energy policy (the energy mix, the exploration of natural resources and 
energy taxation), and a shared EU competence for other areas (Andoura & Vinois, 2015, p. 
29). Consequently, bilateral actions prevail in this field and each Member State keeps 
independent bilateral relations with its foreign suppliers.  
Thus, large parts of EU energy policy are being pursued based on coordinated action between 
Member States, precisely due to the dominance of bilateralism in external energy relations. 
According to EU Observer, as of 2016 the EU Member States had 124 energy-related 
intergovernmental agreements with third countries of which almost one-third did not comply 
                                                          
14 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2012). Official Journal of the European Union. 
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with EU rules (EU Observer, 2016). This creates major obstacles for the European Commission 
which has been trying to frame a common approach in the EU external energy policy.  
Such a situation led to a proposal and adoption of a Decision on establishing an information 
exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements15. The Decision introduces 
new competence for the European Commission. According to the Decision, Member States, 
when intending to enter into negotiations with a third country or an international organization 
in order to amend or conclude an intergovernmental agreement, the Member State shall inform 
the Commission in writing of its intention. It shall additionally regularly inform the 
Commission about the progress in the negotiations. When the agreement on all the key 
elements on a draft agreement has been reached, the relating documents shall be notified to the 
Commission. A Member State is prevented to sign (shall not) ratify or agree to any agreement 
before the Commission releases its opinion on potential compliance related doubts.  
A broader approach (of scrutinizing all international agreements on energy - related to gas, oil 
and electricity) was supported by the Parliament whereas the Member States wanted to restrict 
it only to gas deals. According to the compromise, the international agreements concerning 
electricity will be only subjected to ex-post compliance checks for now. Member States are 
still free to conclude intergovernmental agreements by themselves but in case of doubtful 
compliance with the Union law, they risk an intervention by the Commission.  
The EU uses two types of measures in its bilateral energy relations. First, it includes provisions 
on energy cooperation in its bilateral agreements with third countries, such as for instance 
Article 34(1) of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the Russian 
Federation, which comprises the best endeavor clause, however, it has limited effect in practice. 
(Van Vooren & Wessel, 2014, p. 445). Instead, the soft law i.e. non-legally binding Energy 
Dialogues, MoUs, or Joint Declarations, such as e.g. the 2000 Energy Dialogue with Russia or 
the 2012 EU-China Joint Declaration on Energy Security, have greater importance. Only in the 
case of the Energy Community and the European Economic Area, which have a limited 
regional scope, the EU basis its foreign energy relations in a legally binding way. In other parts 
of the world the foreign policy is largely executive-driven. The need for Europe to develop a 
new generation of “energy interdependence" provisions, aiming at a balance between security 
                                                          
15 Decision (EU) 2017/684 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2017 on establishing an 
information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements 
and non-binding instruments between Member States and third countries in the field of energy, 
and repealing Decision No 994/2012/EU. Official Journal of the European Union. 
87 
 
of supply and demand, in general agreements with producer countries outside Europe, has been 
emphasized also in the Second Strategic Energy Review of the European Commission. These 
provisions, aiming at contributing to a long-term political framework, encouraging 
commitments by private companies on supply and transit, the same as reducing political risks, 
would be based on the EU's energy acquis as appropriate, and on the principles of the Energy 
Charter Treaty. (European Commission, 2008, p. 8). 
The fact that Member States still keep a firm grip on their sovereignty in the EU energy 
relations can be seen by simply looking at the signatories of the MoUs and Joint Declarations. 
The Commission commonly signs the aspects which is related to the external dimension of the 
internal market, pre-empting Member State action in this sphere of shared competence. On the 
other hand, the Member States are in lead of those areas of foreign policy which were not 
covered by the Union yet. (Van Vooren, 2012, p.44).  
Since the EU external energy relations are characterized by heterogeneity, some of the 
countries playing a strategic role in the EU external energy relations, being also a global player, 
will receive further consideration below. Particular accent will be placed on the Russian 
Federation, taking into account, that it is the key energy supplier to the EU with which energy 
relations, especially, in the natural gas sector, remain increasingly politicized and controversial. 
The EU-Russia energy relations will be followed by a brief outline of the energy relations with 
the US and China. Furthermore, a short analysis of the race over the Caspian resources will be 
provided, considering that the region brings together all the four powers. Finally, the last part 
of this chapter will discuss pipeline politics, where countries of North Africa and the Caspian 
Region, along with Norway, play significant roles.  
4.4.1 Russia  
Brussels’s key bilateral diplomatic efforts have been focused on the Russian Federation via the 
EU-Russia Energy Dialogue launched in 2000. The Dialogue, providing an overall structure 
for further cooperation in the sector of energy was centered on improving the investment 
climate, including via the opening up of the energy markets and ensuring adequate and secure 
energy infrastructure, among other goals (European Commission, n.d.). However, EU-Russia 
Energy Dialogue was suspended after of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, but even before it has 
seen only limited success and has been described as “travelling without moving” (Schubert et 
al., 2016, p.224).  
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The EU and Russia set up an arrangement for cooperation on natural gas matters, called the 
Gas Advisory Council, along with the Early Warning Mechanism, that followed the gas dispute 
between Ukraine and Russia back in 2009 (European Commission, n.d.). The main objectives 
were to exchange vital energy-related data and identify risks as well as guarantee fast responces 
in emergency events. However, considering the non-binding nature of the arrangement, as most 
other existing energy related agreements with Russia, the effectiveness thereof has been 
questionable.  
Compared with other partners, the energy relations that Europe maintains with Russia have 
been most challenging. This is mainly due to the clash of visions over the energy policies that 
the two maintain. The current Russian leadership’s concept of a resurgent Russia is directly 
linked with the state control of energy resources internally as well as externally. This approach 
is in stark contrast with the European ideals of liberal and open markets. Since late nineties, 
current Russian President, Vladimir Putin, has been considering that efficient control of energy 
resources would enable Russia to regain its place among the global economic and political 
powers. Efficient control would allow also an influence on the world commodities market 
(Schubert et al., 2016, p.256). Thus, once in power, he launched the process of renationalized 
Russian oil and gas natural resources. This was damaging to the unity of EU, since Russia and 
Gazprom started actively working to propose bilateral contracts with different entities within 
the EU, that is with Member States and also with companies, based in EU, trying to impose 
differences in the relations. This state strategy had geopolitical considerations, as the EU’s 
increased efforts to export its rules to the common European and Russian neighborhood were 
raising important concerns in Moscow. Moreover, the on-going EU enlargement to the East, 
along with the initiation of regional cooperation frameworks, such as the European 
Neighborhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership and the Energy Community, combined with the 
efforts to side-step Russia in accessing Caspian littoral resources, was seen by Moscow as 
intentioned steps to interfere in its exclusive sphere of influence. (Schubert et al., 2016, 
p.257).The Russian government still sees foreign policy through the lens of the “Monroeski 
Doctrine” 16 which affirms Russia’s pre-eminence all around the post-Soviet space. 
Consequently, Moscow considers most of Eastern Europe, including some current EU Member 
States, critical to its national security and legacy. For instance, EU efforts, such as signing of 
                                                          
16 Articulated by Migranyan, and considered as the major foreign policy strategy of the Russian Federation in its 
near abroad after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it affirmed the Russian Federation’s position as the dominant 
power in the entire former Soviet Union. Moscow often invoked the doctrine when it intervened in post-Soviet 
conflicts in the Newly Independent States (NIS), in so called  separatist conflicts. 
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the Association Agreements with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova which, inter alia, include 
chapters on energy, is understood by Russia as a deliberate act to undermine Russian influence 
in these countries and threatens Russian security thinking. Thus, while also trying to preserve 
its influence by military force, as in the case of Georgia and Ukraine, Russia, in the field of 
energy which is directly linked with its foreign policy objectives, seeks to safeguard its 
dominant position by constructing alternative transit routes as well as regional frameworks. 
Transit routes, as we will see below, are an important component of Russian economic power. 
Furthermore, competing regional frameworks, the most obvious example of which is the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) launched in 2015, represent Moscow’s attempts to counter 
EU’s regional cooperation agendas in the neighborhood and safeguarding its dominant position 
in the post-Soviet space.  
The Eurasian Economic Union has been reproducing the process of European integration, yet, 
in an extremely accelerated manner.17 The similarity between the EU and the EAEU, at least 
“on paper”, is obvious. The EAEU, among other objectives, aims to create common energy 
markets between its Member States, which will potentially conflict and overlap with the 
European energy market. It set important ambitions to create: a common electricity market by 
2019, a common oil market by 2024 and a common gas market by 2025 (Pastukhova & 
Westphal, 2018, p.1) However, the unusually speedy process of integration of the Eurasian 
Union, accompanied by the discrepancy between declarative and genuine integration of its 
policies, are causing legitimate doubts that, eventually, form will be prioritized over substance 
with regard to the energy sector as well.  
In this context, it is not surprising that Ukraine’s U-turn towards the EU, which was seen by 
Moscow as a key member to join the EAEU, is of an important concern to Russia. Ukraine is 
still the main transit corridor for Russian gas supplies to the EU and before the construction of 
the Nord Stream submarine pipeline from Russia to Germany, Russian energy exports were 
flowing to Europe solely via Ukraine and Belarus, the former transiting 80 % of its supplies.  
Finally, Russia still has a bitter memory of its lost influence in the Balkan region after the 
Yugoslavia as a longtime ally of Russia broke-up, and the subsequent independence of Kosovo 
                                                          




under the aegis of the EU and NATO. The latter was viewed by Moscow as a precedent for 
ethnic separatist movements with risks of spillover effect along its Southern periphery. 
Thus, the above mentioned cases are indicative of the vulnerability of EU-Russia energy 
relations. The Russian efforts have mainly been directed towards securing its dominant role of 
a natural gas supplier to Europe. Contrarily to that, the EU has been trying to reduce its 
dependence on Russian supplies by diversifying its resources and transit routes. As a result, the 
possibility to find common ground in light of these conflicting agendas and interests has proved 
to be increasingly difficult so far. 
4.4.2 United States 
The United States are seen as the most important ally of the EU when it comes to the security 
in the European energy field after the 2nd World War.  The relationship between the two is also 
important because it forms a foundation of EU’s diplomatic relations, securing its supply routes 
in the energy field. 
Collaboration regarding more intimate and official trade union between the EU and the US was 
detectable already in 1995 with the New Transatlantic Agenda. Trade between the two parties 
equals 31 % of the global total and they cooperate across a range of areas. In the energy sector, 
the EU and the US share a common approach on the need to promote competitive, transparent, 
open and sustainable global energy markets as well as the need to establish universal norms 
governing the energy sector.  
EU-US ‘energy partnership’ has strengthened in the first decade of the 21st century and reached 
its peak in 2009, when EU-US Energy Council was created. The Council, established with US 
initiative, focuses on a wide range of topics, among them, on coordinating efforts on global 
and regional energy security challenges, nuclear safety, energy research and technologies and 
similar (US-EU Energy Council, 2016). Furthermore, the US supports the EU in diversifying 
its resources, inter alia, through cooperating on the Southern gas corridor, which still is a top 
priority project for Brussels for its diversification efforts.   
The US recognizes energy security as fundamental to this cooperation which extends also to 
the European neighborhood, thus, committing itself to the energy security of Ukraine as well 
as other countries of the region. The US and the EU are second and third biggest consumers of 
energy globally. Thus, protection of their national as well as external energy infrastructure is 
of fundamental importance for their economies. This has also gained momentum, in light of 
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the increased US LNG export potential, which calls for ensuring that the European LNG 
receiving infrastructure is adequately protected (Directorate-General for External Policies, 
2016, p. 72).  
Development in the field of unconventional oil and gas revolution in the US offers new 
opportunities for supply diversification to the EU. Firstly, its impact is expected to be more 
indirect, liquidity of the regional market is improving and low price in US hub is a new price 
reference. Having an alternative improves negotiation position of the EU vis- à-vis its 
traditional suppliers. Secondly, the United States can play a decisive role in supporting EU in 
ensuring its security of supply through LNG exports (Riley, 2015, p.10).  
Additionally, the EU and the US negotiated on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), developing the largest cooperation on energy between the two of them 
ever. The negotiations were halted for an indefinite period of time after the 2016 US 
presidential elections took place. 
Notwithstanding the fact that significant discrepancy existed regarding the incorporation of a 
separate energy chapter in the TTIP, the deal aimed at increasing energy trade and diffusion of 
new technological discoveries (Directorate-General for External Policies, 2016, p. 66). 
Traditionally, disagreements have existed concerning environmental regulations and 
regulations on renewable energy projects. (ibid, 2016, p.85).  
However, with appointment of Mr Trump as the US President, these differences have been 
exacerbated. Namely, the US National Security Strategy, has turned the expansion of the US 
fossil fuel industry and its exports into a major component of American foreign and security 
policy, where the US would aim at ‘energy dominance’, instead of energy independence. 
Furthermore, according to the Trump administration statements, those who stand in the way of 
American exploitation of gas, oil and coal resources will be perceived as an obstructer of the 
US national interest (Klare M. T., 2018). With new President Joe Biden’s energy policy this 
seems will be substantially changed. He revoked a permit to build a disputed Keystone XL 
project on his first day in office. The 2,735-kilometer pipeline was planned to carry roughly 
800,000 barrels of oil a day from Alberta, Canada to the Texas Gulf Coast, passing five federal 
states. 
These developments have been taking place when other world leaders have been boasting about 
their achievements in developing the renewable energy exploitation. Even the oil rich Saudi 
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Arabia proudly announced plans for a $30 to $50 billion investments in solar power, while the 
US Secretary of State, Rick Perry, stated that the US is “blessed” with “a substantial ability to 
deliver the people of the globe a better quality of life through fossil fuels”, thus, defying the 
global trend in a striking manner (ibid, 2018).  
These steps, coupled with President Trump’s pulling the United States out of the Paris climate 
agreement, caused serious concerns in the EU. However, with new President Joe Biden’s 
energy policy, oriented towards full decarbonisation till 2050 and a major shift into the 
deployment of renewables on the territory of the US, the key pillars of the EU-US energy 
cooperation are expected to remain unchanged.  
4.4.3 China  
EU - China relations have been based on so-called Sectorial Dialogues that focus on individual 
economic areas. Meetings for the Energy dialogue started  in 1994 to elaborate and further 
develop the Energy Dialogue and to collaborate on different energy-related concerns (European 
Commission, n.d.). The signature of the EU-China Energy Cooperation Roadmap in July 2016 
signaled a new step forward in the energy collaboration between the two of them. The 
Roadmap, guiding this collaboration in the period 2016-2020, covered areas of an interest for 
both sides, among them are renewable energies, energy markets reforms, energy efficiency, 
and the role of international institutions (European External Action Service, 2016).  
China is the world’s biggest producer and consumer of energy, hence, developments on the 
Chinese domestic market have a great impact on the global markets. (European Commission, 
n.d.). Considering its increased consumption needs, China has been actively engaged in 
securing resources abroad. Beijing has been continuously recognizing energy as an essential 
element of its security over the past years. Therefore, China has been focusing on engaging its 
state-owned companies in the global supply chain. Exclusive deliveries to China only are 
expensive and the country focuses more on being one of destinations on the global market.  In 
this aspect, the Chinese energy policy differs from the one pursued by its neighboring Russia, 
which instead focuses on maximizing its percentage of trade, that already exists. Yet, the 
similarity that both China and Russia share is that energy represents a core element of their 
foreign policies and both of them prefer regionalization over multilateralism, which stands in 




President Xi Jinping, contrary to the rhetoric of his predecessors about China as a developing 
country, adopted a confidence stance and embraced China as superpower on the rise. During 
his reign the country’s economy reoriented from export based manufacturing to more services 
and domestic consumption based.(The World Bank Group, 2015, p. 3). Consequently, the 
growth targets and energy intensity are declining. For their part, this has also influenced the 
rate of global energy demand growth that has decreased (Rosenberger, Gordon, Maruyama, & 
Sullivan, 2016). New era of energy abundance decreased Chinese supply vulnerability and new 
trade conditions established fresh possibilities for Beijing’s ambitious new Silk Road project 
(currently known as the One Belt, One Road strategy) as well as for other international 
collaborations in the energy field. Market changes, that have possible positive impacts on 
China’s economy, are in comparison much more complex for Russia, since Russian economy 
stays extremely dependent on energy extraction and export related revenues.  
Beijing’s vision for its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) development strategy, to which it has 
pledged at least $160 billion consists of creating energy, economic, and transport corridors that 
stretch from China all the way to the borders of Europe (Johnson, 2016, p.1) Through overland 
and maritime infrastructure investment, Beijing strives to increase its connectivity with Eurasia 
and create linkages between China, the Middle East, and Europe, OBOR calls for increased 
standardized and linked trade facilities, increased diplomatic coordination, trade facilitation 
policies, including free trade zones, financial integration promoting Chinese currency 
renminbi, and people-to-people cultural education programs across the nations. (Stokes, 2015). 
Recently, this has been a key pillar of Beijing’s strategy for obtaining great power status.  
Furthermore, notwithstanding China’s slowing growth and shift away from an energy-intensive 
model as well as forecasts regarding energy demand growth falling substantially, estimates 
vary on when China’s energy demand will peak, with some arguing peak demand as early as 
the late 2020s, while others believe that energy demand will continue to grow past 2040 
(Rosenberger et al., 2016, p.15). In any event, natural gas is expected to play a crucial role in 
its energy policy, as Chinese leaders consider it key to meeting politically critical domestic 
climate and pollution goals (Xinhua, 2014). Thus, China’s volume of demand for natural gas 
is projected to grow most sharply, even in light of increased efficiency.  
In view of still considerable dependence on imported resources (59 % for oil in 2014 and 30 % 
for gas in 2013), Beijing considers it as the country’s main vulnerability, which was confirmed 
by President Xi in his statement: “[energy security] is of the utmost importance for our 
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prosperous development, the improvement of people’s lives, and social stability.”  
(Rosenberger et al., 2016, p.16). In this context, China is increasingly reticent about letting 
geopolitical energy interests dominate over the commercial side of agreements and has shown 
itself to be a tough negotiator with energy trading partners in pursuing its efforts to diversify 
both the sources and routes of its imports (Rosenberger et al., 2016, p.16). China is yet to 
develop a full-blown strategy linking energy and national security, but its growing overseas 
energy interests are driving new types of security activism such as in the case of asserting 
influence in its bordering sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and its approach to the South 
China Sea (Schubert et al., 2016, p.218).In longer term, it is expected to become more active 
beyond the Western Pacific, motivated mainly by its energy needs. 
Finally, China is striving to play a larger role in global energy governance for achieving its 
objectives of energy security. Despite the fact that this strategy also seeks to allow China to set 
the agenda in order to support its foreign lending and investment initiatives, there is some 
common ground shared with the EU external energy policy, especially, when it comes to the 
acknowledgement of the need to reform the global energy markets. In this context, the 2016 
EU-China Energy Cooperation Roadmap has the potential to yield positive results in future.  
4.4.4 Caspian Region 
The Caspian littoral states: Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan, are known for their abundant oil and natural gas resources. Three Caspian 
countries have prior been part of the Soviet Union, thus, like the Eastern European post-soviet 
states, Moscow perceives them as territories that fit into their sphere of influence. In Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan Russia still has military bases and in Kazakhstan even an operating 
spaceport- Baikonur Cosmodrome. The region, which historically has been the subject of 
geopolitical tussles between great powers such as the British Empire and the Czarist Russia, 
remains a target of political manipulation (Rosenberger et al., 2016, p.259).  Yet, compared to 
other powers Russia remains the main sovereign of the region. The energy sector is indicative 
in this regard as most of the energy resources there are exported to the West through the 
pipelines owed by Russian companies in state ownership. . Furthermore, the protracted process 
of the definition of a legal regime governing the Caspian Sea has been complicating 
international activities in the region.18 
                                                          
18 The legal status of the Caspian Sea has been subject to negotiations for over twenty years between the littoral 
countries (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan). The Caspian Sea, which is the largest inland 
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While the Caspian region represents a potential source to diversify the EU’s energy supply, the 
latter appears in a noticeable disadvantage compared to other powers competing for the Caspian 
resources. Russia which has control over military and economic aspects of the region has 
repeatedly proved both the capacity and determination to safeguard its interest. On the other 
hand, China which enjoys geographic proximity as well as large financial resources to make 
considerable investments, managed to secure new contracts. The latter is slowly encroaching 
upon Russian interests through large scale investments. The EU, contrarily to that, is not 
capable to undertake equally massive investments the success of which would, additionally, 
depend on transit countries in order to deliver these resources to Europe.   
The EU has been trying to secure access to Caspian resources through different means. Back 
in 2009, the European Commission suggested in its Second Strategic Energy Review to create 
a Caspian Development Corporation (CDC) - a block purchasing mechanism in order to assist 
European gas companies to purchase gas from the Caspian Region. (Commission of the 
                                                          
body of water in the world contains huge oil, gas and fishing resources. The controversy over the legal regime of 
the Caspian Sea began with the breakup of the Soviet Union back in 1991. Until then, the Caspian had been 
considered as a common sea between Iran and the Soviet Union. However, as a result of the increase in number 
of littoral states from two to five after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the geopolitical dynamic was considerably 
altered. Consequently, the choice of a legal regime for the Caspian Sea and the delimitation thereof became 
increasingly problematic mostly due to political, rather than legal, reasons. The Caspian, historically, was called 
a sea, due to its big size and sea-related features. However, the UN Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS) 
defines a sea as a body of water that is connected to the world ocean. Yet, notwithstanding the absence of such 
connection, Caspian still can be granted the status of a sea if all the five littoral countries agree on this.  
If the Caspian is defined as a closed sea, then according to the UNCLOS it would be divided among the littoral 
states into their respective territorial waters, exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and continental shelf with varying 
degrees of sovereignty. For instance, while in territorial waters coastal states exercise full and unrestricted 
sovereignty over all activities, in exclusive economic zones UNCLOS grants every littoral state the freedom of 
navigation and overflight as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines in the EZZ, which in case of 
energy-rich Caspian is increasingly relevant. Additionally, Russia, who has traditionally been against defining the 
Caspian as a sea, has been concerned that the division of the surface of the sea would enable the Central Asian 
countries, especially Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, to construct a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which 
in turn would threaten the Russian monopoly over the transportation of the hydrocarbon resources of the Central 
Asian countries to the European market. Russian concerns are also related to the increasing interest of US and 
NATO in the region that in the event of the division of the surface of the sea would make it easier for them to 
enter into the Caspian. 
On the other hand, if the Caspian is defined as a lake then the method of its delimitation should be defined by a 
special treaty agreed among the five littoral states, as there is no international convention or uniform practice for 
the division of international lakes. Some commonly used methods, namely, the condominium principle (joint 
ownership) and the median line principle have been discussed by the littoral countries, yet, there has been no 
common agreement on one specific method so far.   
Due to the complexity to find common ground between the Caspian coastal countries, segregated bilateral and 
trilateral dialogues have been taking place. For example, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Russia have already for 
over ten years agreed on the limitation of boundaries of their contiguous national sectors using the “modified 
median line” principle. The southern part of the sea remains more contested between Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan 
and Iran, with the latter owing the smallest portion of the coastline and thus favouring the division of the Caspian 
Sea in five equal parts. The absence of the agreement on the legal status of the Caspian Sea has arguably been in 
the interest of Russia and Iran who thus retain a leverage to delay some regional projects, like the Trans-Caspian 
pipeline, based on this reason (Janusz-Pawletta, 2015). 
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European Communities, 2008) The CDC, however, became a failed initiative. Another attempt 
of the EU to reach the Caspian resources represents the project of a Trans-Caspian pipeline 
(TCP) – a submarine pipeline destined to transport natural gas from Turkmenistan (and 
potentially Kazakhstan) to Europe, bypassing Russia and Iran. It has been considered by the 
EU as an eastward extension of the Southern Gas Corridor comprised of the South Caucasus 
Pipeline (SCP), Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). 
The TCP project was suggested in 1996 by the United States for the first time. In February 
1999 the Bechtel Group and General Electric agreed with Turkmen government to perform a 
feasibility study on the pipeline and at a 1999 OSCE meeting in Istanbul, Georgia, Azerbaijan 
and Turkmenistan signed a number of agreements concerning the construction of several 
projects, among them also the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Trans-Caspian pipelines (Karayianni, 
2018). However, the project was later stalled, due to the unresolved legal status of the Caspian 
Sea, due to fierce Russian and Iranian opposition, as well as, the competitive major discovery 
of the Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan (ibid, 2018).  
After this failed initiative of the US it took the EU quite some years to move in a Central Asian 
direction. The EU began to take steps in that direction first through the so called 2004 Baku 
Initiative. Later it continued with the 2007 Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia. 
Real negotiations were initiated back in September 2011, based on a legally binding agreement 
with Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan on the construction of the Trans-Caspian pipeline system. 
This initiative was the first occasion where the EU by itself, and not only its individual Member 
States, proposed a treaty on an infrastructure project (European Commission, 2011).  
Yet, until today, some key commercial questions remain unclear regarding the construction of 
the Trans-Caspian pipeline. This mainly concerns the profitability of the TCP in order to justify 
the construction and operation thereof as well as the existence of sufficient demand to support 
stable sales on commercially attractive terms for the government of Turkmenistan19 and the 
companies involved in the production. Additionally, the project has been opposed by Russia 
and Iran. Moscow has been arguing that a submarine gas pipeline would be environmentally 
unacceptable for the region and that as long as the legal status of the Caspian Sea remains 
                                                          
19 Turkmenistan has always had a position searching for a possibility to export larger volumes trying to maximize 
the revenues. For this reason, the country, without having any firm agreement, by itself constructed so called East-
West Pipeline (EWP), which would allow to transmit the gas from the gas field to Turkmenistan’s coast on the 
Caspian Sea. The pipeline was finished in 2015 and since then awaits any further transmission westwards. 
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unresolved the construction of any pipeline on the seabed would not be possible without the 
consent of all five Caspian littoral states. Notwithstanding this, in June 2017 the Council of the 
European Union in its conclusions, when assessing the results of the first decade of the EU 
Strategy for Central Asia, stated that “the EU will continue to seek to extend the Southern Gas 
Corridor to Central Asia, and to further promote the EU’s multilateral and bilateral energy 
cooperation” with the countries involved (Council of the European Union, 2017, p.4). 
More recent developments in the region itself have shown some progress in this regard. 
Namely, in August 2017, the leaders of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan in an effort to bring 
Caspian energy resources to Europe signed for the first time an agreement (Cutler, 2018). 
Furthermore, in December 2016, the Russian foreign minister announced the agreement on a 
the text of a Convention establishing a Caspian Sea legal regime among five littoral states 
(Pannier, 2017). Yet it should be noted that considering the contradictory statements of the 
representatives of the Caspian littoral states, the legal status of the Caspian Sea seems unlikely 
to be resolved soon. 
Finally, notwithstanding the statement of the Azerbaijani deputy foreign minister that 
according to the draft Convention the rights for laying pipelines shall be coordinated among 
“those countries through whose sectors [the pipelines] will run”, (Isazade, 2017)and assertions 
that regardless of the final delimitation of sectors between the littoral states cooperation for the 
exploitation of energy resources can still proceed without prejudice to their respective claims 
(as in the case of Norway and the United Kingdom in the North Sea), it is highly unlikely that 
any project in the Caspian region can succeed without taking into consideration Russia’s role.  
This is especially the case when the European efforts to have a more significant role in the 
Caspian, compared with the ones taken by Russia, are insufficient. Lastly, Brussels compared 
to Moscow has much less leverage and is not equally well positioned to achieve its interests in 
the Caspian where, besides Russia, China is showing increased interest and readiness to 
undertake investments in order to secure larger volumes of energy imports from its Central 
Asian suppliers.  
4.4.5 United Kingdom 
End of 2020 also United Kingdom (UK) became for EU a third country. In a Brexit trade deal 
between the UK and the EU a new model for energy trading and interconnectivity is created as 
well as a framework for cooperation on renewable energy. The basis was in this case 
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completely different since both sides were together developing energy market model for 
decades and initial internal rules were identical. 
The agreement facilitates the flow of energy between the UK and the EU and includes measures 
aiming to ensure that capacity on the interconnectors is sold together with the electricity and 
gas.  
The agreement envisages also a new forum between EU and UK to carry out technical 
discussions for large renewable energy projects, which builds on the already existing North 
Seas Energy Cooperation platform and envisages continued UK participation in the 
International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). The Brexit deal’s energy chapter 
expires on June 30, 2026. Both the EU and the UK have to agree to extend the arrangement on 
an annual basis. This was a compromise related to the fisheries as the hottest topic of the Brexit 
deal. EU felt strong in energy topic and UK in fisheries and this is a guarantee that energy will 
be politicized in future. Best it was illustrated by Lord Teverson from House of Lords saying 
“We will be trading herring for electrons somewhere down the line.”. (Oroshakoff, 2021)  
4.5 Pipeline politics  
Managing transit routes is significantly important. Actually, it is nearly as critical as the 
possession of energy resources. This makes pipelines a politically sensitive topic. The growing 
rate of dependence on the external supply of gas was in past ten years increasing the EU’s 
concerns about the security of supply. Imports represented 74.4 % of EU’s consumption in 
2017, with Russia meeting 42 % of demand, followed by Norway (34 %) and Algeria (10 %). 
Corridors of gas flowing into the EU can be seen on Figure 4.1. 





Source: own calculation. 
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Pipeline import capacity into the EU is 450 bcm annually, LNG terminals allow 212 bcm of 
regasification annually and storages allow additional 113 bcm of stored gas. Currently, the EU 
is building additional infrastructure for gas transit and storage that will allow an inflow of an 
additional 100 bcm of gas annually. Import is constantly increasing due to higher consumption, 
lower prices and falling domestic production. In 2017, all gas from Russia was delivered by 
Gazprom with a majority ownership share of Russian Federation (Eurostat, 2019). The 
construction of pipelines requires considerable investments, long-term planning and political 
negotiations as, usually, they cross borders of sovereign states. Due to these efforts, pipelines 
tend to establish long-term relationships between consumers and suppliers that creates a semi-
permanent interdependence (Schubert et al., 2016, p.225). Therefore, it is common to witness 
fierce international competition over the choice of transit routes, volumes of supplies as well 
as origin of the resources. For illustration, by the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline, 
Germany acquired direct access to additional Russian supplies, however, this happened at the 
expense of reduced importance of previous transit countries, such as Ukraine and Poland. Thus, 
pipelines, besides their economic value, carry a considerable political importance. 
Gas Directive 2009/73/EC20 and its key “unbundling” Article 9. 1 (b) (ii) not allowing that a 
company which directly or indirectly exercises control over a transmission system is at the 
same time producer or supplier of gas was clearly oriented against Gazprom, perceived as a 
threat because of its dominant position on the EU market. The Directive in Article 36 allows 
also an exemption which has to be time limited, the use of the pipeline has to be charged under 
comparable conditions, part of the pipeline has to be accessible for third parties and the 
exemption must not be detrimental to competition or the effective functioning of the internal 
market in natural gas, or the efficient functioning of the regulated system to which the 
infrastructure is connected.  
The Directive was adopted after several EU Member States signed an intergovernmental 
agreement with the Russian Federation to build the South Stream gas pipeline over their 
territory where they envisaged ownership of Gazprom over the entire pipeline and had a 
retroactive effect (“South Stream bilateral deals breach EU law, Commission says,2013). This 
was the end of the South Stream project and Gazprom was in its attempt to by-pass Ukraine 
searching for an alternative route. 
                                                          
20 Directive 2009/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC. 
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Political influences and fierce battles in the public arena were most visible in the case of 
building the Nord Stream II gas pipeline. In 2011, the company that operates Nord Stream I 
(Nord Stream AG) started to evaluate a possibility of expanding the project, adding two 
additional lines (later named Nord Stream 2). This two additional lines would allow overall 
annual capacity of a transport of up to 110 billion m3 of gas. (Pinchuk, 2015). 
In 2015 Gazprom signed an agreement to build Nord Stream 2 with Royal Dutch Shell 
(Netherland), EON (Germany), OMV (Austria), and Engie (France). This joint venture was 
blocked by Poland. Therefore on 24 April 2017, Gazprom’s subsidiary responsible for the 
construction of new pipeline signed with the same partners (only in Germany E.ON was 
replaced by companies Wintershall and Uniper) a financing agreement with the same purpose. 
(Foy, Toplensky, &Ward, 2017). 
In January 2018, Germany authorized Nord Stream 2 to construct on German territory and in 
May 2018, the construction began. In January 2019, the US started to threaten the companies 
engaged in the construction of Nord Stream 2 with sanctions. On 21 December 2019, when the 
pipeline was at that time almost completed, the construction company Allseas decided to cease 
its involvement in the construction afraid that the US would enact the US National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 envisaging sanctions (Allseas, 2019). At that time the 
pipeline was 95% completed and since then the construction is in a standstill. 
In parallel, a legal battle was going on in the EU. Gas Directive 2009/73/EC with its regime of 
third party access and possible exemptions based on decisions of national energy regulators 
was interpreted differently by different lawyers. Some were of an opinion that its regime is 
relevant for Nord Stream II, some were opposing. The Gas Directive indeed did not explicitly 
set out a legal framework for gas pipelines to and from third countries and therefore it was not 
clear if the scope of the definition of “interconnector”' is applicable to such pipelines entering 
the European Union or not. 
Due to different interpretations and non-reaction of the European Commission, the debate 
became one of major political problems in the EU in the years 2015 – 2018 with Member States 
opposing Nord Stream II (led by Poland) on one side and Member States supporting Nord 
Stream II (led by Germany and Austria) on the other side. After a compromise between 
Germany and France, the Commission proposed an amendment to Gas Directive 2009/73/EC 
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extending the regime of the Directive also to pipelines entering EU territory from third 
countries. (Keypour, 2019, p.78). 
The European Commission presented the proposal on 8 November 2017. The European 
Parliament's plenary session adopted its negotiating position on 11 April 2018 and Member 
States' ambassadors backed a general approach on behalf of the Council of the European Union 
on 8 February 2019. An informal agreement between the institutions on a compromise text was 
reached on 13 February. The Parliament formally endorsed the draft amendment on 4 April, 
followed by the Council on 15 April 2019. 
The amendment to the Gas Directive (2019)21 aims to ensure that all major gas pipelines 
entering EU territory comply with EU rules which are the same as for interconnectors between 
Member States (level of transparency - unbundled, are accessible to other operators, are 
operated in an efficient way).   
That means Germany had to seek an exemption from EU market-opening requirements as long 
as it does not hurt competition or supply on the EU internal market. The procedure for an 
exemption is run by the German energy regulatory authority but the Commission with its 
binding opinion plays a decisive role. With the amendments to the Gas Directive, the European 
Commission clearly got its first serious competence in the EU foreign energy policy.  
The Nord Stream company, Nord Stream AG, has tried to avoid the newly imposed regime 
through several legal measures, but currently without success. It tried to present almost the 
completed pipeline as finalized at the date when the amended Gas Directive entered into force. 
It also sued the EU due to endangered billions of EUR invested in the project in the ECJ and 
started an arbitration request according to the Energy Charter Treaty. The notice of arbitration 
was served on 26 September 2019 and the outcome is not known yet.  Nord Stream AG asked 
the arbitral tribunal to determine that the European Union is in breach of its international law 
commitments under the Energy Charter Treaty and to make orders requiring the EU to 
discontinue its breach. (Gurzu, 2019). It seems that the company Nord Stream AG is the sole 
target of the amendments. 
Nord Stream AG bent its back and applied to the German energy regulatory authority for a 
derogation. Derogation would allow its owner Gazprom to avoid separation of the operator of 
                                                          
21 Directive (EU) 2019/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 amending Directive 
2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas. 
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the pipe from the entities supplying the gas, to deny access to third parties to use the pipeline 
and to have its tariff fees designed by itself and not approved by the German regulator. On 15 
May 2020, the German regulator denied the derogation. (Hernandez, 2020, May 15). 
Respecting the decision of the German regulator would increase the transmission tariff since 
the average tariff as a basis for the tariff fee is calculated as an average cost of all transmission 
costs on the territory regulated by the regulator (ibid, 2020, May 18). Reorganization of 
Gazprom to meet the unbundling criteria is possible but also incurs some costs. On top of that 
US Senator Ted Cruz announced: “If Gazprom uses the Akademik Cherskiy to finish the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline, [President Donald Trump] must and will impose crippling sanctions on 
Gazprom.” (ibid, 2020, May 15). Attitude towards Nord Stream II is the same among 
Republicans and Democrats and election of President Biden doesn’t seem to change the stance 
of US. 
Russia, Norway and Algeria together account for 71 % of the EU’s natural gas supply. 
Nevertheless, the picture is uneven: according to ENTSOG as of 2013 no zone in the EU had 
dependence on gas supplies derived from any gas supply from any major supplier, except 
Russia, of over 20 %, while the supply dependency on Russian gas in around ten zones 
amounted to 60 % or above (Schubert et al., 2016, p.206). The resources from these countries 
are accessed by the means of three transit corridors. These corridors differ in terms of their 
capacity, scale, and reliability. Norwegian deliveries through the North-Western corridor have 
been always steady, thus, making Norway Europe’s most reliable supply source. The Eastern 
corridor has in contrast, has been subject to multiple politically motivated disruptions. The 
construction of the fourth transit corridor in order to bring Caspian resources to South-East 
Europe through Turkey and by circumventing Russia, is under way and will be operational in 
2021. The EU has been attaching high importance to the aforementioned project.  
The multiplicity of corridors, apart from geographic rationales, would increase competition 
and, potentially, decrease prices. However, the choice between direct access to resources and 
the diversification thereof is fundamental in foreign energy policy and it is as much about 
money as about politics. The Nabucco project is indicative in this regard. Intended to unite 
Caspian, Central Asian and Middle Eastern gas resources to Central Europe by circumventing 
Russia, Nabucco was seen as the most favored project for diversifying Europe’s natural gas 
supplies. However, due to the failure to safeguard suppliers and routes, the project was 
eventually curtailed to Nabucco West (Schubert et al., 2016, p.206). In the meantime, Russia 
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managed to safeguard its influence over Europe by the means of bilateral agreements with 
individual EU Member States. Consequently, Moscow, in the North, built a direct line to 
Germany, known as the Nord Stream pipeline (and launched the additional Nord Stream 2), in 
order to secure its control over the northern route and, in the South, started promoting its second 
project – the South Stream pipeline to maintain the dominant position in the Southern corridor 
as well. The latter was later indefinitely suspended due to European concerns that it was not 
designed to bring additional supplies to the EU, but - to bypass existing routes through Ukraine 
and strengthen Russia’s position. Thus, it can be seen as a success of the EU who has been 
calling on Russia to abide to its market-based rules for building a new pipeline.  
After the failure of South Stream, Russia managed to pressure Turkey to accept a new, so-
called “Turkish Stream”, pipeline project. The fact that the latter, planned to bring Russian gas 
to Turkey via a submarine pipeline, had political motivations was evident from the fact that 
Turkish Stream was announced shortly after the deliberate decrease of Russian gas supplies to 
Turkey, thus, effectively pressuring Ankara to accept the new pipeline project proposed by 
Moscow (Strumond, 2015).Turkish Stream creates additional challenges to Europe as in case 
natural gas, previously transiting via Ukraine, is redirected to Turkish hubs to be resold in 
Europe, the EU risks to pay more for the same resources. Moreover, bringing such gas to the 
EU requests major ongoing investments in the pipeline infrastructure on the territory of 
Bulgaria, Serbia and to a lesser extent in Hungary.  
Finally, considering that most of such pipelines are upstream-driven and the supplier countries 
and companies propose, finance and also build those pipelines in order to market their own 
resources, the EU efforts to counter such projects (even if it risks increasing dependence on 
one country) are often hard to justify in practice (Schubert et al., 2016, p.231). 
The four corridors identified above, which are the main routes to deliver natural gas resources 
to the EU from third countries, play an important role in the EU’s efforts to diversify its 
supplies, which remains a general principle in the EU external energy policy. Thus, each will 
receive a brief consideration below.    
4.5.1 The North-Western corridor from Norway 
Norway is the most important operator of Europe’s Northern route since it provides for roughly 
one third of the EU’s current gas imports from the oil fields of the North Sea, Norwegian Sea 
and, potentially, the Arctic Sea. According to the 2015 Energy Union Package, Norway, which 
is already integrated in the internal energy market as a member of the European Economic 
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Area, plays an essential role in enhancing the EU security of supply in natural gas. Thus, the 
EU aims to develop its partnership with Norway via additional projects and further integrate 
the latter into its internal energy policies (European Commission, 2016). 
Apart from being the second largest supplier of natural gas and crude oil to the EU, Norway 
has also been the most reliable supplier. Furthermore, its production is predicted to remain 
stable for the foreseeable future thanks to new developments, combined with sufficient 
investments and production in the existing fields (Schubert, Pollak, & Kreutler, 2016), p. 233). 
Contrarily to the exhaustively developed North Sea resources, the ones of the Norwegian Sea 
are continuing to develop further.  
4.5.2 South-Western Corridor from North Africa 
The South-Western Corridor is considered to be the smallest, the simplest and the most 
transparent route (Schubert, Pollak, & Kreutler, 2016), p. 234). Here European pipeline 
interests are exclusively linked with natural gas resources, for which Algeria is the EU’s third 
largest supplier. Most of Algerian gas (70 %), which in 2013 according to BP amounted to 11 
% of EU imports, is exported via pipeline. Two-thirds of the exported gas flow to Italy and the 
remaining to Spain. Around 30 % of natural gas, which is not transported by pipelines, is 
delivered to the EU and Turkey in the form of LNG (Schubert et al., 2016, p. 234). Furthermore, 
due to the political turmoil in Libya and Egypt, the amount of natural gas delivered from these 
countries has been decreasing in recent years.  
Considering the geographical proximity, combined with the untapped proved resources 
available in the region, North Africa is an additional lasting source of natural gas supply for 
the EU. Egypt and Libya might add a considerable amount of exports in the foreseeable future 
and provide the EU with additional sources.  
4.5.3 The North-Eastern Corridor from the former Soviet Union 
Russia is EU’s most important strategic partner when it comes to supply of oil and natural gas. 
The vast gas pipeline network transporting Russian natural gas is called the Unified Gas Supply 
System of Russia (UGSS) and the majority of supplies are delivered to EU through the 
infrastructure that was built still in Soviet times. Several Russian domestic links are 
indispensable for their export capacity. Such lines are the Northern Lights line, connecting 
western Siberia and Ukraine and the Soyuz, connecting western Ukrainian border with 
Kazakhstan. (Schubert et al., 2016, p. 237). Four main routes provide Russian gas to Europe 
and Turkey: the biggest one crosses Ukraine (Brotherhood), the second goes through Belarus 
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(Druzhba), the third crosses the Black Sea (Turk Stream and Blue Stream) and the fourth, most 
recent one, crosses Baltic see and goes straight to Germany (Nord Stream) (Schubert et al., 
2016, p. 237). Nord Stream 1 and the Turk Stream pipelines are the newest systems. All the 
others need an upgrade since they were constructed in late sixties or seventies of the 20th 
century.  
Both continental pipelines that bring gas to Europe together with several smaller pipelines, 
cross transit countries like Ukraine and Belarus (80 % flowing through Ukraine). Therefore, 
any dispute or instability between e.g. Russia or Ukraine directly affects the EU as a client is 
of a special concern to EU. The considerable dependence on transit countries, which according 
to Moscow hurts its reputation, prompted Russia to establish direct links with EU Member 
States, such as in the case of the Nord Stream pipelines, whichever since their inception have 
been mired in controversy largely due to the firm opposition of Poland and from the Baltic 
states. While Nord Stream is already an operating pipeline, the decision to add two new legs to 
the existing pipeline back in 2015, known as “Nord Stream 2”, one year after the Russian 
annexation of Crimea, has become particularly contentious. Thus, some EU institutions as well 
as Member States are still looking for ways to put obstacles to counter the arguably destructive 
project.  
Thus, this complex environment, coupled with pricing disputes and maintenance issues, to 
some degree provides the reasons behind the problematic nature of the EU-Russia energy 
relations. Consequently, EU is for more than a decade looking how to substitute monopolistic 
suppliers, while Russia is in parallel trying to keep its market share and build alternative routes 
towards EU and to bypass Ukraine.    
4.5.4 The South Eastern Corridor  
The South Eastern Corridor is divided in two sub corridors: the old one transporting resources 
from Central Asia to Europe via Russia and the new one aimed at delivering Caspian (and 
potentially Central Asian or Iranian) resources to the EU by crossing Turkey.   
The old corridor, bringing Central Asian resources, runs from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan 
and Kazakhstan to Russia through the largest Central Asian gas network called the Central 
Asia-Center (CAC) pipeline with five lines. The latter is entirely controlled by Russian 
Gazprom. Thus, the energy rich countries such as Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 
being important supply source for Europe, have to transmit the vast majority of their natural 
gas through CAC on its way to EU. (Schubert et al., 2016, p. 239). Moscow has been trying to 
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ensure its central role in the region by preventing alternative routes for Caspian gas that would 
exclude Russia as a transit country. Thus, if in some cases bypassing the latter would make 
more economic sense for Central Asian countries, it would entail significant risks of worsening 
relations with Moscow, which remains the region’s undisputed superpower (Schubert et al., 
2016, p. 240). 
The new corridor, which has been an important priority for the EU is known as the Southern 
Gas Corridor. The latter is constituted by different smaller pipeline projects and has specifically 
been designed to bring (at present) Azerbaijani natural gas resources to Europe by 
circumventing Russia. The project being among the “EU's highest energy security priorities” 
(European Commission, 2008, p.5) runs from the Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan. Gas from 
that gas field is feeding the Trans-Anatolian (TANAP) pipeline, eventually connecting to EU’s 
Nabucco West. This pipeline runs through countries like Georgia and Turkey through the 
existing interconnector Turkey-Greece that was built in 2007. It is an important part of the 
Southern corridor. Another important project of the network is the ongoing Trans-Adriatic-
Pipeline (TAP) delivering gas from the northern part of Greece to Italy by crossing Albania 
and the Adriatic Sea. Back in 2013, the TAP project was chosen as a preferred route of 
transportation by the Shah Deniz Consortium in order to deliver Caspian resources to the EU 
and was by the European Union also recognized as a Project of Common Interest (PCI). TAP 
started to operate in November 2020. 
The new Southern Gas Corridor gives Turkey an important role in the future of energy security 
in Europe, which, as long as political conditions permit, could offer an important link to Iran. 
However, in a shorter term, Turkey and more precisely the Turkish Stream project will allow 
Russia to send its gas to the EU utilizing the TAP pipeline and up to 15 bcm annually to 
Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Slovakia. This poses a direct challenge to the developers of the 
Southern Gas Corridor, since in case Gazprom uses the final component of the Southern Gas 
Corridor to deliver some 10-12bcm/y gas to the European market, it would be turning open 
access EU’s policy into the latter’s disadvantage (Roberts, 2015, p. 7).  
Currently, the TAP line is able to carry some 10 bcm/y of Azerbaijani gas to European markets 
from early 2021 onwards, yet, it was designed with a built-in capacity to put additional 
compression in place with a plan to double the capacity to at least 20 bcm/y (ibid, 2015, p. 14). 
The idea of the developers of the Southern Gas Corridor was to plan ahead in order to be 
prepared to receive the “next wave” of gas supplies from Azerbaijan. However, at present the 
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“next wave” of Azerbaijani gas projects is not expected to come on stream until to fill the extra 
capacity planned in both the TANAP and TAP lines due to unpredictable level of gas 
consumption in EU which turned towards accelerated decarbonisation. Considering that Russia 
is still planning to finalize its Turkish Stream II project, the spare capacity of the TAP pipeline 
could most probably be used by the latter, thus, obliging the producers of the “next wave” of 
Azerbaijani output to seek for alternative ways to reach the European market (ibid, 2015, p.7). 
Thus, this development would clearly undermine the core idea of the Southern Gas Corridor - 
to be an alternative transit route allowing the EU to reduce its dependence on Russia. Yet, it 
can equally serve as a driver for new pipelines delivering additional supplies in the future. 
4.5.5 Ukrainian corridor 
A lot of pipeline politics emerged due to Russia’s obsession to bypass Ukraine with gas routes 
and cut it off from transit income and gas supply. Regularly repeating gas crises due to cuts of 
gas flows through Ukraine allowed in May 2014 to Guenther Oettinger, EU Commissioner for 
Energy, to get a mandate to start trilateral gas negotiations between the European Union, 
Russian Federation and Ukraine. The Commissioner’s role as a broker in the trilateral gas talks, 
according to Stuewe (Stuewe, 2017, p.12) importantly increased the EU’s supranational 
competence in gas policy. EU Commission for the first time entered the country to country 
negotiations on gas contracts mediating on behalf of EU countries and customers. 
Supranationalism silently entered through the backdoor. This spill-over effect was even more 
visible during the next trilateral talks preceding the expiry of the Gazprom-Naftogaz transit 
contract. This raised questions in Europe and the world whether the transit contract would be 
renewed – especially if one has in mind the close to non-existing level of the Russian – 
Ukrainian relationship and mutual distrust at the time. 
The format in which this situation would unfold was – EU (with Vice President of the European 
Commission Maroš Šefcovič), Ukraine (Naftogaz, Ukrtransgaz, the Ministry) and Russia 
(Gazprom and the relevant Minister). 
The first trilateral was organized on 17 July 2018 in Berlin. The coordinates of the trilateral 
talks were established – and they remained pretty stable through the year and a half of the 
negotiations: the application of EU law in Ukraine (through its membership in the Energy 
Community), and its implication on the transit, the unbundling of an independent (from 
Naftogaz) transmission system operator to carry such a transit and the tariffs for such activity.  
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The volumes and the duration of the prolonged contract were in the orbits of the trilateral talks 
constantly, but the most important fact was the insistence of the Russian – and the EU side – 
on the EU acquis implementation in Ukraine, which was all about the Energy Community. 
In the second round of the trilateral talks, the EU proposed ambitious transit volumes of 60 
bcm basic + 30 bcm additional per year for next ten years. The proposal was seen as a 
negotiation chip. It was probably at the highest end of the expectations, the lowest end being 
yearly prolonged contracts (to be signed for each year on regular auctions of the capacity) or 
even not that long – occasional transit contracts per month or quarter. The volumes would be 
the residual once the Nord Stream 2 and the Turkish Stream are put in place (which would 
mean anything from one digit to 30 bcm per year).  
The next round planned in May did not take place. The wave of the EU election took place 
around this time, to allow formation of the new European Commission in November. The snap 
parliamentary election in Ukraine was immediately called for July. On top of that in June 2019, 
the Ukrainian Constitutional Court ruled that some provisions of the law on Energy Regulator, 
a key body for Ukraine to comply with EU rules, are unconstitutional. The Court allowed their 
application until end of 2019.  
In September with the new Cabinet of Ministers in place in Ukraine, the Energy Community 
Secretariat proposed a way forward in amending the laws which would enable proper 
certification of an independent transmission system operator and comply with EU rules.  
The new round of the trilaterals, after 8 months, took place on 19 September in Brussels, with 
the same parameters of the debate on the table. Not only did both sides agree that a future 
contract will be based on EU law but the Russian side requested for assurances regarding the 
transposition of EU legislation into the Ukrainian law so that transposition is on time and 
correct. The Energy Community Secretariat was tasked to analyze the transposition and 
implementation of the Third Energy Package in the sector of gas and to draft and review 
existing regulatory acts in Ukraine that are related to transit. The Secretariat delivered its 
analysis to the Ukrainian regulator and the EC on 11 October. Simultaneously, the unbundling 
plan of the TSO was adopted and laws enabling it were adopted in November. The candidate 
TSO applied for certification to the regulator. 
On 28 October, three sides held the 4th round of talks. The European Commission sent to the 
parties a written assessment of Ukraine’s implementation of the EU acquis relevant for transit 
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with a conclusion shared also by the Energy Community Secretariat that there are no obstacles 
in the Ukrainian law to an EU-based long-term transit agreement. 
The result of the meeting was - disappointing - the Commission tabled again a proposal for a 
framework agreement - indicative volumes (40-60 bcm/a + 20-30 bcm flexibility), a duration 
of 10 years with a stable EU-based tariff but including a ‘walk-away’ clause in case ofa tariff 
increase above 10 % after 5 years. In addition, the EC’s proposal recognized a need to conclude 
an Interconnection Agreement as a pre-condition for signing the transit contract.  
After several further exchanges of proposals and conditions, Russia and Ukraine agreed. The 
Secretariat received the Ukrainian regulator’s certification of the Gas TSO of Ukraine late 
November and issued a positive opinion on 17 December 2019. The unbundling saga - 
suffering from internal disputes in Ukraine and inertia for many years – was finalized. 
Moscow and Kyiv signed on 30 December a five-year agreement (2020-2024) on the transit of 
Russian gas to Europe via Ukraine, a day before the old one was to expire. At that moment, 
one fifth of Europe’s annual natural gas consumption came from Russia via Ukraine. The 
transit obliges the two sides to transit (ship or pay) at least 65 billion cubic meters of natural 
gas via Ukraine in 2020, then at least 40 billion per year from 2021 to 2024.  
4.6 From inclusiveness to dominance, from multi- to bilateralism  
The EU is not rich with natural resources and cannot play a dominant role as a supplier. The 
EU’s strength is its huge and rich demand driven market, which is used as a negotiating tool 
particularly in bilateral relations. Illustrative is a statement of Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir bin Mohamad (Dallison, 2019) who wanted to strike a deal with United Kingdom 
after exiting EU saying that EU uses environmental concerns as a justification for its tough 
stance on palm oil, an important Malaysian export product. He further blamed EU that 
environmental concerns are designed to protect the agricultural industries of some EU states. 
He asked why EU agreed on a trade deal with South America with its beef production as by far 
the world’s biggest agricultural cause of deforestation, incomparable with CO2 emissions 
related to palm oil production. He named EU’s stance as “blatant hypocrisy” being “a form of 
modern colonialism that has no place in today’s world. By using trade as a weapon, the EU is 
in effect bullying poorer regions of the world”. (ibid., 2019) 
Here I need to add that highly controversial trade deal with Mercosur from June 2019 later 
didn’t get support in some EU Member States thanks to French-led blowback over the 
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environmental impact of the accord, particularly in terms of destruction of the Amazon 
rainforest and was not ratified. In order to have a credible trade agenda, Brussels is now under 
pressure to get serious about locking its much-touted green and social "standards" into future 
deals. It seems that a template trade contract for the future will be the one with New Zealand 
because New Zealand's Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern is by herself a strong proponent of 
greener trade deals. Major EU Member States have called on the Commission to use trade 
agreements as a leverage to get other countries to act on their Paris climate commitments. All 
older trade agreements usually had a clause on environmental aspects and sustainability but 
without any enforcement provision. It seems that latest EU’s Green Deal commitments could 
change this substantially for the future. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen 
even publicly stated that she wants to leverage the EU’s status as the world’s biggest trade bloc 
to set international norms for sustainable trade and fight climate change. (Guillot, 2021) 
The principle of non-discrimination is embedded into the EU acquis but it is not used in relation 
to third countries. Since the EU foreign energy policy emerged as a continuation of the internal 
legal framework such a situation causes some controversies. The principle of non-
discrimination prohibits treating similar situations differently and treating different situations 
in the same way, unless there are objective reasons to do so. It requires consistency and 
rationality and EU institutions should justify their policies and abstain from engaging in 
arbitrary conduct. For Talus (Talus, 2018, p.1), the amended Gas Directive from 2019 is 
discriminatory since it is designed against one single pipeline – Nord Stream 2.  
Wish it or not, such discriminatory status the EU imposed not only against Russia, who is 
opposing the EU’s internal legal framework, but also towards Energy Community Contracting 
Parties, which are following EU’s rules. This is yet another example of the reluctance of the 
EU to ensure a level playing field in the EU-Energy Community relations.  At first glance, the 
discussion might seem of a purely technical nature, however, the Directive has considerable 
extraterritorial implications, inter alia, on the Energy Community Contracting Parties as it aims 
to unilaterally expand the application of EU rules beyond its territory. Reasons why this move 
goes against the EU rhetoric with regard to the Energy Union are several: Firstly, the 
Commission’s move is purely unilateral and is disregarding both its international obligations 
taken under the Energy Community Treaty which is affected by this proposal as well as its 
objective of enhancing regional cooperation with neighbors, as stated in the Energy Union 
Package. Secondly, the move is striking in light of the foregoing reluctance of the Commission 
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to accept reciprocal rights and obligations on interconnectors among the EU Member states 
and the Energy Community Contracting Parties.  
On the one hand, the amended Directive has been put forward without prior consultation of 
relevant stakeholders. By this unilateral action, the EU is disregarding its obligations taken 
under the Energy Community Treaty to which it is a Party. By signing the Treaty, the European 
Union decided to be bound by it equally as other parties. Moreover, the Contracting Parties of 
the Energy Community are considered as third countries by the EU. Thus, the amended 
Directive, which aimed to expand the application of EU rules to the jurisdiction of third 
countries risks entailing conflicts of legal regimes since it will have legal effect on the territory 
covered by the Energy Community. In this context, the absence of prior consultation with the 
Energy Community goes against the spirit of the Treaty and the obligations stemming from it. 
This also contradicts the statement of the Commission “to establish a consultative process and 
involve the Contracting Parties when developing EU laws in the future which will have a direct 
impact on the Energy Community Contracting Parties” (Energy Community, 2014). 
Moreover, this unilateral move undermined the role of the Energy Community in strengthening 
the Pan-European energy market. As we saw above, the EU institutions have been stressing the 
importance of engaging with neighboring countries and enhancing regional cooperation, inter 
alia, by the means of the Energy Community, which is mentioned several times in the Energy 
Union Framework Strategy as well as its following reports. However, the recent move of the 
EU goes against this objective and limits it to a purely declaratory nature.  
On the other hand, the EU has been reluctant to ensure a level-playing field and balanced rights 
and obligations between the Contracting Parties of the Energy Community and the bordering 
EU Member States. Consequently, the approach vis-a-vis interconnectors between the EU 
members and the Energy Community Contracting Parties has not been subject to reciprocity. 
This is especially striking when the Commission in order to “ensure investment security in a 
pan-European energy market and avoid different treatment between Contracting Parties and 
Member States” back in 2014 accepted the interpretation of an interconnector under Article 94 
of the Energy Community Treaty, according to which interconnectors “integrating the 
Contracting Party/Contracting Parties with the EU internal energy market, shall be treated in 
the same way and be subject to the same provisions as the respective flows, imports, exports, 
transactions, capacities and infrastructure between Contracting Parties under Energy 
Community law”(ibid, 2014) . Nevertheless, further to this the Commission issued merely a 
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Recommendation calling on the Member States to implement the EU acquis regarding the 
above mentioned interpretation (Energy Community, 2014). Considering the fact that a 
recommendation is a non-binding document, it represented a simple invitation for cooperation.  
Additional attempts to ensure reciprocity between the Energy Community Contracting Parties 
and the EU Member States were raised in the framework of the discussions on the legislative 
proposal amending the Regulation on the security of gas supply (2010)22. Recognizing that a 
gas crisis could develop also beyond EU borders, including the Energy Community Contracting 
Parties, the amended regulation in many areas applies to the Contracting Parties of the Energy 
Community. However, in practice the Commission still proved reluctant to accept reciprocity 
by e.g. introducing “switch-on”23 clauses as a general principle for ensuring the level playing 
field and efficient integration of the energy markets in question. Instead, the discussion was 
reoriented towards the long-standing issue of amending the Energy Community Treaty which 
has been pending for years. 
The Energy Community Contracting Parties as equal participants to the single European gas 
market were forgotten also in the context of settlement of a dispute between European 
Commission’s DG Competition and Gazprom. Due to Gazprom’s anti-competitive actions 
back in 2012, the European Commission launched an antitrust investigation in 2012, which 
focused on: Gazprom’s denial of third party access to gas pipelines, illegal partitioning of 
markets by destination clauses and unlawful pricing misusing Gazprom’s dominant position. 
Despite Energy Community’s call to settle the same issues on the territory of Contracting 
Parties and use the negotiating clout in that particular procedure the Commission remained 
silent. 
 
A step further in imposing dominance in the foreign energy policy of the EU has been done 
through amendments to Annex XXVII of the Association Agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine from 2014 (European Council, 2019). The original Annex XXVII referred to the 
Energy Community acquis where the EU and Ukraine participate as two out of ten equal 
Parties. The Energy Community acquis is in some cases adapted and differs from the EU acquis 
                                                          
22 Regulation (EU) No 994/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October 2010 concerning 
measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive 2004/67/EC. 
23 The rationale behind the “switch on clause”, initially put forward by the Commission, was to introduce a “double 
checking” mechanism necessitating the confirmation of both the Energy Community Secretariat and the European 
Commission concerning the implementation of the gas security regulation by a Contracting Party. Only after such 
confirmation, the obligation towards the Contracting Party could be “switched on” to an EU Member State. 
However, the Commission later showed reluctance in introducing such clauses as a general principle for ensuring 
legal certainty and non-discrimination, arguing that there was no relevant legal basis for such mechanism.  
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acts with the same title. In 2019, Ukraine desperately needed EU support in trilateral talks on 
Russian gas transit. Apart from trilateral talks, as described above, the European Commission 
in early 2019 proposed to the EU Council the position to be taken in the Association Council 
(common governing body established on the basis of the AA). The procedure appears to have 
gone rapidly – within 5 months from the EC proposal, the final decision of the Association 
Council was taken. The text was adopted in an unaltered form, which shows that neither the 
Council of the European Union, nor the Ukrainian side, which tacitly transferred loyalty from 
national institutions to the European Commission, introduced changes to the text.  
The new Annex XXVII was adopted as Decision 1/2019 of the Association Council 
Association Council, 2019). It envisages that Ukraine shall consult the European Commission, 
about the compatibility of any legislative proposal in the electricity, gas and energy efficiency 
area with the EU acquis, prior to its entry into force. The obligation to consult includes also 
proposals for modification of already legislative acts that already transposed particular EU 
legal act. Ukraine shall further refrain from putting into effect any act which was prior to its 
adoption not submitted for consultation. The European Commission has three months to 
respond. After three months, Ukraine is allowed to adopt an act without the Commission’s 
blessing. Eventual nonresponse in three months shall not be treated as a consent of the 
Commission or that such act is compatible with the EU acquis. Further, Ukraine shall 
communicate to the Commission the final version of every domestic legal act related to the EU 
acquis listed in the annex.  
Not only did Ukraine transfer its sovereignty to the European Commission but the Association 
Council with the Decision introduced a parallel legal framework. The Energy Community 
acquis is sometimes different compared to the EU acquis. While the original annex XXVII was 
very clear and envisaged adoption of the Energy Community acquis by Ukraine (“Ukraine 
undertakes to gradually approximate its legislation to the EU acquis as indicated in the Protocol 
concerning the Accession of Ukraine to the Energy Community Treaty”), the new version of 
Annex XXVII refers to the EU acquis and, clearly, only deadlines from the Energy Community 
acquis shall be respected (“EU acquis that Ukraine committed to implement within the 
framework of the Energy Community Treaty. Deadlines agreed therein shall apply to this 
Annex.”).  
 
The EU evidently was not entirely satisfied with the state of energy sector reforms in Ukraine 
and saw “the need to provide further support measures to ensure that the reforms undertaken 
have an irreversible and lasting character. The additional provisions are therefore intended to 
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contribute to a correct approximation and implementation of the approximated legislation by 
Ukraine, based on the EU energy acquis.” (Explanatory Memorandum by the European 
Commission on the Proposal for a Decision to amend Annex XXVII). The Association Council, 
in adopting the new Annex XXVII, gave the AA supremacy over Energy Community law. The 
new consultation mechanism was evidently inspired by the objective to make the process of 
gradual approximation with EU energy law more efficient, faster and sustainable but conflict 
with the parallel implementation duties under the Energy Community Treaty may arise. Unlike 
the bilateral Association Agreement, the multilateral Energy Community Treaty, within its 
scope, does not provide for an approximation but an implementation duty by Ukraine. This 
implementation duty is sanctioned by an enforcement mechanism modelled on EU 
infringement action procedures.  
The parallel existence of a bilateral and a multilateral legal order is not unique for the case of 
Ukraine but pertains to essentially all Contracting Parties which have agreements with the EU 
and its Member States based on approximation duties. Article 103 of the Energy Community 
Treaty resolves this potential tension in favor of the bilateral relations in stating that “any 
obligations under an agreement between the European Community and its Member States on 
the one hand, and a Contracting Party on the other hand shall not be affected by this Treaty”.  
At the same time, however, Article 6 of the Energy Community Treaty imposes on both the 
EU and a Contracting Party such as Ukraine a duty of loyal cooperation, obliging them to 
“abstain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this 
Treaty” and, “positively, to facilitate the achievement of the Energy Community’s tasks.” 
While not necessarily implying breaches of the Association Agreement or the Energy 
Community Treaty, the existence of two parallel legal orders and mechanisms to ensure 
compliance raises the issue of homogeneity. Homogeneity could be jeopardized by divergences 
in substance (e.g. adaptations in a piece of Energy Community law to be implemented by 
Ukraine which does not exist in the corresponding piece of EU law with which Ukraine is 
supposed to approximate) as well as by divergences in assessment (e.g. the Secretariat or 
ultimately the Ministerial Council comes to different conclusions as to the compliance of a 
given piece of Ukrainian law than the European Commission).   
As Adam Cwetsch said during an online discussion “Implementation of Annex XXVII to the 
Association Agreement: progress, challenges and opportunities”, this annex is for the European 
Commission unique and treated as a privilege for Ukraine compared to the multilateral 
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framework (Kopač, personal minutes, 2020, 28 April)24. According to Ulla Hakanen from the 
European External Action Service, such transfer of sovereignty was possible only in special 
circumstances in the context of trilateral gas talks (Kopač, 2020, ibid.). 
Thus, all the above mentioned cases served to demonstrate the existing discrepancy between 
the statements and the actions of the European Commission. In this context, unless the EU’s 
executive arm starts translating the declared objectives into actions, the Energy Union, which 
was envisioned by its authors to have a true Pan-European dimension and an outward-looking 
nature, is destined to fail to live up to the expectations, while the EU itself risks remaining a 
mediocre player in the energy field for a longer time. The European Commission with Annex 
XXVII got competences that are unimaginable inside the EU, perhaps only comparable to the 
competences based on the Decision on establishing an information exchange mechanism with 
regard to intergovernmental agreements and non-binding instruments between Member States 
and third countries in the field of energy from 2017. This was an institutional and functional 
spill-over proving the accuracy of the neofunctionalist theory of political integration.  
                                                          
24 Minutes are available at author. 
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5 US Foreign Energy Policy 
 
5.1 A brief historical overview of the US energy policy 
US energy policy has gone through different changes throughout history, swinging between 
the three sides of the so-called energy trilemma (Tapia Ramirez, 2017, p.58). In an initial 
period, which can tentatively be situated between 1918 and 1956, competitiveness was the 
primary objective of the energy policy. In a second period, energy supply security was placed 
firmly at the forefront as a result of the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the consequent definition of 
the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine25. The security of supply related concerns reached their peak 
in 1973 as a consequence of the embargo that the Arab countries applied to the US because of 
its support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War. Supply security practically monopolized the 
energy debate in the US throughout the 1970s, and remained at the center of the debate in the 
following years. Finally, during a third period, which started midway through the 1980s, the 
debate became a lot more multi-sided: on the one hand, an interest in energy security never 
waned, mainly due to military conflicts in strategic zones (Gulf War in 1990-91, Afghanistan 
in 2001 or Iraq in 2003); the emergence of global terrorism with repercussions on the energy 
markets (one of Bin Laden’s recurrent accusations towards the United States was having 
“stolen our oil at ridiculous prices, the greatest robbery that mankind has ever witnessed” (Bin 
Laden, 2002)as well as the sharp increase in energy demand in the emerging countries. This 
reintroduced into the US strategic lexicon the concept of “competition for resources”26, which, 
in turn, generated a sharp increase in international energy prices, reaching their maximum 
levels in the first quarter of 2009 and brought back the debate about the “competitiveness” of 
the North American energy model. On the other hand, the sustainability of the US energy model 
became an important topic of debates during this third period, with different accent depending 
on the political party in power, with greater emphasis in the second mandate of Clinton-Gore 
between 1996 and 2000, and in the Obama Administration starting from 2008 (Tapia Ramirez, 
2017, pp. 58-59). 
                                                          
25 In January 1957, President Eisenhower declared a new position in US international relations ratified by 
Congress two months later, according to which any country could request economic assistance and/or military aid 
from the US, in case that country felt a military threat coming from another state. The decision made by the 
Eisenhower Administration, which was prompted by incipient Arab hostility and the Soviet Union’s growing 
influence in the region, also marked the transition of the US from being concerned with competitiveness in the 
previous period in the field of energy, to being preoccupied with guaranteeing access to resources. 
26 This expression appears as from 2006, in the annual report issued by the Defence Department.   
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5.2 Some milestones shaping the US energy policy  
The US economy has generally been marked by competitive markets and private initiative. The 
US Constitution’s protection of private property and an American culture that favors  individual 
responsibility and liberty have worked together in maintaining the economy’s market 
orientation and relative success of the market oriented system despite occasional swings in 
political views, when the favorable view of liberal markets is less warmly embraced than at 
other times (Jamison, 2011, pp. 366-383). An important exception in the long history of liberal 
market framework has been the regulation of public utility services. Public utility as a term is 
not well defined but has been usually connected to the industries that tend to be monopolistic 
due the nature of their business and are concerned with the public interest. Their performance 
significantly affects social and economic functioning of the country and therefore they are 
subject to legal obligations beyond and above those relevant to other enterprises (ibid, 2011, 
p.366-383).  
There are few aspects of different treatment of utility enterprises in the US The utilities are in 
general regulated monopolies. Regulations usually include limits on the providers’ prices, 
restrictions on the extent to which a utility can discriminate similar customers in its service and 
an obligation to serve without differentiation all customers willing to pay the regulated price.  
The regulated prices must allow the operator to maintain its financial integrity, i.e., to recover 
its reasonable costs and cover the costs of equity and debt. This is limitation to government’s 
authority to regulate prices (Philips, 1993, p.291). Such a limit of the government’s competence 
to regulate prices is designed to check eventual opportunistic behavior by the government, 
which could otherwise reduce investment and services. Utilities in monopolistic sectors are 
more often publicly owned, although private ownership is not excluded (Jamison, 2011, p. 3). 
In this sub-chapter we will discuss some milestones on the way to US energy liberalization and 
regulation, which are most relevant and which shaped US energy policy as it is today.  
At first energy was offered to customers either locally or regionally, thus the policies regulating 
the sector were also initially developed at the local level. Only later the regulating policy was 
established also on a state level. No general regulatory entity had been appointed on a local 
level, therefore regulatory policies developed organically and particular resources like oil, coal, 
and natural gas were governed individually, unrelated to each other (Tomain, 1990, p.357). 
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century important transitions in industry took place. 
US energy focus first switched from wood to coal and later from coal to oil and natural gas. In 
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parallel the nature of markets changed as well: from local to regional and later national level. 
This evolution mirrored the progress of the energy sector itself. Meanwhile, the predominant 
paradigm of US energy law and policy could already be discerned characterized by ordinance 
that emanated from underlying tenseness between a system, providing energy from private 
companies and state control (ibid, 1990, p.357).  
In the beginning of the twentieth century, oil became the paradigm of big industry. One of the 
earliest landmark events in the history of the US oil sector became the splitting up of John 
Rockefeller’s oil monopoly - Standard Oil. Decreed in 1911 by the US Supreme Court in 
application of the antitrust legislation (often known as the Sherman Act of 1890), the decision 
marked the advent of a new industrial policy - more focused on maintaining effective 
competitive conditions on the markets (Tapia Ramirez, 2017, p. 63). Oil Standard, founded in 
1870 by Rockefeller, not only developed the production, refining and transporting of oil 
products in the US (where it managed to obtain a market share of 80 %), but it was also the 
pioneer of the vertical integration of these activities, until it finally became the first industrial 
conglomerate in history (ibid, 2017, p.63). Yet, Standard Oil’s success went too far. Some of 
its increasingly aggressive trading practices caused great controversies in public opinion after 
a series of reports published in McClure’s Magazine. The rising protest movement, the so-
called “progressive movement”, led to a reaction from the authorities in defense of the 
consumers and respect for the basic rules of competition. Eventually, Rockefeller’s Standard 
Oil was to be split into as many as thirty-three companies, many of which would end up by 
merging with each other or with other international companies, to form what would later come 
to be known as the “seven sisters”: Anglo-Persian Oil Company (currently BP), Gulf Oil, 
Standard Oil of California (currently Chevron), Texaco (later merged with Chevron); Royal 
Dutch Shell, Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso/Exxon) and Standard Oil Company of New 
York (Socony) (known as Mobil, now part of ExxonMobil) (ibid, 2017, p.63). In the first years 
of its emergence the natural gas industry was not concentrated. Natural gas was more often a 
nuisance disturbing oil extraction than a market product. (Tomain, 1990, p. 359). Back in the 
days of the Second World War when fuel rationing was a constant threat to the allied forces 
and began to cause great inconvenience to the Americans in their daily lives, President 
Roosevelt wrote to his Secretary of the Interior: “I’d like it if you could put some of your team 
to work on the possibility of using natural gas. I’ve been told that there are a lot of wells in the 
West and South-West of the country where hardly any oil has been found, but where there is a 
vast amount of natural gas that is unutilized because it is too far from populated zones” (Yergin, 
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2011, p.317). Certainly it was not a question of discovering an already well-known fuel, yet, it 
was considered that its potential was strictly limited by the cost of its transportation. Therefore, 
President Roosevelt was proposing an unusual measure, namely, using natural gas to cover the 
shortage of oil. The regulatory context was ideal as back in 1938, the Natural Gas Act had been 
passed, which placed the interstate natural gas transfer network under public control (Tapia 
Ramirez, 2017, p. 83). In the years before New Deal the energy sector oil replaced coal as the 
main energy source. The market was dominated by large, integrated private companies. During 
the New Deal such organization of the sector continued. The only difference was the 
federalization of the policy that was most evident in the regulation of interstate energy sales 
since market became national and the national state had to adapt (Tomain, 1990, p. 363). 
Development of the natural gas market went through similar transition. When natural gas had 
started to be perceived as useful and precious good, the small companies that were in charge 
prior to that, were ruled out and the sector eventually became regulated on the federal level. 
The Federal Power Act from 1935 and the Natural Gas Act from 1938 gave power to the 
Federal Power Commission (FPC), initially created to coordinate hydroelectric projects under 
federal control, to start regulating the sale and transportation of electricity and natural gas.  
Amendments to the Natural Gas Act from 1940 gave the FPC competence to certify and 
regulate Natural Gas facilities. In 1954, the judge in case Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin 
decided that the FPC has jurisdiction over facilities producing natural gas sold in interstate 
commerce. Ten years later, back in 1964, another judge in a case City of Colton v. SoCal 
Edison decided that the FPC also has jurisdiction over intra-state sales of power that had been 
transmitted across state lines. This had negative consequences for the security of gas supply 
and even caused energy crises with chronic brownouts in the 1960s and OPEC embargo in the 
1970s due to a colossal backlog of applications for natural gas permits.  The situation called 
for reorganization of the FPC. In 1977, Congress reorganized the FPC as the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), expanded its responsibilities and in 1978 adopted the 
National Energy Act which was a legislative response to the energy crisis and which, among 
others, unified intrastate and interstate gas markets. This legislative initiative, introduced by 
President Carter, became a major step in the legislation for the supply and for the demand side 
of the energy sector. The package has soon been followed by the Energy Security Act signed 
into law in 1980, which addressed energy conservation and development of renewable energy 
sources. Both legislative packages established a strong framework for regulation securing 
market-based initiatives, for the development of energy efficiency programs, tax incentives 
and disincentives as well as for alternative fuel programs. Importantly, most of the market-
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based mechanisms have been retained in some form to the present, while excessive regulation 
has been abandoned. 
Some specific consequences for the natural gas market as a result of the Natural Gas Policy 
Act and the 1985 Order concerning the gas market were requiring that natural gas pipelines 
allow open access to transportation services, in order to enable consumers to separately 
negotiate prices with producers and contract separately for transportation. Besides, the 
Restructuring Rule of 1992 mandated unbundling of sales services from transportation 
services, providing customers with full choice of providers and opening these markets to 
competition (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission).  Thus, FERC has been encouraging 
less regulated natural gas market that would boost competition, which would eventually result 
in not only increased production but increased utilization as well. 
The growth in production and usage of natural gas in the US is also attributed to the fact that 
back in the late seventies, as part of the legislative package Congress passed the Fuel Use Act, 
which treated natural gas in a curious way: its utilization for producing electricity was 
prohibited, reserving it exclusively for activities that were considered to have greater added 
value, such as industrial, cooling and heating processes. At the beginning of the nineties, the 
restrictions on the use of natural gas to produce electricity were lifted, which ushered in the era 
of what was known as the “dash for gas”, not only in the US but also in Europe27. In fact, at 
present, the major use for natural gas in the United States is electricity generation 
(approximately 35%), followed by industrial consumption (30%) and domestic consumption 
(about 20%) (Tapia Ramirez, 2017, p. 83). Over the past 20 years, the growth in gas demand 
in the US is entirely attributable to electricity generation, due to the fact that both industrial 
and domestic consumption have declined (ibid, 2017, p.83).  
As discussed in the beginning of the sub-chapter, one can identify some key features of the U.S 
energy policy which have remained unchanged over the years. Firstly, the US industrial policy, 
in comparison with the European one, has mostly ran on private competition. Therefore, there 
is a suspicious attitude toward central planning and the government’s attempts to halt large 
accumulations of corporate power has usually taken place through enforcement of antitrust 
policy. Thus, heavily planned controlling of the economy has not been recognized as a 
generally accepted approach the business. Secondly, although government has been perceived 
                                                          
27 The Dash for Gas was an energy sector move in the 1990s when newly privatized electric companies in the 
United Kingdom massively shifted to natural gas in generating.   
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as a guarantor against safety net in the event of abuse of power of the corporations, it has also 
been promotor of competition and therefore of other business entities. Thirdly, there has been 
a dedication to achieve the high-tech energy production based on a large-scale capital intensive  
entities (Tomain, 1990, p. 391). Lastly, the predominant model of the US economy and also 
energy policy is founded on the principles of democratic capitalism. This is represented by 
private ownership, aversion towards central planning and low wariness of monopolies. 
Country’s reliance on the market has constituted such a strong foundation that the state 
intervenes only in case of very evident market abuses (ibid, 1990, p.391).  
5.3 Energy independence as the main goal of US energy policy 
In this chapter I will place the main focus on the energy security and the US strategy towards 
it. Energy security, as noted above, has been the major focus in US politics particularly since 
the oil price shocks of the 1970s. Since then the US predominately focused on its independence 
in the energy sector. Following the oil crisis in November 1973, President Nixon announced 
“Project Independence,” a plan to achieve energy self-sufficiency by 1980, which included 
measures such as putting the clocks back or forward on a seasonal basis, decreasing the 
temperature in public buildings from 23-24°C to between 18 and 20°C, and reducing the speed 
limit for administration vehicles to 80 km/h (Tapia Ramirez, 2017, p. 69). In 1975, the US 
Congress passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, which besides creating the strategic 
oil reserve following the International Energy Agency’s (IAE) recommendations28, imposed 
efficiency standards on vehicles for the first time.  
The energy independence target was also welcomed by President Carter, who made it a core 
issue in his mandate, in a famous speech in which he defined the energy crisis as the “moral 
equivalent of war”  (Carter, 1977). Carter set up the Energy Department, and allocated 
thousands of millions of dollars to the development of alternative technologies. It is also a 
known fact that he installed thirty-two solar panels on the roof of the White House, which 
Reagan ordered to be removed once he became President (Tapia Ramirez, 2017, p.69). All in 
all, energy independence would come to form part of the US political lexicon, and would be 
welcomed, sometimes worshipped, by the successive administrations (ibid, 2017, p.69). . It 
was during Carter’s Presidency and another consequence of the 1973 oil crisis that a pivotal 
                                                          
28 The International Energy Agency was set up in 1974 following the first oil crisis to coordinate the strategies of 
the oil consuming countries. The IEA established certain rules for coping with emergency situations, such as 
keeping a strategic reserve stock. In 1976, the IEA proposed a long-term plan to reduce the rate of energy 
consumption, which included improving energy efficiency and developing alternative sources of energy. 
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role was created for Saudi Arabia, which was accentuated by the Iranian Revolution. The 1979 
Revolution in Iran extracted the latter from the US sphere of influence, and also reduced its 
production by between 3 and 4 million barrels per year (around 7 % of the world production at 
that time), a capacity that the country never recovered in full because of the successive 
obstacles faced by the Iranian oil industry (ibid, 2017, p.69). These events considerably 
strengthened the role of Saudi Arabia and triggered the creation a policy later called Carter 
Doctrine. In his speech on the State of the Union in January 1980, President Carter declared 
that the United States would use military force, to the extent that this was necessary, in order 
to defend its national interests in the Persian Gulf (Carter, 1977). This was a response both to 
the Iran hostage crisis and the military presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and 
represented one of the most serious geopolitical moments in the fight for energy resources in 
the history of US energy policy (Tapia Ramirez, 2017, p. 70). Oil, which had a fundamental 
role in the US economy, was seen as a scarce resource and the United States was ready to use 
the necessary military force to guarantee its supply.    
The question of US energy independence came to the forefront once again during the George 
W. Bush presidency. The National Energy Policy published a few months before the September 
11 attacks was restating the neo-conservative idea which was already supreme in the Bush 
administration, namely the fact that the US growing dependence on foreign oil clearly showed 
that the US had failed to establish an effective energy policy. This thesis was reinforced after 
the September 11 attacks, which apart from the belief that it was making the United States 
vulnerable, came to be seen as a source of financing for international terrorism. This became 
the underlying ideology of the 2004 Iraq War and the parallel effort to develop alternative oil 
supplies. This was summarized in 2006, when President Bush presented a speech on the State 
of the Union. He stated that it was necessary to break America’s addiction to oil often imported 
from unstable parts of the world (Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the 
State of the Union, 2006), a somewhat unexpected statement from a Texan president whose 
early professional career had revolved around the oil sector. Later, the record levels of oil prices 
in 2008 further strengthened the argument for US energy independence (Tapia Ramirez, 2017, 
p. 73). 
Overall, it can be argued that the United States has done relatively little to adapt to the changing 
global market in previous decades. Instead, the energy independence rhetoric of the 1970s and 
a protectionist and misleading view that the US can be safe if it looks inward and that it can 
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rely on itself for guaranteeing its own energy security has been prevalent (Rosenberger et al., 
2016, p.32). While criticized for being outdated and misleading, this has long held populist 
appeal and had a degree of resonance not only during the Cold War but also in the previous 
years (Rosenberger et al., 2016, p.32).  
5.4 From energy independence to energy dominance 
Policy responses in the beginning of the twenty-first century had not changed much comparing 
to the ones in the 1970s. They were still advocating an increase in the size of the Strategic 
Petroleum Reserve (SPR), tightening standards on vehicle fuel consumption, expanding oil 
production domestically and trying to diversify types of fuels (Duffield, 2015, pp. 240-241). 
Yet, during President Obama’s period address of climate changes was added on top of those 
objectives. In his Climate Action Plan from June 2013 this dimension of energy policy became 
a major aspect in creation of the energy strategy of US. President Obama was actively engaged 
in climate related multilateral activities. This new strategy, coupled with the US foreign 
policy’s new orientation towards the Pacific (so-called “Pivot to Asia”), facilitated the historic 
agreement between the US and China back in November 2014 with regard to the reduction of 
their emissions in the next two decades. This agreement in turn gave a decisive boost to 
international climate negotiations that culminated successfully in Paris in December 2015.  
However, on the first day of Donald Trump’s presidency (20 January 2017), the White House 
website proclaimed Obama’s Climate Action Plan as “harmful and unnecessary” and 
announced to repeal it. In March 2017, President Trump indeed signed an executive order to 
officially nullify Obama's Clean Power Plan trying to revive the coal industry (Davenport & 
Rubin, 2017). This was only one out of several steps that President Trump took during the first 
year of his term in office making a 180-degree turnaround from the energy policy of President 
Obama. The culmination of this abrupt shift in the US’ energy policy was made particularly 
known by the Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (Escribano, 2018). 
Most of the proposals of President Trump with regard to energy matters (called the “America 
First Energy Plan”) were announced in May in a speech in North Dakota, one of the places that 
is well-known for its increase in the production of unconventional hydrocarbons in recent years 
(Tapia Ramirez, 2017, pp. 89-93). His proposals, which sometimes sounded like slogans, 
included: American energy supremacy; achieving total energy independence from the OPEC 
countries or any other hostile nation; removing all administrative obstacles to exploration; and 
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adopting a neutral position towards the development of new technologies, for example, 
between renewable energies and nuclear energy (ibid, 2017, pp.89-93). Among the other 
energy related measures  making part of Trump’s plan of action for the first 100 days were: to 
revoke all the executive decisions taken by President Obama in recent years in matters 
concerning energy and climate, including the Climate Action Plan and the Waters of the US 
Rule; to “save” the coal industry; to “ask” TransCanada to submit again the permits to construct 
the Keystone XL Oil Pipeline29; to lift all restrictions on exploration and drilling for 
hydrocarbons;  to “cancel” the Paris climate agreement and suspend all the US contributions 
to the UN programs fighting climate change and to “get rid of” the nuclear agreement with Iran 
(ibid, 2017, pp.89-93). With the election of President Joe Biden all this policy orientation 
became irrelevant on the first day in office of President Biden. 
The National Security Strategy published by the White House in December 2017 echoes the 
America First Energy Plan. America’s energy dominance is seen as a means towards the 
prosperity of the US: “For the first time in generations, the United States will be an energy-
dominant nation” (The White House, 2017, p.22). Furthermore, according to the Strategy, 
unleashing the abundant energy resources, such as coal, petroleum, natural gas, nuclear and 
renewables would build a foundation for future growth by stimulating the economy. According 
to the Trump administration, anyone standing in the way of American exploitation of coal, oil 
and gas resources would be perceived as an obstructer of the US national interest (Klare M. T., 
2018). Among the priority actions stated in the National Security Strategy are: limiting 
regulatory burdens to energy production, promoting exports of the US energy sources, and 
ensuring energy security by working with allies and partners (The White House, 2017, p.23). 
Thus, Trump’s National Security Strategy, has positioned the expansion of the US fossil fuel 
industry and its exports into a major component of American foreign and security policy. US 
started to aim for the energy dominance, instead of mere energy independence. This 
dramatically changed with the President Biden, who dropped the doctrine of energy dominance 
the first week after he took the office. 
While the overall consequences of Trump’s policy still remain unexplored, it should be stressed 
that in US type of capitalism state policy cannot basically change an energy ecosystem. 
Therefore, it needs to be stressed that US energy leadership is not run by energy nationalism 
                                                          
29 Almost 2,000 kilometres long pipeline project linking the Alberta oil reserves in Canada with the refineries in 
Texas and Illinois, which was rejected by the Obama Administration in 2015.  
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but by business dynamism that found potentials in hydrocarbons as well as in renewable 
energies. For example, due to the reduction in the costs of generation of electricity from 
renewable sources, the transition in the US electricity sector has become inevitable despite 
President Trump’s strong support to coal industry. Therefore, even state policy cannot reverse 
the trend of the energy transition leading the US electricity generation industry towards a 
combination of gas and renewable energies, combined with new electricity storage systems and 
smart grids. Also the interest of business communities and the regulatory capacity of the federal 
states, especially those where the voters support renewable energy because of economic (as in 
Texas) or because of environmental reasons (as in California) is an important counterbalance 
to the fossil oriented  policy of Trump’s administration (Escribano, 2018). Yet, it is inevitable 
that a legacy of Trump’s policy will slow down this process. Trump’s attitude also developed 
with changed circumstances. During the presidential campaign Donald Trump promoted 
energy isolationism. This has been later demonstrated by his attitude towards the ban on 
petroleum exports. While candidate Trump was opposing to the decision of the Obama 
Administration to remove the ban on petroleum exports back in 2015, in the course of 2017 a 
wave of US oil and gas exports was unleashed and President Trump changed his mind to the 
extent that he threatened with tariff retaliation measures if i.e.EU would not import more LNG 
from the US (ibid, 2018). Business went its own way. Namely, between January and June of 
2017, the US exported on average 750,000 barrels a day of petroleum, a figure which was 
doubled during the last quarter of the year 2017 and which made the US one of the largest oil 
exporters in the world (ibid, 2018). From a first tanker anchoring EU port in 2016 the European 
Union countries took delivery of already 36 percent of overall US LNG cargoes in 2019. It 
should be noted that the policies which have brought this result were in place already before 
Donald Trump became a President. Despite his initial campaign in favor of going back to the 
prohibition of US petroleum exports in the name of “America First”, fast growing fossil fuels 
export during his mandate in the Oval Office will remain a remarkable achievement.  
Despite the fact that the US achieved the status of the biggest producer of oil and natural gas 
on the planet, the three objectives traditionally pursued by its external energy policy kept their 
importance. First one was traditionally that global oil markets are sufficiently supplied and 
disruptions are minimized as much as possible. Second one was to support allies (among which 
Europe has usually been the major focus of US energy diplomacy) to diversify their own 
resources of energy. The third one was and is to use sanctions, often against oil and gas 
producing countries to change their policies (O’Sullivan, 2017, p.9). The latter has traditionally 
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played a critical role in the arsenal of US foreign policy. The new environment of well-supplied 
energy markets and the energy dominant position of the United States enables the US a better 
leverage to press and secure the cooperation of other countries for imposing multilateral 
sanctions. Yet, on the other hand, Washington would by energy supply threats lose its 
reputation to be seen as a reliable supplier. Any hint that American energy exports would be 
used for political purposes would definitely work against their interests and against 
Washington’s ability to achieve its objectives with an assistance of the energy diplomacy.  
5.5. New definition of energy security 
When Joe Biden won the elections against Donald Trump some very fundamental ingredients 
of US foreign energy policy changed. On the first day of his term he brought US back to the 
Paris agreement. This symbolic step was very fast upgraded with tangible decisions. By issuing 
a set of executive orders on 30 January 2021 President Biden proclaimed climate change a 
national security priority. Biden’s orders paused the auctions of federal lands and waters to oil 
and gas companies, expanded conservation protections, created a new civilian conservation 
corps and promised to deliver economic help to coal-producing regions suffering from the 
industry’s decline. All that was 180 degrees opposite to previous Trump’s policy trying to 
intensify use of oil and gas. 
President Biden will still need Congress to accomplish his target of spending budget money on 
climate change to help reach the goal of eliminating greenhouse gas emissions from the power 
sector by 2035 and across the economy by 2050 (Colman, Lefebvre, 2021). 
 
5.6 Development of unconventional gas and oil in the US and its geopolitical 
consequences 
Technological revolution that enabled unconventional gas and oil exploration happened in a 
silence away of high level state policy papers. The Department of Energy’s (DOE) Strategic 
Plan (2014-2018) or the National Security Strategy’s chapter on eenergy security almost didn’t 
mention the term unconventional gas and oil. They are mentioned only indirectly by stressing 
safe and secure deployment of domestic energy sources, as a complementary measure to 
Strategic Petroleum Reserves, by support to modeling analysis and data collection “to promote  
environmentally responsible development of unconventional domestic petroleum and natural 
gas resources” (U.S. Department of Energy) etc. Much more were stressed renewable energy 
sources that were in a focus of President Obama’s climate policy. No matter that the 
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unconventional resources had and will have substantial impact not only for US energy security 
plan but also for the world oil and gas markets. In oil sector they are reducing the level to which 
the US is depending on the oil imports. Consequently they will reduce the power and influence 
of oil exporting countries and regions such as Venezuela, the Middle East or Russia (Stevens, 
2012, p. 7).  Nevertheless, it should be mentioned here that the US does depend on a steady 
flow of world trade in energy where several other factors play a role (Directorate-General for 
External Policies, 2016, p. 37). Even though the US was self-sufficient, interconnectedness of 
its energy prices with world energy prices was and still is inevitable, since the impact of world 
crises is evident as well in US economy (Cordesman, 2015, pp. 3-6). Moreover, the US heavily 
depends on the state of health of global economy where an important role play also economies 
that import fossil fuels from US. Thus, through this indirect influence the oil import still plays 
an important strategical role for US. This role is even getting on its weight no matter if US are 
self-sufficient in energy production or not (ibid, 2015, pp.2-6). Generally, has unconventional 
oil and gas revolution in US benefited to EU as an importer of fossil fuels since US exports 
puts a pressure to downsize global oil and gas prices. As a swing-producer with high price 
elasticity US easily replace some other major oil suppliers from OPEC, particularly from Saudi 
Arabia and even Russia  (Directorate-General for External Policies, 2016, p. 37). Price 
elasticity of US shale oil also prevents big price fluctuation and are after the start of massive 
export from US globally substantially smaller (ibid, 2016, p.32).  
As for natural gas, firstly, thanks to the hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling techniques, 
which were originally developed for gas extraction and whose use became widespread 
somewhere around 2010, natural gas production in the US rose by approximately 50 % since 
2007. Yet unlike the case of oil, which is a global resource, natural gas has had until recently 
a less explicit effect on international markets. This was mainly due to the fact that there was 
no real international market for natural gas as such. Only few years ago scholars were writing 
that gas markets remain regionally concentrated because of greater cost involved in its 
transportation to long distances as well as preference for pipelines as a less costly transportation 
method (Tapia Ramirez, 2017, p. 83). The fact that natural gas is more lightweight on the 
primary matrix and, above all, the regional nature of most gas markets means that any impacts 
felt in the US will be much smaller in the rest of the world. Only two years later, in 2019, EU 
countries were a destination of 36% of all LNG cargoes from US and price on TTF, the most 
liquid European gas hub (Rotterdam) was occasionally lower than price on Henry hub, the most 
liquid and price setting hub in US. 
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Firstly, US shale gas revolution contributed to the commoditization of natural gas which has 
been moving towards this direction. The dominance of oil-indexed pricing was replaced by 
gas-on-gas pricing in many parts of the world (O’Sullivan, 2017, p.9). The effects are also 
considerable on other associated markets, mainly the biggest consumers of gas, such as the 
electricity sector itself (where replacing coal with natural gas in the US seems like being 
structural) or the industrial sector, with a notable upsurge in activity in the industries that 
consume a lot of natural gas (Tapia Ramirez, 2017, p. 87). 
Secondly, according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the United States in 
2017 for the first time since 1957 exported more natural gas than they imported, making the 
country a net exporter. Already in 2009, the US surpassed Russia as the world's largest natural 
gas producer as shale gas production drove overall increases in production. Furthermore, in 
2016, as the Sabine Pass LNG terminal in Louisiana began to ramp up operations, US LNG 
exports started increasing. Sabine Pass now has four operating liquefaction units, with a fifth 
currently being under construction (Xinhua, 2018). The Cove Point LNG facility in Maryland 
exported its first LNG cargo on March 1 2018 and is the second operating LNG export facility 
in the United States, after Sabine Pass. Four other LNG projects are under construction and 
expected to further increase US natural gas exports (ibid, 2018). These developments, which 
will have an impact on the gas markets outside the US, in some cases already became noticeable 
between 2000 and 2016 when the number of countries exporting LNG more than doubled, 
while the number of countries importing LNG tripled (O’Sullivan, 2017, p.9).  On the supply 
side, increased US export potential has created some challenges for gas exporters like e.g. 
Russia or at a lesser degree Qatar. For the Russian Federation, the US shale gas revolution had 
an indirect impact on major producers such as Gazprom witnessing its negotiating position vis-
à-vis European states worsened as a result of new LNG competition from the other side of 
Atlantic.  This caused decline in market share and uncertainty about the long-term demand 
(Stern & Rogers, 2013, p. 8). Moreover, the situation forced Gazprom to grant discounts to its 
key clients in Europe. The Russian government rightfully saw this development as problematic 
for Gazprom, not only because wells cannot simply be shut down in case demand or prices 
drops below competitive levels. This is unlike with the shale gas. Extracted volumes of natural 
gas have to be or flared, or stored at high costs, or redirected elsewhere if the infrastructure 
allows (Waldie, 2013). Additional negative impact that the US shale gas revolution had on 
Russia can be illustrated, for instance, by Russian government’s decision to abandon the 
development of the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea “until better times” back in 2012.  
130 
 
Finally, Russian Gazprom exports only 40% of extracted gas. All the rest is sold domestically 
with negative margin. It is therefore understandable that the EU plans to diversify supply routes 
and strengthened negotiating position of European countries has made the Kremlin worried it 
will be no longer possible to replace the domestic losses by high profit margins from sales on 
the European market. This gap could be filled by other clients but it seems to be difficult to 
find them (Euractive, 2012). Thus, if Russia does not use the current situation to reform its 
energy sector according to a market model, greater liberalization of gas markets would 
significantly constrain over time Russia's ability to use energy as a wedge between the United 
States and its European allies and also affect its revenues, which greatly depend on energy 
exports.  
Before discussing the implications of the US shale revolution on the demand side, it is also 
worth mentioning that the success of the unconventional gas industry for the US became also 
US administration policy tool. Namely, in April 2010 the US Department of State initiated the 
Global Shale Gas Initiative (GSGI)30 with intention to encourage and help countries striving to 
balance their resources of unconventional natural gas. This enabled the US to create alliances 
with countries like China, India, Poland, Ukraine, Jordan and other (Kuhn & Umbach, 2011, 
p.219)  
With this instrument, the US is attempting to achieve various goals simultaneously: to promote 
American technology and obtain new market-shares; to create strategic partnerships and help 
to countries in the alliance to decrease their reliance on import; and to promote natural gas as 
a more sustainable fuel (ibid, 2011, p.219). Additionally, for energy security reasons it is in the 
interest of the US that countries like China or India develop their own resources which would 
alleviate their dependence on countries of bigger concern for Washington, like Venezuela and 
Russia.  
On the demand side, the US tried with presence in the growing Asian energy market to help to 
improve cooperation between China and Washington on a wide range of issues. The US is a 
key destination to provide new sources of fuel to China, which has a rapidly growing demand 
for LNG, particularly to heat homes and switch from coal based electricity generation to gas 
based one and is therefore a prime export target for American gas producers. Two important 
energy deals were proposed during the US President Trump’s first state visit to China in 
                                                          
30 Currently known as the Department of State’s Unconventional Gas Technical Engagement Program.  
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November 2017, which paved the way for enhanced collaboration in this industry which was 
key supporter in Donald Trump’s election campaign as the US transforms into an energy 
exporter (Hsu, 2017). The deals envisaged Chinese energy investment in shale gas production 
in West Virginia and Alaska as well as American LNG exports to China. Such cooperation 
would increase dependence between the two countries. On the one hand, it would bring 
additional investments into the US, while on the other hand, it would provide new sources of 
energy for China, which has become heavily dependent on energy imports. At that time it 
imported around 65 % of its crude oil supply and some 33 % of its natural gas supply. Import 
dependence from that time only increased. Additionally, while the US is in need of energy 
investment, Beijing has been encouraging energy firms to diversify abroad in order to get 
access to fossil fuels. Also China has been striving to diversify its energy suppliers in order to 
ensure energy security, hence imports from the US would allow Beijing to obtain new sources 
from regions outside traditional Russia and Iran (ibid, 2017).  
Chinese investment in American fossil fuels represents a new energy relationship between 
China and the US, yet, it does not come without caveats. Considerations are of practical and 
political nature. Despite the fact that President Trump at that time seemed to embrace Chinese 
participation in the American energy sector, there were those who believed that an increased 
Chinese presence in the US could have a negative influence on the design of the market-based 
economy in US (ibid, 2017). China (along with Russia) is mentioned several times in the most 
recent National Security Strategy as the ones attempting to erode American security and 
prosperity by inter alia making economies less free and less fair (The White House, 2017, p.2). 
On the contrary, China has been wary due to the potential interference of the US in its energy 
supply security fearing that Washington could cut off its supply at the Malacca Strait in case 
of a political conflict. Among Chinese strategists has been a widely shared belief that the US 
would use its dominant position in Asian waters, especially in the Strait of Malacca, to coerce 
China and stem its rise as a global power (Sliwinski, 2014). Therefore, in recent years, China 
has been increasing its military footprint in the region of the South China Sea and upgrading 
its status to “core” Chinese security interest similar to Taiwan and Tibet, while also unilaterally 
declaring its sovereignty over large swaths of the South China Sea included in the so-called 
“nine-dash line.” (Rosenberger et al., 2016, p.36). In spite of these caveats, the current US 
Department of Commerce has attempted to alleviate China's fears that the US would use energy 
to retaliate against China by publishing a 100 Days Plan, in which it is assurance that the US 
would treat China just as it does any other nation without a free trade agreement (Hsu, 2017). 
132 
 
Finally, following President Trump’s visit to Beijing, in February 2018, the Cheniere Energy - 
the first LNG export terminal in the US and also the leading exporter of liquefied natural gas, 
signed the first-ever long-term deal with the state-owned China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC) for long-term LNG sales and purchase cooperation (Xinhua, 2018).Thus, 
with growing interdependence between the two countries, it can be argued that the growing 
role of US as gas exporter and China’s supply vulnerability and importance of that question for 
Chinese politicians gas supply offers an opportunity that energy becomes means of mitigation 
of tensions instead of its traditional role of tension exacerbation. 
Lastly, when it comes to Europe, the development of unconventional gas and oil in the US is 
expected to have a positive impact on the energy security of the EU and its Eastern 
neighborhood, in which the US is found to have a significant stake. The US has had a crucial 
role in European energy security after World War II.  The EU, being an energy importer, is not 
specifically referred to in the Department of Energy’s current Strategic Plan. Nevertheless, the 
US does not see its security concerns to simply end on their territory which is confirmed by 
both Obama and Trump administrations. The Obama-time National Security Strategy, states 
that “ the challenges faced by Ukrainian and European dependence on Russian energy supplies 
puts a spotlight on the need for an expanded view of energy security that recognizes the 
collective needs of the United States, our allies, and trading partners as well as the importance 
of competitive energy markets” (The White House, 2015, p.16). Furthermore, the International 
Order subchapter, was recommending “working with Europe to improve its energy security in 
both the short and long term” (ibid, 2015, p.25). In the same vein, the 2017 National Security 
Strategy confirms that a strong and free Europe with whom the US shares values of free market 
as well as a commitment to the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, 
particularly when tackling global security challenges, promoting prosperity, and upholding 
international norms - is of vital importance to the US (ibid, 2015, p.25). Furthermore, the 
Strategy in a Regional Context chapter points out that the US will work with allies and partners 
to diversify European energy sources to ensure the energy security of European countries, 
while also stating that the US will work with its partners “to contest China’s unfair trade and 
economic practices and restrict its acquisition of sensitive technologies” as China is gaining “a 
strategic foothold” in Europe by such unfair means (The White House, 2017, p.47).  
Thus, both European dependence on Russian energy imports and Chinese unfair practices, 
mainly through state-directed investments (which is also valid for Russia), are important 
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considerations in US security strategies. Yet, apart from committing to support Europe’s effort 
diversify its fuel sources and delivery routes of transport, with the increased production of 
unconventional resources, the US also becomes an important source for European LNG 
imports. This is placing the EU in a better negotiating position vis-à-vis Gazprom, reduce 
Moscow’s ability to unduly influence  political outcomes in Europe, while strengthening 
Europe’s ability to counter Russian  influence in European affairs (Medlock, Jaffe, & Hatley, 
2011, p.45).  
Unconventional oil and gas revolution in the US therefore offers some opportunities on the 
demand side and some challenges on the supply side. While for suppliers, such as Russia, new 
competition coming from the US creates challenges both in terms of Gazprom’s negotiating 
power vis-à-vis its traditional suppliers as well as the need to look for alternative clients to 
ensure stable revenues for its economy, on the demand side - it is expected to bring some 
positive impacts. The development of strong energy ties between the US and China could 
contribute to the improvement of their cooperation on a range of issues, and potentially 
decrease tensions in the Pacific region. Moreover, while a more indirect impact of the shale 
revolution is expected to improve liquidity and increase transparency of the gas markets and 
as a consequence improve bargaining position of EU and China as the biggest importers vis-à-
vis their traditional suppliers. The US can also play an important role in supporting the EU in 
ensuring its security of supply through LNG exports (Riley A. , Prioritization in EU Energy 
Policy: Energy Security First, then Energy Union, 2015, p. 10). Finally, protecting critical 
energy infrastructure, that has always been a common interest of the US and the EU, has gained 
momentum in light of the increased American LNG export potential, as it calls for ensuring 
that the European LNG receiving infrastructure is adequately protected (Directorate-General 
for External Policies, 2016, p. 72). 
5.7 Foreign energy policy regional initiatives 
5.7.1 Development aid 
All post World War II American presidents till Donald Trump have believed that their role is 
to uphold certain universal values. At times, there was some hypocrisy in the promotion of 
democracy and human rights but at least rhetorical commitment was in the center of the US 
approach. This rhetoric had an implication on the design of development aid together with the 
main objectives of the US foreign energy policy mentioned above: ensuring that global energy 
(particularly oil) markets are well-supplied, supporting US allies to diversify their own sources 
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of energy, and using its power as the largest global consumer of oil to compel countries to 
change policies by the means of sanctions. One such tool is foreign assistance (or “Official 
Development Assistance (ODA)” as defined by the international donor community). The US 
is ranked first for net disbursements of economic aid among aid country donors (except for the 
EU28). 
Foreign assistance is viewed by many as an essential instrument of US foreign policy.31 Since 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, foreign aid has increasingly been associated with 
national security policy. US foreign aid policy has developed around three primary rationales: 
national security, commercial interests, and humanitarian concerns. These broad rationales 
form the basis for the numerous objectives of US assistance, including promoting economic 
growth, reducing poverty, improving governance, expanding access to health care and 
education, promoting stability in conflictive regions, promoting human rights, strengthening 
allies, and curbing illicit drug production and trafficking (Tarnoff & Lawson, 2010, p.4). 
Furthermore, the US has a history of providing assistance serving both development and special 
political and/or strategic purposes. Programs funded through these accounts generally aim to 
promote political and economic stability, often through activities indistinguishable from those 
provided under regular development and humanitarian programs (ibid, 2010, p.8).  
Such accounts are, for instance, the Economic Support Fund (ESF), designated to promote 
economic or political stability in areas where the US has special strategic interests. For many 
years, following the 1979 Camp David accords, most ESF funds went to support the Middle 
East Peace Process. A substantial amount of funding still goes to Egypt, the West Bank, 
Lebanon, and Jordan. However, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, ESF has largely supported 
countries having an important role in the war on terrorism (ibid, 2011, p.9). 
A similar account, serving particular strategic political interests of Washington, is the 
Assistance to Europe Eurasia and Central Asia account (AEECA), which combines two aid 
programs that were established at the fall of the Soviet Union. The Support for East European 
                                                          
31 Other tools of US foreign policy are the US defense establishment, the diplomatic corps, public diplomacy and 
trade policy. The State Department diplomatic corps are the eyes, ears, and often the negotiating voice of US 
foreign policymakers. Public diplomacy programs, such as the Fulbright program and Voice of America, project 
an image of the US in order to influence foreign views positively. US trade policy can have a direct impact on the 
economies of other nations though for instance free trade agreements and Export-Import Bank credits. Finally, 
foreign aid, probably the most flexible tool of the US foreign policy toolbox, acts as both carrot and stick, and is 
a means of influencing events, solving specific problems and projecting US values. 
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Democracy Act of 1989 (SEED) and the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian 
Democracies and Open Markets Support Act of 1992 (FREEDOM support act) were designed 
to help Central Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union achieve 
democratic systems and free market economies (ibid, 2011, p.9).  
For over 50 years, the bulk of the US bilateral economic aid program has been administered by 
the US Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID is responsible for most 
bilateral development assistance (inter alia for the energy sector) and disaster relief programs. 
Furthermore, in conjunction with the State Department, USAID has been managing most of 
the ESF and AEECA programs, which, as already noted above, have been used as means of 
promoting US political and strategic goals through supporting development activities in target 
countries (ibid, 2011, p.21).  
For illustration, the USAID’s Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, except for partnering to promote 
resilient and democratic societies, strengthening economic growth and energy security, has 
actively been supporting European-Atlantic integration of the countries of the region according 
to their aspirations (USAID, 2016). The underling rationale of USAID’s activities in the 
concerned region has been to support the partner countries through various programs in their 
continuing transitions to stable, prosperous, free-market and pluralistic democracies (ibid, 
2016). Considering the US history of free market policies, the country has been upholding the 
free market principles also externally and supporting the strengthening of private enterprise 
development, also in the energy sector, to achieve economic growth.   
As mentioned, the US has been assisting the countries of Europe and Eurasia in their efforts to 
get closer to the European Union in accordance with the priorities of the governments. The 
USAID Country Development Cooperation Strategies have been pointing out that the US 
assistance represents an important tool of engagement helping countries e.g. like Ukraine to 
advance reforms in order to integrate closer into the European institutions and structures. This 
is an important point as the US has usually been more direct, unilateral, and prone to imposing 
its own model in accordance with American exceptionalism and the view that the US is 
predestined to spread its model worldwide (Cox, Ikenberry & Inoguchi, 2000).  In contrast, 
scholars have argued that the EU’s foreign policy practices are strongly focused on dialogue, 
incentives, tolerance, and patience (Manners, 2008, p.68, 78). This belief has been reflected in 
its development cooperation as well. However, in recent years, particularly during the Obama 
administration, it has been observed that the gap between the way the EU and the US were 
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implementing their respective development policies has been narrowing. Del Biondo has 
examined this shift by looking at the change in the two actors’ attitudes towards the concept of 
partnership in development cooperation. 
The EU and the US are indeed very different foreign policy actors, which is also reflected in 
their development policies. The latter can be illustrated by the way the EU and the US have 
incorporated partnership in their development policies. Partnership, as defined by Hyden, is a 
“social contract” between development partners (donors) and partner governments (recipients), 
on an equal level and based on a thorough level of trust (Hyden, 2008, p. 260). Based on this 
idea, partnership has often been connected with ownership, the idea that recipient countries 
take the lead in the formulation of development strategies (Del Biondo, 2014, p. 2). Both the 
EU and the US have formally committed to this principle, however, while the EU has been a 
frontrunner in partnership-based development, the US was found to be rather slow in 
implementing this agenda.32 The fact that partnership has been the key principle of EU 
development policy can be seen in the contractual and legal character of the EU’s aid 
agreements and the strong focus on country ownership. In contract, the US, has not been able 
to truly implement it, arguably, due to the strong influence of the Congress, the President, and 
of a State Department that views development cooperation as the major instrument of foreign 
policy (ibid, 2014, p.2). Contrarily to that, the European Commission is known to be relatively 
autonomous in formulating its development policies. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, 
scholars have observed that in recent years the gap between the EU and the US approaches to 
developments policies has been narrowing (ibid, 2014, p.2). On the one hand, development 
policies of the European Union have increasingly resembled those of the US, mainly due to the 
fact that the EU development assistance is becoming more focused on security concerns as well 
as conditions on budget support have been increasing. On the other hand, development policies 
of the United States, while still strongly being driven by security motives, have started 
incorporating the country ownership approach in recent years (ibid, 2014, p.2). To illustrate 
the latter, back in 2010 the Presidential Policy Directive on Global Development included a 
number of proposals to make US foreign assistance more in line with the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. According to the document, the US development assistance 
would be made in line with established national strategies and country development plans to 
                                                          
32 Partnership has become a standard reference in the international development community. The 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, signed by both the EU and the US as members of the Development Assistance 
Committee of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC), recommends a 
partnership-based approach to development.  
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respect country ownership (The White House, 2010). Furthermore, the Quadrennial Diplomacy 
and Development Review introduced a “new approach to development”, based on a 
“commitment to partnership” with host governments, local organizations, and other donors 
(The State Department and USAID, 2010, p. 94). 
Thus, it is noteworthy that despite the fact that the US foreign policy has been characterized by 
unilateralism, American exceptionalism, and the belief of the United States being predestined 
to spread its model around the world, there are some aspects where the difference between the 
attitudes of the US and the EU are narrowing. This can be observed in their approaches towards 
the concept of partnership and country ownership as well as the efforts that the United States 
is providing to help the countries of the EU Eastern neighborhood to integrate closer with the 
European Union, which includes undertaking the necessary measures to reform their markets 
(including the energy sector) and institutions in line with EU standards.  
 
5.7.2 The US foreign policy towards the South Caucasus  
For much of the period since the end of the Cold War, US foreign policy toward the Southern 
Caucasus wandered in the void - lacking a strong strategic impulse. It can be described as 
foreign policy à la carte. The result was an absence of a deeper strategic involvement and a 
lack of an urgency. Reappearance of Russia under President Putin as an assertive regional 
power substantially changed the strategic landscape. Short war in Georgia in 2008, during 
which two territories under Russian control (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) de facto  separated 
from the country, highlighted the potential of the region to create difficulties for Washington  
to manage their relations with Kremlin. The current American policy seems to be seeking 
cooperative outcomes where possible, while making clear the line beyond which Russian 
unilateralism is unacceptable (Khelashvili & Macfarlane, 2010, p.122). For years already we 
can observe the trend of reduction of the exposure of US diplomacy in the region. This goes 
hand in hand with encouraging other partners, particularly the EU, to share the burden of 
foreign policy engagement.  This could be even traced in the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian 
war when the United States demonstrated strong support toward the EU effort to mediate a 
ceasefire in Georgia’s war and the deployment of an EU Monitoring Mission to monitor the 
ceasefire. Expectation of US that EU will take a stronger role in this region has become more 
obvious in the following years and can be regarded as part of a larger transatlantic division of 
labor. In the November 2020 military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan due to the 
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Nagorno Karabagh region the US didn’t intervene at all while EU was busy with another 
conflict with Turkey over migrants and gas exploration in a sea close to Cyprus and left all the 
initiative to Russia and Turkey.  
The US policy in the region can be described as ad hoc and inconsistent. It can briefly be 
described as a combination of ideological concerns (strong promotion of democracy in 
Georgia), business interests (access to gas and oil in Azerbaijan), lobbying of Armenian 
minority in US (policy towards the Karabagh conflict), and personal preference of leaders (the 
personal relationship between Presidents Bush and Saakashvili) (ibid, 2010, p.105).  
One region-wide policy on which the US was putting most emphasis after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union was the development of Caspian oil and gas resources. Reasons behind the fact 
that the US policy towards the South Caucasus revolved around this sector was that the United 
States was seeing the Caspian oil and gas reserves as a vehicle that could lead to economic 
prosperity of the whole region, thus relaxing regional political tensions and economic 
problems. US saw as a backbone of such process a construction of oil and gas infrastructure 
that would enable access to the energy resources of the region. In US eyes such infrastructure 
would enhance Turkey’s strategic importance and economically benefit Georgia. Additionally, 
it was thought that a transport corridor would assist in securing an independence from Russia 
and cut away Moscow’s grip over the regional energy resources.  Furthermore, according to 
the logic, all this would boost economic reforms and potentially motivate Armenia and 
Azerbaijan to join the positive trend of economic development and find a solution to their 
conflict. It was also anticipated that this would possibly facilitate easing of hostilities between 
Armenia and Turkey. On a global level, Caspian energy flow would improve the US’s energy 
security. It would also positively influence to reduction of EU’s dependence on export of 
Russian energy resources. Finally, this was thought to happen with relatively small investments 
Western donors in combination of investments of energy companies (Rumer, Sokolsky, & 
Stronski, 2017). 
Transport infrastructure that was intended to take Caspian oil and gas from the Caucasus to 
Western markets became the focus of political engagement of the US in the region. The State 
Department even appointed a special envoy on the level of Ambassador to coordinate energy 
diplomacy in the Caspian region (ibid, 2017). To increase the political importance of that envoy 
he was on top of being advisor to the Secretary of State appointed also as an advisor to the 
President. His job was to promote the new transportation corridor among EU capitals and on 
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different conferences in the region, in US and in EU. The envoy encouraged different EU 
governments to participate in the project and could count on the US taxpayers money for 
different pipeline initiatives (U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2012, p.v). 
However, the expectations of a potential of establishing an oil and gas corridor were too hasty 
and perhaps even romantic. Gas corridor with the construction of TANAP gas pipeline indeed 
materialized but benefits to the region were far below expectations and political tensions even 
increased. Also gas supply process through US shale revolution dramatically changed and 
dependence on gas pipelines for EU and the rest of the world was in the time of the finalization 
of the project far smaller than in the times when the corridor was designed. 
In the first decade after the South Caucasus gained independence not much has changed for the 
better. Things started changing in 2004 with the Georgian Rose revolution and the new 
Georgian leadership which set big ambitions not only with regard to the country’s economic 
development but also its foreign policy path. Namely, the new leadership decided to leave 
Russia’s orbit and set their intention to integrate with the West. They clarified their aim to the 
EU and to the US. Brussels’ response was more cautious comparing to the one offered by 
Washington. The EU was well aware of difficulties that countries in the East and Central 
Europe faced in the process of integration with the West. Contrarily, due to the fact that 
promoting democracy was at the top of all priorities for the US foreign policy under the 
President George W. Bush’s administration, their response could hardly have been more 
enthusiastic and willing to support Georgia. (Bush, President Bush's Second Inaugural Address, 
2005). Thus, the democratic transformation was a natural candidate for a wide US support. 
In this context, the United States refocused its policy attention from Azerbaijan, previous 
promising reformer with oil and gas potential towards Georgia. The later showed a clear 
interest to join West, including NATO, following the traced path of some other Eastern 
European countries. With its reform agenda Georgia promised to be a new flagship in the region 
to westernize its political orientation (Rumer, Sokolsky & Stronski, 2017, p.17). 
Consequently, Georgia became US’s favored post-Soviet state. With new orientation the 
differences comparing it to the neighbors became visibly deeper. Armenia’s tinny steps towards 
democratization were almost not visible. Once promising Azerbaijan was orienting towards 
less tolerant, more authoritarian regime under the new President Ilham Aliyev in such 
neighborhood Georgia was shining with its active rebuilding of institutions, fight against 
corruption, liberalizing several segments of market. Similar process was going on in several 
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other post-Soviet states. The most clear-cut example is Ukraine which had its Orange 
revolution that accelerated hope for reforms for the better but soon disappointed its population 
and international community by corruption accusations, competitive political agendas of main 
politicians, personal rivalry etc. (ibid, p.17). Georgia’s new pro-Western orientation and its 
attempts to become NATO member had its price. In 2008 a war between Russia and Georgia 
broke out and Georgia lost control over substantial portion of its territory (Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia regions). Kremlin’s military action was a clear signal that NATO membership is not 
tolerated on its door-step. A signal of non-tolerance of US’s influence zone in its direct 
neighborhood was sent to all post-Soviet states, not only to Georgia and also to US which 
would not wish to start a war with Russia just because of some new NATO membership closer 
to the heart of the Soviet empire. As a consequence, the US lost its focus on building Georgia 
as a regional reform winner and more or less left the battlefield to the EU (Rumer et al., 2017, 
p.18). After Russo-Georgian was the US changed its policy towards the region from an active 
one towards a management of status quo without launching any new major initiatives. US 
assisted Georgia in political transition into the post-Saakashvili period, managed to prevent any 
breakthrough in the negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan related to the status of 
Nagorno Karabakh and other opened questions, maintained working relations with more and 
more authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan. Region was geographically important as US’s 
gateway towards Afghanistan. (Rumer et al., 2017, p.19). 
Less intensive US engagement was replaced by EU’s involvement. Poland in 2009 launched 
an idea of Eastern Partnership which became an official policy of EU towards 6 post-Soviet 
states. It offered different platforms of cooperation, various forms of technical assistance and 
grants to co-fund loans of international financial institutions under the leadership of US or EU. 
Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine didn’t exclude full membership 
in EU at a later stage. Moldova and Ukraine became Contracting Parties to the Energy 
Community Treaty while Georgia became an Observer and entered full membership only in 
2017. What followed was a change in policy leadership in the South Caucasus. NATO 
membership aspiration was replaced by the EU. Above mentioned Eastern Partnership 
initiative was accompanied by Association Agreements (AA) with Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine and with membership of those three countries (and Observer status of Armenia) in the 
Energy Community. AA promises closer cooperation between the respective country and the 
EU, requests certain economic and political reforms in exchange and doesn’t really promise 
EU membership, but doesn’t exclude it either. An attempt to sign a similar AA with Armenia 
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in 2014 didn’t succeed due to Moscow’s resistance and its pressure on Armenia to join a 
competitive Eurasian Economic Union. Only much later, in 2017, the EU finalized with 
Armenia negotiations on a much less ambitious Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership 
Agreement. Similar agreement is still not agreed with Belarus due to its pro-Kremlin 
orientation and with Azerbaijan, which resists political reforms requested by an agreement with 
EU and can afford this economically having a waste volume of gas and oil reserves. The new 
European initiative had a strong support from Washington whose preference for the EU to take 
a stronger role in its neighborhood became obvious after the Russo-Georgian war, when the 
EU mediation and the consequent deployment of the monitoring mission was welcomed by the 
US. Furthermore, due to the fact that NATO was perceived by Moscow as a direct threat to 
Russia the expansion of which would be opposed in every possible manner, including military, 
EU integration seemed as a less antagonistic path.  
Even signature of AA as a milder step in comparison to NATO membership, came at its price. 
Ukraine in 2014, when after massive and bloody protests finally initialed the AA with EU, as 
a consequence lost the Crimea and was military attacked by Russia which occupies part of 
Ukrainian territory still nowadays. A strong pressure of Moscow against signature of AA was 
exercised on Moldova and Georgia as well but both of them successfully signed AA without 
major political earthquake. Both of them had to pay their pro-Western political orientation by 
a loss of some territory already earlier. For Armenia price had to be paid only in 2020 by a loss 
of Nagorno Karabagh.  
This Kremlin’s well established process of punishments of non-obedient pupils with a loss of 
part of their territory, later transformed into pro-Russian enclaves, was at least after Maidan 
revolution in Ukraine in 2014 a clear sign that an old post WW II order of division of spheres 
of influence and a balance of power allowing the national security and predictable foreign 
policy is over.  
In brief, if we look at US engagement in the South Caucasus region during the last quarter of 
a century we can observe a strong and lasting commitment. First the US intensively supported 
independence and sovereignty efforts of all countries in the region. It supported the Euro-
Atlantic integration of the region. In Georgia and Armenia US continues with a strong cultural 
engagement thanks to extensive ties of Armenian-American and Georgian-American 
community. Particularly in Georgian this is aligned with political and educational support. US 
has an important security interest in South Caucasus despite it is diminishing, particularly due 
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to announcement of withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and Iraq. Economic interest 
also used to water down due to abundance of shale oil and gas.  In such circumstances it is 
quite understandable that US is supportive to an idea that at least EU takes over an initiative in 
the region. With the lower intensity of US engagement, with not very efficient engagement of 
proverbial slow EU and with the increasing Russian opposition against US and EU involvement 
in the post-Soviet territories the region slowly drifts back towards a Kremlin’s umbrella. 
Azerbaijan in this process found a new ally in Turkey while the rest of the region is struggling 
with keeping its sovereignty.  
US partial retreat therefore left certain vacuum that was not filled with EU’s presence 
sufficiently. Previous US policy framework is in current political context not applicable 
anymore but a new, different comprehensive policy has not been established either. 
 
5.7.3 Three Seas Initiative 
After the EU’s integration of Central and Eastern European Member States in 2004 and 2007 
and after China launched in 2012 its 16+133 initiative for approximately the same area of the 
EU,  the US also came with an initiative called the Three Seas Initiative. The initiative started 
on high level with its first summit in Dubrovnik on August 25-26, 2016. The two-day event 
concluded by adoption of a declaration on cooperation in economic matters, particularly in the 
field of energy. Since two LNG terminals (Swinoujsce in Poland and Krk in Croatia) were in 
the focus of interest of participants, it is quite clear that the initiative is closely related to US’ 
attempt to minimize demand for Russian gas and Russia’s influence and increase its market 
share for LNG in Europe.  
The Three Seas Initiative is a forum to promote regional dialogue. It has 12+1 participants, 
namely: the three Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), the Visegrad four (Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), Austria, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Slovenia. The +1 is 
the US, actively promoting the initiative, always present at a high level (the second summit in 
2017 in Warsaw was attended by President Trump). Poland’s conservative ruling party’s (Law 
and Justice) leading politicians have been trying since they took over the power in October 
2015, to build close collaborations with their neighbors wanting to balance the influence of 
“old Europe” in Brussels. “Old Europe” refers to the pre-2004 EU-members minus Great 
                                                          
33 Initiative was in 2019, when also Greece joined it, renamed into 17+1 
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Britain. The initiative originates in the pre WW II idea of Polish leader Józef Piłsudski, who 
developed a geopolitical concept of Intermarium. Piłsudski believed that an alliance of Poland, 
Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus in a federal body could protect their respective sovereignties 
endangered by the Soviet Union. The concept was extended to Hungary, Italy, Yugoslavia, and 
Romania in the later 1930’s by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs in Poland, Józef Beck. 
The Three Seas Initiative or Trimarium has some similarities with Intermarium (fear of Russian 
influence, wish to create a regional alliance to counterbalance interests of big Western 
European states) but also many differences due to a different time perspective. The initiative 
holds one summit per year. It plans to create an investment fund to which the US in February 
2020 promised 1 billion US dollars (Atlantic Council, 15 February 2020). The initiative did 





6 Russian Foreign Energy Policy  
 
6.1 Setting the context 
A decade ago, demand growth and unpredictability in the security of supply still controlled the 
energy markets, particularly due to the ongoing crisis in the Middle East. After the US shale 
revolution and oil and gas export boom on one side and China’s growing demand and import 
dependency on the other side the global energy markets shifted substantially. Due to the 
unconventional energy boom, which became possible thanks to technological innovation in the 
United States in less than a decade, natural gas and crude oil production increased by over 50% 
and 80 % respectively (US Energy Infromation Administration, 2016). Russia faced substantial 
changes, since its economy is deeply interconnected with its energy assets of which prices were 
dropping. Also the competition on the market got tougher since new energy producers emerged. 
Additionally, Russia clashed with the US and the EU over their interests in Ukraine. As a 
response US and EU introduced several sanctions prohibiting transfer of some key technology 
needed for drilling and financing possibilities. Both types of sanctions hit Russia substantially 
and further deteriorated Russian capability to economically cope with the lower prices on 
global oil and gas markets. Russia didn’t change its attitude to Ukraine but instead announced 
its “pivot to Asia,” particularly to China (Rosenberger et al., 2016, pp.1-8). Instead of  a swift 
pivot to Asia, however, Russia faced a different reality: lower prices, increased competition 
and continued critical dependence on European market. With Europe being Russia’s major 
customer for energy resources and Moscow being increasingly dependent on the energy 
revenues coming from European clients, the level of interdependence of EU-Russia relations 
in the energy sector is considerably high and it doesn’t seem it will significantly change soon, 
even in light of the European efforts to diversify its resources or Russia’s attempts to look to 
the East to Asian markets.  
5.6 Impact of the shale gas revolution on the gas prices and transatlantic cooperation  
As I already pointed out unconventional gas not only transformed the US energy market, and 
in particular the natural gas market, but it was also the tipping point of a fundamental change 
in global gas markets (Kuhn & Umbach, 2011, p.210). The rise of production of 
unconventional gas corresponded with other important elements in political and economic 
environment, accompanied with technological changes. Approximately in parallel with the 
shale gas revolution the demand dropped due to global financial crisis and accelerated 
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construction of LNG terminals and tankers allowed LNG to reach many more customers. These 
factors suddenly created a “gas glut”. Natural gas suddenly became a fuel of the future and the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) vividly named this a “Golden Age of Gas”  (IEA, 2011). 
This development, as already pointed out, would potentially be beneficial for some countries, 
among them the European Union and its energy security. It deserves closer consideration.   
Unlike the top priority of security of supply issues in transatlantic cooperation after the first oil 
crisis in 1973-74 which resulted in the creation of International Energy Agency (IEA) this area 
of energy policy didn’t attract much attention in 1980s and 1990s. Both, EU and US were 
promoting competition and liquid markets as a best protection against any scarcity of supply. 
(Kuhn & Umbach, 2011, p.207). EU governments mostly perceived energy resources as an 
economic rather than a strategic good. All potential problems in the delivery chain therefore 
remained a problem of companies. The only exemption were oil and gas stocks which became 
an obligation of European governments and were regulated. Indeed, from the mid-1970s until 
the early 2000s Europe didn’t experience any major security of supply crisis. Consequently, in 
Europe, in contrast to the US, where oil supply security specifically has always been a key 
concern of the US government, energy security was not seen as a strategic issue or a challenge 
by European industries and businesses (ibid, 2011, p.207). However, with the major disruptions 
experienced by the EU Member States due to the gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine, 
particularly in the winter 2008/2009 energy security concerns have gained momentum.  
At that time the US shale gas revolution hasn’t made a major impact on the European gas 
market yet but already its appearance was enough that EU started to search opportunities how 
to diversify its gas supply by LNG as well. This was accompanied by an attempt to reduce CO2 
emissions due to a threatening climate crisis where natural gas suddenly appeared as a possible 
transitional fuel on the path from burning coal towards full decarbonisation. can have a positive 
impact on its European partners looking to diversify their energy resources. The realization of 
this potential depends on the development of gas market. Traditionally Europe relied on the 
regional market which had no disturbances and no scarcity of supply. There was no need to 
change the traditional market pattern. Stronger competition from US and also other LNG 
suppliers reshaped the market, “de-regionalize” it and make it more flexible by challenging 
traditional views of geographic distribution of resources (ibid, 2011, p.209).  
In this changing context, players will need to become more flexible while adapting to market 
changes and start investing into alternative supply and demand sources. The unconventional 
146 
 
gas is a rather new commodity that has entered into the framework of transatlantic cooperation. 
The US and Europe have had its isolated, independent and self-sufficient gas markets.   In gas 
trade they started to collaborate only in the late 1990s when transport of natural gas became 
possible by shipping it in the form of LNG. When the importance of LNG in the natural gas 
markets increased, it consequently deepened the interrelation of the US and European markets 
(ibid, 2011, p.209). Among some important implications of the shale gas revolution has been 
its indirect impact on European gas prices. Namely, still in 2010 Gazprom used only for some 
15% of its supply a price index that was not linked with oil index (ibid, 2011, p.217). Nowadays 
majority of gas supply contracts refer to price in one of the gas hubs which is substantially 
different than oil index. In 2016 only around 40% of gas in EU was still supplied under the 
long term contracts and this portion will drop to below 10% in 2028 (ACER, 2019). This cannot 
be described with any more appropriate word as a dramatic change.  
Unconventional gas has become the “new policy” option for European countries, giving buyers 
more leverage to renegotiate high Russian oil-indexed gas price demands that are included in 
its long-term contracts. Thus, even if not produced in Europe, US shale gas with all other LNG 
deliverables to European terminals put a certain price cap on Russian gas prices (ibid, 2011, 
p.218).  
Despite the fact that the US is the fourth biggest oil exporter in the world, it never established 
a formal cooperation with OPEC. In the past, OPEC, as a cartel for influencing oil prices, was 
never in the interest of the US. The COVID-19 pandemic and the economic crisis which it 
caused in spring 2020 forced the US to align its policy with OPEC and even Russia. Shale oil 
extraction is closely related to shale gas extraction and developments on the oil market have a 
strong implication on the shale gas economy. Extraction of shale oil is unprofitable if the price 
per barrel is below 40 US $ per barrel. The pandemic and the major economic crisis emerged 
on a top of an oil price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia going on from early March 2020 
when Saudi Arabia had pumped every possible drop of oil to sale it at rock-bottom prices in an 
attempt to punish Russia for its refusal to support deeper OPEC+ output cuts. Due to the 
COVID-19 crisis, the market looked to remain overwhelmed for months to come by the 
catastrophic collapse in demand caused by the lockdowns in the majority of the world’s biggest 
economies. On 13 April 2020, the OPEC+ alliance (OPEC + Russia) with the support of 
President Trump sealed the largest ever coordinated production cut, removing about a 10th of 
global supply (Blas, 2020). Economic consequences of the pandemic removed from the market 
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another 10 % of global supply.  Bloomberg enthusiastically reported: “Trump, who has been a 
critic of OPEC for years, is the one who put it together,” said Daniel Yergin, the oil historian. 
“Of all the deals he’s done in his life, this has to be the biggest.” (ibid, 2020). No matter that a 
few days later, the price of oil became negative on some markets and a series of bankruptcies 
in US shale oil and gas industry started. “There has been a tectonic shift in global oil politics. 
Putin, Saudi Prince and Trump, the leaders of the world’s three largest producers, are dictating 
global petroleum supply. And America now accepts that low prices aren’t in its interest.” (ibid, 
2020).  
6.2 Russian energy policy in a nutshell 
The Russian leadership’s concept of a resurgent Russia is directly linked with the state control 
of energy resources internally as well as externally. Since late nineties, current President 
Vladimir Putin has been considering that efficient control of energy resources would enable 
Russia to regain its dominant position as a global superpower and as a major influencer on the 
global markets of energy sources (Schubert et al., 2016, p.256). Thus, once in power, he started 
to renationalize Russian fossil fuel resources and it was under his leadership that the state and 
Gazprom started actively pursuing the goal of closing bilateral agreements with different EU 
Member States and European enterprises based on different conditions. Moscow started to 
differentiate between countries that were cooperative and compliant to their foreign policy on 
the one hand and countries that were apparently violating interests of Russia on the other hand. 
The first group was offered better prices and the second group had higher prices and underwent 
energy supply disruptions. Russian gas cuts with political background already happened in the 
1990s and only grew in significance in the 2000s. This state strategy, besides economic, had 
geopolitical considerations. Namely, the EU’s increased efforts to export its rules to the former 
Soviet states were raising important concerns in Moscow. Additionally, the on-going EU 
enlargement to the East, the initiation of regional cooperation frameworks, such as the 
European Neighborhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership and the Energy Community, along 
with the efforts to side-step Russia in accessing Caspian resources, was seen by Moscow as 
intentioned steps to interfere in its exclusive sphere of influence (Schubert et al., 2016, p.257). 
The Russian government sees foreign policy through the lens of the “Monroeski Doctrine”34, 
                                                          
34 Articulated by Migranyan, and considered as the major foreign policy strategy of the Russian Federation in its 
near abroad after the break-up of the Soviet Union, it affirmed the Russian Federation’s position as the dominant 
power in the entire former Soviet Union. Moscow often invoked the doctrine when it intervened in post-Soviet 
conflicts in the Newly Independent States (NIS), such as e.g. the separatist conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
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which affirms Russia’s pre-eminence in the post-Soviet space. Consequently, Moscow has 
been considering most of Eastern Europe, including some current EU Member States, critical 
to its national security. Therefore, EU efforts, such as signing of the Association Agreements 
with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova which, inter alia, include chapters on energy, have been 
understood by Moscow as deliberate acts to undermine Russian influence in these countries. 
Hence, while also trying to preserve its influence by force, as for example in Ukraine or 
Georgia, in the energy field, which is directly linked with its foreign policy objectives, Russia 
has been seeking to safeguard its position by constructing alternative transit routes as well as 
regional frameworks.  
On the one hand, transit routes constitute an integrative part of the state infrastructure that are 
important for exporting energy sources and they contribute to the projection of Russian 
economic power on a long-term basis. Gazprom found a way to become owner of national gas 
pipelines through creation of huge claims for delivered gas and offsetting them by pipeline 
assets in Armenia, Belarus and Moldova. On the other hand, competing regional frameworks, 
the most manifest example of which is the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), which also has 
an important energy dimension, represents Moscow’s attempt to counter EU’s regional 
cooperation agendas in the common neighborhood in order to embed its dominant position in 
the post-Soviet space.   
Russia tried to manifest assertive stance the sanctions imposed by the West by constructing 
energy-focused “pivot to Asia”. In this attempt the Russian government signed a set of gas 
agreements with China. However, Russia, that was known for its military power and experience 
of using gas prices and trading infrastructure for its political benefits appeared to have this in 
common with China. Thus, unable to use the previous toolkit of gas price and disruptions 
policy, Moscow started to express its discontent with lower oil prices and sanctions imposed 
by the West by adventurous foreign policy (Rosenberger et al., 2016, p.6). This might have had 
a positive impact on President Putin’s stature at home, who has been re-elected for the fourth 
term, yet, at the global stage, it turned Russia into a more unpredictable actor. This is especially 
the case considering that President Putin has been depicting energy as considerably the most 
powerful tool in Russia’s international toolbox, even in times when developments on the 
energy market have not been most favorable for Moscow.  
Finally, Russia has been avoiding legally binding obligations over the way it operates in its 
energy markets so far. It stepped out of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) back in 2009. While 
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having various concerns with regard to the treaty, the trigger of the pull-out became the ruling 
of an international court issued in favor of a group of foreign shareholders in the nationalized 
Yukos company, according to which Russia was bound by the treaty’s provisional application 
clauses (Dreyer & Stang, 2014, p. 141). After nearly twenty years of negotiations, Russia joined 
the WTO in 2012 (but energy trade is not much covered by the WTO rules). While transparent, 
open governance still may not be taking place in Moscow, Russia’s decision to join the WTO 
demonstrates some level of acceptance of enforced international impartial standards for the 
country’s external commercial relations, which are characterized of being highly politicized, 
particularly, with its neighbors (ibid, 2014, p.41). 
The Russian government has in June 2020 formally adopted its new energy strategy to 2035. 
The strategy “identified natural gas as the leader in growing global demand for energy, and 
charted a path to ramp up production of liquefied natural gas (LNG), and branch out into 
hydrogen and blended fuels.” (Hernandez, A., 2020, 12 June). The country plans to more than 
triple its production of LNG by 2024. Scaling up hydrogen: Russia also aims to turn its top role 
in the natural gas trade into a foothold for dominating the future hydrogen economy 
(Hernandez, A, 2020, 12 June). 
6.3 A closer look at Russia’s energy sector 
Russia’s energy reserves and productive capacity place it in the top row of global energy 
players. Russia was the top global oil producer, pumping 10.73 million barrels a day (mb/d) of 
oil and gas condensate, in 2015 (Soldatkin, 2016) and it was the second largest natural gas 
producer in the world, producing 1.82 billion cubic meters (bcm) a day as of 2016 (Pedersen, 
2015). Russian energy companies have a wide range of foreign investment and technical 
partners, including ExxonMobil and BP, which were limited but not ended due to Western 
sanctions imposed on Russia in the aftermath of its annexation of Crimea (Rosenberger et al., 
2016, p.19).  
Both oil and gas production in Russia is dominated by state-run companies. In the late 1990s, 
thanks to the gradual privatization of the oil industry after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
some enterprises in private ownerships accelerated growth within the sector. Apart from that 
also, a lot of international oil enterprises tried to join the Russian market. Their success varied. 
However, in the last decade, the number of companies in the oil sector shrink and the Russian 
oil industry became strongly controlled by the state. Consequently, national enterprises 
dominated most of the oil production in Russia. After liquidating Yukos’ assets, state owned 
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Rosneft became the Russia’s top oil producer. The company increased its share of oil 
production back in 2016 by obtaining 50.8 % controlling share in Bashneft, also owned by the 
state.  Bashneft was the sixth-largest producer in the country (EIA, 2017). In 2016, more than 
80 % of total oil production in Russia belonged to the top five companies in Russia (separately 
counting Rosneft and Bashneft) (Eastern Bloc Research, 2017, p. 8). 
In the natural gas sector, the upstream is controlled by Gazprom, that is managed by the state 
and was producing about two-thirds of Russia’s total natural gas output in 2016 (Eastern Bloc 
Research, 2017, p. 13). Possibilities of new players to successfully enter or expand their tinny 
share on this market are limited. Gazprom’s dominant upstream position is further consolidated 
by its legal monopoly on pipeline gas exports (ibid, 2017).  
The minerals extraction tax (MET) and the export tax are Russian primary hydrocarbon taxes 
(IEA, 2014). The government has changed its hydrocarbon tax rates multiple times in recent 
years in order to balance its federal budget deficit. In a tax maneuver in 2015 the state increased 
MET and lowered export tax which was before twice as high as MET (Henderson, 2015, pp. 
36-48). The idea was to keep income from both taxes approximately similar as before but in 
late 2015 the government proposed a new law that postponed planned decrease of export tax. 
During next two years the government proposed several other adaptations of two taxes in order 
to keep persistent federal budget deficit under control (EIA, 2017). These short-term 
interventions and superficial steps point to the reluctance of the Russian government to address 
challenges faced by its energy sector, which is in need of genuine reforms.  
Russia’s energy assets include an extensive pipeline network stretching throughout its territory, 
Central Asia and into Europe. The Unified Gas Supply (UGS) system is the umbrella term, 
describing the unified western part of Russian natural gas pipeline grid (Schubert et al., 2016, 
p.237). Back in 2007 was Gazprom ordered by the state to establish an Eastern Gas Program 
(EGP) in order to branch out natural gas infrastructure in eastern Siberia and Russia’s Far East. 
Last 10 years Gazprom has been further developing the pipeline infrastructure to allow the 
transport of gas from the fields in Yamal and Eastern Siberia and to broaden its export routes 
to China and to Europe (Nord Stream and Turkish Stream). 
By Russian Law on Gas Supply, adopted in 1999, stipulates that owners of natural gas pipeline 
systems are obliged to enable non–discriminatory access to the grid for the purpose of domestic 
customers’ supply. The right to use UGS system for export is by a Law on Gas Export from 
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2006 granted exclusively to Gazprom as an owner of UGS system (Yafimava, 2015, p.2). 
Likewise, Russia has an extensive domestic distribution and export pipeline network for oil, 
which is nearly completely owned and run by the state-owned Transneft (EIA, 2017). 
Therefore, the vast majority of Russia’s crude oil must, on the way to other countries via 
continent or by loading tankers in Russian ports, cross Transneft’s system.  The only notable 
exception is the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline, running from Tengiz field in 
Kazakhstan towards port of Novorossiysk in Black Sea. This system is owned by a consortium   
where the largest share (24 %) belongs to Transneft. Smaller quantities of oil are exported by 
rail shipped on ships from independent terminals. 
Among additional energy assets of the Russian Federation are longstanding relationships that 
Russia maintains with different countries. Despite seeing its share reduced somewhat, Russia 
has maintained its positions as the main supplier of crude oil and natural gas to the EU, while 
also emerging as the leading supplier of solid fuels (Eurostat, 2017). In 2016, almost 60 % of 
the whole export of Russian crude oil more than 75 % of  natural gas export from Russia ended 
in European OECD members (EIA, 2017). By contrast, in Asia, as of 2016, Russia accounted 
for 11 % of China’s crude oil imports (ibid, 2017), 8 % of Japan’s crude oil imports 
(International Energy Agency, 2016), and 4 % of South Korea’s crude oil imports (EIA, 2017). 
Yet, Moscow has been hoping to double flows of oil and gas to Asia over the next two decades. 
In this context, on the back of the gas agreements of 2014 signed with Beijing, two years later, 
Russia succeeded in expanding its oil market share in China and to became the biggest source 
of supply of crude oil, exceeding Saudi Arabia (ibid, 2017). Russia’s success was mainly the 
result of a direct pipeline to northern China, the proximity of the Kozmino port to China as 
well as new rules allowing small independent refineries in China (known as “tea pot” 
refineries) to buy imported supplies (ibid, 2017). Yet, in an increasingly diverse supply market, 
Russian activities in China are expected to be marked by stiff competition for market share. 
While gas geopolitics has made the most headlines, as a matter of fact, the Russian government 
far more relies on oil than on gas. Russian state earns 6 to 8 times more revenues from oil 
(Kononczuk, 2012, p.10). Partly, this can be explained by the fact that Russia exports three 
quarters of the oil it produces, but only one third of its produced gas (ibid, 2012, p.10). Yet, 
gas represents a more powerful instrument in Moscow’s foreign policy toolbox due to the fact 
that on the global oil market Russia is a price taker, while for gas it has been able to define the 
pricing conditions. Thus, the recent collapse in oil prices, coupled with Western sanctions, have 
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hit Russia’s economy very hard. Moreover, Russian firms rely on foreign suppliers for 80 % 
of their equipment in some increasingly challenging areas including complex seismic software, 
hydraulic fracturing technology and equipment for offshore operations (Henderson, 2015, 
p.28). Therefore, Western sanctions, which have been targeting these areas in particular, have 
impacted the capacity of Russian firms to develop some unconventional resources. 
Finally, during the last decade, Russia has been incapable to keep pace with the energy demand 
boom and has been slow to launch gas projects in its resource-rich Far East (Hille, 2016). At 
present, due to limited access to Western capital market financing, Russia finds itself struggling 
to maintain momentum in energy projects, especially those with China (Gabuev, 2015, p.2). 
Additionally, Russia no longer has dominance over the energy trade in Central Asia, due to 
increased competition coming from the former Soviet states to supply China with oil and 
natural gas (Rosenberger et al., 2016, pp.19-22).. Thus, apart from the quick “pivot to Asia”, 
which turned out to be limited, Russia started reorienting its energy and economic growth 
strategy to reinforcing long-standing energy supply relationships to its long-time customer - 
Europe, yet, without abandoning hopes of becoming a more prominent player in Asian markets 
(Rosenberger et al., 2016, pp.19-22).. 
6.4 Limits of Russia-China energy relations 
In the face of Western sanctions and falling oil prices, Russia turned to the East in order to 
ensure its energy exports at reasonably high prices, obtain necessary energy equipment, and 
develop the Russian Far East, which represents a political imperative for Moscow. However, 
the Russian government’s “pivot to Asia” has shown limited success so far.  
At the core of President Putin’s strategy has been to deepen Russia-China energy and political 
ties. In 2014 alone, Russia signed more than 100 high-level agreements with China (Gabuev, 
2015, p.148). Yet despite the high number of deals, Moscow did not manage to secure financing 
for some major infrastructure and energy projects, which the latter was looking for. After more 
than a decade of negotiation over the construction of Power of Siberia gas pipeline, one of the 
biggest joint projects between Russia and China, Beijing did not show enthusiasm towards the 
new investment opportunities put forward by Moscow for the proposed Altai gas pipeline 
(Power of Siberia-2). Nor did any Chinese partner come forward for the 49 % stake offered by 
Russia in the giant Vankor oil field (Dreyer & Stang, 2014, p. 21). Besides, even though 
Moscow succeeded in obtaining support from the China Insurance Investment Ltd. for 
developing the Yamal liquefied natural gas (LNG) project and also Gazprom managed to 
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secure a five-year $2.17 billion loan from the Bank of China (Marson & Ostroukh, 2016), the 
amount of Chinese financing, compared to Russian capital requirements for the energy sector, 
has been limited.  
As a result, the planned new Russian pivot in Asia lost its momentum. It appeared some years 
too late. One of the reasons is slowing of Chinese energy demand and the second one is growing 
competition on natural gas market. On top of that deep mistrust still exists in Russia-China 
relations largely stemming from historical grievances (Dreyer & Stang, 2014, p. 21). On top of 
that, increased competition between the two powers in Central Asia - where Russia still 
dominates the regions’ political and security spheres and China is increasingly establishing 
itself as an important economic power, especially, via its One Belt One Road (OBOR) strategy 
- has been posing further challenges (Rosenberger et al., 2016, pp.19-22).  
Thus, instead of a fast creation of Russia-China energy axis, Russia came to a limit that can be 
best highlighted by the Russia-China energy relationship. Consequently, in place of turning to 
Asian markets following Western sanctions, Russia, once again, became convinced in the 
importance of sustaining its market share in Europe in order to safeguard its dominant position, 
particularly in the gas market.  
6.5 Challenges to Russia-Europe energy relations 
Europe and Russia have been bound in a mutually dependent energy relationship. Yet, each 
has been trying to create leverage for itself by finding alternative options in order to minimize 
the interdependence. This has been translated into Europe’s ongoing attempts to diversify its 
resources and Russia’s strategy to reach Asian markets.  
In the European market, Gazprom remains the dominant supplier of natural gas, which supplies 
different European Member States at different prices based on long-term supply contracts. The 
preference for long-term (20-30 years) contracts that index gas prices the dynamics of oil prices 
can be explained by the fact that Russia with its export potential has a clout to influence oil 
prices and prefers stability and predictability in energy income (Dreyer & Stang, 2014, p. 38). 
However, due to the continued policy of pricing its gas relative to oil prices, Gazprom has 
effectively become a high-cost supplier. Moreover, Gazprom’s pricing system remains highly 
politically determined by the level of acceptance of Russia’s foreign policy agenda by a third 
country. For instance, the price of gas offered by Gazprom to Germany is lower compared to 
the one offered to Lithuania.  
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Considering that Gazprom’s activities are directly linked with the foreign policy of the Russian 
Federation, they have become increasingly problematic for the EU in recent years. This was 
largely due to the growing tensions in the EU-Russia relations as a result of the Russian 
aggression in its immediate neighborhood as well as the latter’s concerted efforts to meddle in 
the internal politics of EU countries in order to divide Europe from within. Consequently, 
Europe has started renewing its long-term efforts to reduce its dependence on Russian energy. 
This has become most illustrative in the Baltic states among which, Lithuania managed to make 
the biggest progress back in 2014, by opening its LNG terminal, ending Gazprom’s monopoly 
on its gas supply. The floating LNG terminal, aptly named “Independence,” already received 
its first LNG from the United States back in August 2017 (Sytas, 2017). Importantly, if utilized 
at its full capacity, the terminal can theoretically cover 80–90 percent of the Baltic region’s 
LNG demand (Rosenberger et al., 2016, p.29).  
Furthermore, several steps have been taken by Brussels to decrease European vulnerability vis-
à-vis Gazprom. These initiatives, aimed at further developing a common European energy 
policy, have been accelerated by the crisis in Ukraine, which created the urgency for rapid 
progress. Among such efforts are: more efficient solidarity mechanisms in case of gas supply 
disruptions, better cross-border cooperation as well as increased level of coordination in the 
process of negotiating energy deals with third countries. Among softer measures are the EU’s 
attempts to put in place effective energy diplomacy for the Union to be able to speak with one 
voice and have a better negotiating position vis-à-vis foreign suppliers. Finally, the launch of 
a sensitive antitrust case against Gazprom by the competition authorities in Brussels back in 
2012 has further demonstrated the gravity of EU’s concerns with regard to Gazprom’s abuse 
of dominant position on the European market.  
Russia’s position in Europe has also been challenged by other energy exporting countries both 
in natural gas and oil. Regarding oil, Russia competes with Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia 
has focused on countries like Sweden and Poland that have for many years been dominated by 
Russian supplies (Williams, Said, & Faucon, 2015). Iran, on the other hand, has well taken 
advantage of the lifting of sanctions and succeeded to increase its market share on 900,000 
barrels per day (Zhdannikov, 2016). Lastly, thanks to the shale gas revolution in the US and its 
LNG exports entering the EU market, combined with the European internal efforts to be better 
equipped vis-à-vis Gazprom, the latter’s status quo in Europe has been increasingly challenged. 
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These challenges, which together threaten Russia’s participation on European markets and 
seem hard to be balanced by a build-up in the East, have become of increased importance for 
Moscow. Thus, convinced in the necessity to refresh and expand energy supply relationships 
with the EU, Moscow, on the one hand, started taking some concessionary measures, for 
example with regard to energy pricing. The latter has shown signs of eroding due to increased 
competition from alternative gas suppliers as well as due to European demands to obtain either 
at least partial linkage of gas prices to spot market prices or price reductions in the framework 
of their re-negotiations of energy contracts with Gazprom (Henderson, Gazprom - Is the 2016 
the Year for a Change of Pricing Dtrategy in Europe?, 2016, p.3). On the other hand, Russia 
has been trying to safeguard its sources of hard currency revenues from traditional consumers 
in Europe through constructing new pipelines, which both aim at circumventing the transit 
countries, such as Ukraine, and securing its dominant position of the natural gas supplier to 
Europe. The ongoing project of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, an effort that would concentrate 
80 % of the EU’s gas imports from Russia onto this single route leading directly to Germany 
(Steinhauser, 2015), coupled with the Turkish Stream pipeline in the South, which similarly 
aims to serve as an alternative route to the principal transit route via Ukraine, are indicative 
thereof.  
Going forward, Russia will continue using all the instruments at its disposal in order to 
capitalize on fractures within the European continent as well as divisions between the EU and 
other suppliers, especially the US (Rosenberger et al., 2016, p.30). However, in light of current 
realities: a destabilized Russian economy, limited success of its shift to Asian markets as well 
as European attempts to move more rapidly away from Russian energy dependence, Russia’s 
position is becoming vulnerable. Thus, Moscow, realizing the importance of European markets 
for its gas exports, slowly started repairing Gazprom’s damaged reputation.  
6.6 Change of attitude in Russia’s energy relations towards Europe 
As suggested before, the energy sphere, once seen as a catalyst of strategic partnership between 
Russia and the European Union, gradually became a leverage for Russia to “blackmail” EU 
Member States for going against its foreign policy agenda. Already before the 2009 Russia-
Ukrainian gas crisis, it has been in a state of tug-of-war, both parties trying to play by their own 
rules and using each other’s weaknesses to their own benefit. The Commission has been trying 
since the 1990s to promote the liberalization of European energy markets promoted by already 
four packages of directives in its attempt to set out a common legal framework. First was the 
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First Package in the mid-1990s (mainly concerned with electricity and gas transit across the 
borders). Second Package followed in the early 2000s (attempting to liberalize energy supply 
and production). In response to the market disruptions of 2006, a Third Energy Package was 
proposed in 2007, aiming to take liberalization significantly further by an introduction of a 
concept of “ownership unbundling”. According to that request, energy companies were obliged 
to sell supply networks or to place them under entirely independent management. An important 
reciprocity clause was part of the Third Energy Package, which envisages that companies of 
non-Member States are only authorized to operate in EU markets if abiding by the same 
unbundling rules and principles - dissociating ownership of production, transport and sales of 
gas - within the European internal market (Pick, 2012, p.348, p. 330). 
From the Russian perspective, the reciprocity principle has been perceived as an “anti-Gazprom 
clause” as it was posing an obstacle to Russia’s major vertically integrated company – Gazprom 
to access European markets. Significantly, the unbundling requirement was challenging widely 
known Gazprom’s strategic objectives in EU markets, namely, directly controlling sales to 
European customers by means of acquiring more downstream assets. Considering the fact that 
Gazprom has been doing this to some extent in a several number of EU Member States, with 
the Third Energy Package, conditions from some of Gazprom’s long-term contracts with EU 
Member States had to be renegotiated. This was particularly concerning dispositions, which 
ran counter to the competition framework envisaged by the EU’s liberalization measures: 
among others, where Gazprom had downstream assets and where the “take-or-pay principle” 
or “destination clause” were part of buyer’s obligation. Such relatively standard contract 
provisions were obliging wholesale trader from a costumer country to pay for a certain volume 
of gas irrespective of whether it was really taken or not, and on top of that prohibiting the re-
selling of gas which was not used in a customer country (ibid, 2012, p.331). Thus, the Third 
Energy Package was seen in Moscow as an EU attempt to reshape its energy relations with 
Gazprom as dominant supplier, or at least to narrow down its room for maneuver on the internal 
market of EU. Without doubt, the Amended Gas Directive extrapolating the Third Energy 
Package regime to the new infrastructure entering the European Union from third countries 
(Nord Stream 2) had the same effect. 
Despite the European Commission’s attempts to engage Russia in a common framework, 
Russia has been managing to resist this multilateral logic also with the help of EU Member 
States themselves, who were undermining the Commission’s efforts. This has largely been due 
to the fact that the dependence on Russian imports varies considerably between the Member 
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States. Considering that this dependence is largely influencing the opinion about Russia as a 
potential threat to individual Member States’ energy security, not all Member States saw the 
need to protect themselves with a common EU foreign energy policy (Umbach, 2010, p.1237). 
Thus, Russia’s Gazprom was able to agree on long-term contracts in bilateral deals with the  
national champions in the European main net importers, such as with Gaz de France Suez (until 
2030), E.ON Ruhrgas from Germany (until 2035) and with Italy’s ENI (until 2035). These 
agreements gave Russia some advantage in negotiations with the EU and have allowed 
Gazprom to continue keeping energy cooperation with the EU primarily on its own terms 
(Kirchner & Berk, 2010, p.868). Back in May 2004 when ten Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries joined the EU, Gazprom was striking its first deal with the Commission’s DG 
COMP. Namely, in order to avoid fines for abusing its dominant market position Gazprom has 
promised to remove destination clauses from its contracts with Western clients (ENI, OMV, 
E.ON and GDF) (Polish Oil and Gas Company (PGNiG), 2017). However, this privilege 
remained only for “old Europe”, since destination clauses remained valid in Gazprom’s long-
term contracts with its Central European customers until several years later (e.g. in 2010 from 
Polish Oil and Gas Company’s contract) (Polish Oil and Gas Company (PGNiG), 2017). In the 
contract with Ukrainian Naftogaz the clause remained valid until end 2019. Apart from 
destination clauses, Gazprom was using other tools to isolate Central European  markets from 
each other and from the West, namely via shares in transmission system operators owing 
infrastructure or via provisions of long-term contracts (Slovakia, Ukraine, Hungary), which 
didn’t allow the trade between those countries.35 Besides, no need to say that Gazprom has 
misused its dominant position to charge considerably higher prices for its customers in the 
Central European region in comparison to prices offered to Western Europe despite the 
transportation costs are lower than for shipping the gas to the West. The prices paid by the 
states in Russia’s immediate neighborhood were directly correlated with the political 
orientation of the respective governments and their current political relation to Moscow (Pick, 
2012, p.348). The Polish example could serve as a good illustration. At certain moment the 
price of the same molecules of Russian gas delivered via the Yamal Pipeline to German 
customers was almost 150 US dollars per 1000 cubic meters lower, compared to the price paid 
by Polish customers.  
                                                          
35 For instance, when Gazprom in January 2009 cut off the supplies via Ukraine, Polish Oil and Gas Company 
could not buy gas from anyone else than Gazprom, since all other potential suppliers couldn’t obtain Gazprom’s 
approval for re-selling Russian gas. 
158 
 
Due to Gazprom’s anti-competitive actions the European Commission back in 2012 launched 
an antitrust investigation in 2012. The investigation ended in 2015 by issuing formal charges 
of abuse of Gazprom’s monopolistic position in the Central European region (Polish Oil and 
Gas Company (PGNiG), 2017). The Commission’s decision was justified by an explanation of 
three facts: illegal separation of EU markets by the means of destination clauses, rejection of 
third-party access to gas infrastructure and unlawful pricing flowing from Gazprom’s dominant 
position in CEE (Riley A. , Gazprom: Double standards in EU antitrust law. One law for 
American tech companies and another for one Russian gas company?, 2017).  
DG Competition was threatening Gazprom with a fine of up to 8 billion US dollars (i.e. 10 
percent of its global annual turnover in 2015) (Tagliapietra, 2017). In a bargaining process 
Gazprom agreed to these three allegations: to remove all contractual barriers to the free flow 
of gas in Central European gas markets; to take measures to enable their better integration (e.g. 
by removing export bans and destination clauses); to facilitate interconnection agreements 
between Bulgaria and Greece, and to create opportunities for more gas flows to the Baltic States 
and Bulgaria. It agreed also to introduce competitive benchmarks, including Western European 
hub prices into its price review clauses in contracts with customers in the Baltic States, Bulgaria 
and Poland as well as more frequent and efficient price reviews (ibid, 2017). While these 
commitments were criticized for being insufficient by some Central European states, in the 
view of the European Commissioner for competition, it represented a forward-looking solution 
in line with the EU rules. This amicable settlement was in the interest of Gazprom itself since 
it avoided an infringement decision that could have obliged the Russian company to pay a huge 
fine. The final decision of the EU’s anti-trust chief, Margrethe Vestager, whether to settle with 
Gazprom in light of the pledges to mend its ways, or whether to impose fines was by some seen 
as mild. Gazprom did not need to pay. Its pledge to change its behavior on EU markets cannot 
be attributed solely to substantial EU fines. In light of the recent developments on the world 
energy markets, g, the shale gas revolution in the US and increased competition coming from 
other suppliers, combined with Russia’s failed pivot in Asia, Moscow clearly understood that 
replacing Europe as the main destination of Russian exports of natural gas and the heavy 
dependence on revenues from the EU market is highly improbable to change at least for some 
time to come. Therefore, it is in Russia’s interest to repair Gazprom’s damaged reputation. The 
full transformation of Russia’s energy sector, to the one based on market rules, remains highly 
unlikely in the near future, yet, Moscow, despite its realistic rhetoric, has demonstrated a strong 
imperative to frame energy relations with the EU in a relatively cooperative manner. 
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Importantly, this shift can also be noticed in Gazprom’s relations with the Energy Community, 
which compared to the EU, has much less leverage to put the Russian gas giant under pressure 
for its wrongdoings. Namely, back in December 2017, Gazprom agreed to exclude a destination 
clause from the 2012 Intergovernmental Agreement on the supply of natural gas to Serbia 
challenged by the Energy Community Secretariat (Energy Community Secretariat, 2017). 
Additionally, the recent application for the exemption for third party access in Serbia by a 
Gazprom subsidiary company further demonstrates a shift in Gazprom’s behavior towards rule-
based energy relations and some willingness to respect the EU acquis. Finally, these 
developments also provide significant indications as to how Russia might operate in the 
European markets as its gas export strategy further develops. 
6.7 The energy dimension of the Eurasian Economic Union 
Moscow’s attempts to repair its energy relations with Europe have not prevented it from 
engaging in yet another race with the EU, this time on a multilateral level. With Russia’s 
growing assertiveness and long-time intentions to ensure its pre-eminence in the post-Soviet 
space, Moscow stepped up efforts in order to challenge the EU’s role in the post-Soviet area. 
In this context back in 2015, Moscow launched its Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a 
regional project largely reproducing the process of European integration, yet, in an extremely 
accelerated and superficial manner. Notwithstanding the absence of a directly elected body, the 
similarity of the EAEU with the EU, at least “on paper”, is obvious (Pop, 2016, p.51).  
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the GDP of previous Soviet republics 
plummeted and mutual trade shrank. After first years of turmoil, some former republics started 
to think about closer trading ties. In 1995, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan signed the first agreements on the establishment of a Customs Union. In 1999, the 
same countries signed the Treaty on the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space and a 
year later established the Eurasian Economic Community, which Uzbekistan joined in 2006.  
But years of economic demise and revival changed previous Soviet economies. “In 
Kazakhstan, for example, 47 percent of its trade activity was with Russia in 1995. By 2011, 40 
percent of its exports went to Europe, while only 9 percent went to Russia.” (MacFaquhar, 
2014).  
The Eurasian Economic Community was modelled following the same historical steps as EU. 
First step was Euroasian Economic Community, later upgraded in 2015 with an Eurasian 
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Economic Union based on a Treaty (Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, 2015)36 signed 
by Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. After the signing, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
promoted the establishment as a strong and powerful center, that advocates development of 
economy and joins more than 170 million people (ibid, 2014). Kazakh government 
representatives already on the spot stressed that the Eurasian Economic Union is meant as 
purely economic union with no political overtone (ibid, 2014). The bloc was later enlarged by 
Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. It tries to copy the institutional structure of the EU with its rotating 
presidency (every year compared to six months in the EU), Supreme Eurasian Economic 
Council, composed of the heads of member states (competence is to approve the budget, 
determines the strategy and goals) and Eurasian Economic Commission (taking decisions on 
the customs policy of the union, rules on competition, energy and fiscal policy of the Eurasian 
Economic Union. The Eurasian Economic Commission consists of two bodies: the Council and 
the Collegium. The Council is composed of the Vice Prime Ministers of the member states and 
is responsible for the overall management of the Eurasian Commission. The council convenes 
once every quarter. The Board as an executive body has twelve commissioners. One of them 
is a Chairman of the Board. Each member state can appoint up to two commissioners. The 
Board monitors the implementation of the treaty, prepares annual progress reports and issues 
recommendations. The EAEU has no parliamentary dimension. 
The Eurasian Economic Union has a similarity with the EU only on the surface. It is dominated 
by Russia. The headquarters of the Commission is in Moscow. The official language is Russian. 
Russia has by far the biggest economy and population (more than 80 %) among the member 
states. EAEU has its Court with headquarters in Belarusian Minsk, composed of two judges 
from each member state. Unlike in EU the judges are appointed by the head of government of 
the member state. However, since some member states are still considered dictatorships, it 
would be difficult to stress its independence and similarity to the European Court of Justice. 
The EAEU currently includes Armenia and Belarus which are also members of the EU Eastern 
Partnership initiative, one of the main objectives of which is also economic integration, yet, 
into the European internal market. Despite the fact that according to the Russian Foreign 
Affairs Ministry, “there are no contradictions between the integration processes in the West 
and the East of Europe because they both come down to the free movement of goods, capital, 
services and labor” (Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian, 2011), the gap between 
                                                          
36 Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. Eurasian Economic Union, 2015. 
161 
 
the rhetoric and the reality is evident. Apart from the considerably speedy process of the 
integration of the Eurasian project, which raises questions regarding the genuine institutional 
integration, Russia has been exploiting coercive measures targeting countries chosen by 
Moscow to become members of the EAEU. These measures included, inter alia, economic 
embargoes, manipulations with energy prices, supply disruptions as well as the use of force. 
Moreover, while the EU’s aim in building regional frameworks is to externalize its acquis based 
on open markets and fair competition, the objectives of Russia is to create yet another leverage 
to dominate its neighboring countries by increasing their economic and institutional 
dependence on Russia which retains a noticeably superior position in the post-Soviet space.  
In this context, Ukraine’s U-turn towards the EU, which was seen by Moscow as a key member 
to join the EAEU, became a major blow to Russia’s Eurasian agenda as well as instructive of 
its real motives. Additionally, considering the significant dominance of the Russian market 
over the ones of the remaining members, the Eurasian project is arguably described as a 
plutocratic regional agreement, in which the smaller member states do not delegate the 
decision-making power to a supranational body, but to a larger member state (Rivera & 
Garashchuk, 2016, p.99). This prevents any potential spill-over effect. 
EAEU could be almost called the “Russian Energy Union” since in mutual trading 
relationships, energy resources are by far the most important trading products, reaching for 
nearly 50 per cent of the total exports (Wolffgang, Belozerov, & Brovka, 2013, p.94). 
Correspondingly, according to the founding treaty of 2015, cooperation in the field of energy 
is one of the main fields of the EAEU and the latter attaches high importance to the creation of 
a common energy market between its member states. The EAEU energy market concepts for 
all three energy sectors - electricity, oil and natural gas – were approved by the Eurasian 
Supreme Economic Council in the spring of 2016. Based on these concepts, individual 
programs are planned to set important deadlines and to formulate basic principles for 
cooperation in the three sectors. 
These programs should be used as a basis for the national development plans of the individual 
EAEU member states. The EAEU has high ambitions: a common electricity market by 2019, 




Among the three envisaged common energy markets, the one in natural gas seems to be the 
biggest hurdle. The concept for the Eurasian gas market was approved at the same time as the 
one for the oil sector (spring 2016), yet, negotiations were stalled for a long time due to the 
energy dispute between Russia and Belarus. The Belorussian side in the beginning of 2016 as 
a result of concerns over the high price paid for Russian gas, particularly in view of falling gas 
prices for the EU, unilaterally started paying a reduced amount to Gazprom (US$73 per 
thousand cubic meters instead of the agreed US$132). This way it accumulated over US$720 
million of a debt to the Russian company (ibid, 2018, p.3). In response, Moscow reduced its 
oil exports to the neighboring state, which became a heavy blow to the Belarussian oil-fired 
economy. The two parties eventually reached a compromise but Minsk had to repay the debt 
of $ 726 million in full. On the same day, the President of Belarus signed the Customs Code of 
the EAEU (Kardas & Kłysiński, 2017), while also agreeing on the creation of a sustainable 
program for a common gas market in the EAEU by the end of 2018.  
Consequently, the Eurasian Economic Commission’s Advisory Committee on Petroleum and 
Gas approved the program for the creation of gas market on 24 April 2017. Unlike the program 
for the common oil market, which envisages common tariffs and mechanisms for oil transit 
and export to third countries, the program for the common gas market refers solely to natural 
gas extraction, trading, transport, storage and processing exclusively within the territory of 
EAEU (Pastukhova & Westphal, 2018, p.1). In parallel to the removal of destination clause on 
EU markets the EAEU program envisages just opposite: introduction of control mechanisms 
that would prevent the resale of gas bought within the EAEU for domestic consumption later 
to third countries. Apart from that colonial clause also harmonization of rules and standards in 
the common gas market are also envisaged. This is especially striking when gas trading 
volumes within the EAEU are relatively low (33.5 bcm per year) compared to gas exports to 
third countries (177.4 bcm) (ibid, 2018). Thus, it is more than clear that the decision reflects 
the interests of Russia, the largest gas exporter, while also serving to further reinforce 
Gazprom's export monopoly on pipelines. These control mechanisms would effectively 
provide Moscow with another instrument to prevent the sale of gas by Belarus or Kazakhstan 
to Europe or China. On the other hand, Moscow offers to EAEU member states the possibility 
to obtain cheap supplies from Russia under inter-state agreements so that a reconciliation of 
interests can take place. 
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The dissatisfaction of non-Russian members of the Eurasian Economic Union with this 
provision is best seen through the statement of the Deputy Prime Minister of Belarus Mr. Igor 
Petrishenko stating that tariffs on natural gas transportation on the common market of the 
Eurasian Economic Union should not exceed the tariffs that entities of the domestic natural gas 
market pay. For him it is the key issue that directly affects the possibility of building an 
effective common natural gas market of the union where all members enjoy equal conditions. 
Since Gazprom as an owner of the gas transportation system is free to set gas transportation 
prices, the price Belarusian consumers are supposed to pay is three times higher than the price 
consumers in neighboring Russia's Smolensk Oblast pay for the same service. (Belta, 2021) 
With further progress of the Eurasian project and the level of dominance of Russia over its 
smaller members, it becomes increasingly manifest that notwithstanding what its name 
suggests, the Eurasian Economic Union represents a geopolitical project. Therefore, the main 
objective thereof is to safeguard Russia’s dominant position in the post-Soviet space. The 
EAEU has intentionally been designed as a conflicting project to EU led integrationist projects, 
among which is the Energy Community, specifically working on building a Pan-European 
energy market. Thus, with the EAEU objectives with regard to creating the common energy 
market being put in place, risks of deepening gaps on the borders with EU-oriented countries 
are rising. Finally, such gaps could potentially deepen even inside of these countries, if one 
considers that e.g. the Crimean Peninsula, eastern parts of Ukraine as well as twenty percent 
of Georgia’s territory are de facto under Russian control. The whole set of relations among the 
member states still lies on intergovernmental relations. 
6.8 The differences between the EU’s single energy market and the Eurasian Economic 
Union market design 
The EU’s legal framework supported the gradual opening of national markets with care to 
promote competition and equal treatment of all market participants for the benefit of 
consumers. The Eurasian Economic Union, at first glance being similar to European 
integration, features important differences. As presented below, the EEU and the EU  acquis 
aim to establish completely different market designs.  
The Eurasian Economic Union Treaty consists of four parts. The principles for cooperation in 
the energy sector are defined by Section XX in part three of the Treaty.  
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Section XX (Energy Industry) has the intention to create the common electricity market by July 
2018 and the common market for gas, oil and petroleum products by July 2025 (Art.104). 
According to Article 79 of the Treaty, the member states should develop a long-term mutually 
beneficial cooperation in the energy sector, implementing a coordinated energy policy and 
creating step by step the common market for energy resources (electricity, gas, oil and oil 
products).  
The market shall be based on principles of cooperation, the gradual harmonization of 
legislation and the unhindered access to services of natural monopolies. The goal is to establish 
a unified pricing method and to introduce a trading platform at international level.  
Annex 21, the “Protocol on ensuring access to services of natural monopoly entities in the 
electric power sphere, including fundamental pricing and tariff policy”, is the most advanced 
framework for the energy sector but is still rudimentary compared to the acquis and is 
structured on 35 pages only.  
The gas sector (Art. 83) is less developed in terms of a detailed description and framework 
structure than the electricity market. In general, the member states shall develop a long-term 
and mutually beneficial cooperation in the areas as:  
 Gas transportation through the territories of the member states; 
 Construction, reconstruction and operation of gas-related infrastructure (gas pipelines, 
underground storage facilities); 
 Development of services required to meet domestic gas demands of the member states.  
Article 80 on “Indicative Balances of Gas, Oil and Petroleum Products’’ says that respective 
authorities of the member states shall develop and agree on indicative (planned) gas, oil and 
petroleum products balances of the Union (Art.80(1)). According to the statistics of the EAEU, 
the gas balance of the EAEU in the year 2015 was 679.3 bcm of which 205.1 bcm of gas was 
exported.37 The balances should be developed according to a specified methodology (Art. 
80(2)). To develop projected balances according to a specified methodology seems not to 
follow market-based mechanisms which, by contrast, is central in the EU acquis.  
                                                          




The common oil market framework (Art. 84) provides rules for trade of oil and oil products as 
such (elimination of tariff barriers and export duties and rules for equal access to the 
infrastructure). 
Article 104 also prescribes that member state should conclude international treaties within the 
Union on the establishment of common markets in electricity (Art.104(3)), gas (Art.104(5)) 
and oil and petroleum products (Art.104(7)). In May 2019, the member states signed an 
international treaty on the formation of the EAEU common electric power market, which sets 
out its participants and infrastructure organization as well as an electric power trade 
procedure.38  In practice, the single market does not function yet. 
Annex 22, the “Protocol on the rules of access to services of natural monopoly entities in the 
sphere of gas transportations using gas transportation systems, including fundamental pricing 
and tariff policy”, is even more general and covers access to the transmission system and other 
topics.   
Article 2(2) of Annex 22 defines “equal net back pricing’’ where wholesale prices for gas are 
formed to meet domestic demand and are based on predefined criteria separately defined for 
gas producing member states and gas consuming member states. The calculation based on such 
a formula is misleading with respect to the understanding of wholesale prices which are formed 
under free market conditions. Such mechanisms are not in line with the acquis. Article 80 on 
“Indicative Balances of Gas, Oil and Petroleum Products’’ says that relevant authorities in the 
member states shall agree on indicative (projected) gas, oil and petroleum products balances of 
the Union (Art.80(1)). To develop projected balances according to a specified methodology 
seems not to follow market-based mechanisms according to the acquis.  
Article 3 of the Protocol, Annex 22 (Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union, 2015)39 lists the 
main principles with which the members of the Eurasian Economic Union shall gradually form 
a common gas market and provide access to the transmission system. In Paragraph 2, the 
priority supply of domestic demand for gas of the member states is mentioned. For the common 
electricity market, Article 5 of the Protocol on electricity transportation access (Annex 21) 
outlines the same prioritization of domestic electricity demand. Compared to the acquis, this 
                                                          
38 EAEU common electric power market to be launched on January 1, 2025 at the latest, (August, 2019), available 
on website of Eurasian Economic Commission.   
39 Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. Eurasian Economic Union, 2015.  
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provision would be inconsistent, as it would have a discriminatory effect in terms of 
prioritization of domestic gas and electricity supply towards the common internal market.  
Article 4 reads that the access to services of natural monopolists in the gas transportation sector 
shall only be applicable to gas which is originated in the territories of the member states. The 
framework of the Protocol shall not apply to territories of third states and to gas transportation 
to and from the Union. This means that the Protocol is only valid for member states of the 
EAEU. This provision for the access to gas transmission systems is inconsistent with the 
acquis, where access to the transmission system is granted to all system users under the same 
conditions. 
Article 5 mentions that Member States should establish an information exchange system which 
includes data on domestic gas consumption to access the transmission system. Such provisions 
provide a basis for central planning access which is not following market-based conditions in 
general.  
Annex 23, the “Protocol on organization, management, functioning and development of the 
common markets of oil and petroleum products”, is the last part of the energy industry section 




7 Chinese Foreign Energy Policy  
 
7.1 An overview of the Chinese energy sector  
Over the past few years, the People’s Republic of China moved to the top ranks in global energy 
demand. In 2011, it became the biggest global energy consumer globally and is still the second-
biggest oil consumer right after the US (EIA, 2015). While until the early 1990s China was a 
net oil exporter, in 2009 became the second-biggest net importer of crude oil and petroleum 
products in the world. Increasing oil consumption in China amounted to 43 % of all the oil 
consumption growth on the world in 2014 (ibid, 2015). China's largest oil fields are already 
mature with a production peak long ago. Extraction companies need to invest in techniques to 
sustain oil flows at the mature fields. There are also some untapped reserves in the western 
provinces as well as potential offshore fields but they all need major investment. Additionally, 
in order to incorporate its supply of oil into its domestic consumption destinations from 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Myanmar, China has been investing in its national oil pipeline 
infrastructure. 
China’s increasing consumption of natural gas made the country to search for alternative 
imports via new pipelines and LNG terminals. The country has been investing in natural gas 
pipeline infrastructure to connect production sites in the western and northern regions with 
consumption centers along the coast and to accommodate greater imports from Central and 
Southeast Asia. Constant growth in natural gas demand in recent years, particularly in the urban 
coastal areas, has led the country to become the world's third-largest LNG importer and to 
accelerate development of its LNG and pipeline infrastructure (ibid, 2015).  
China remains the world's biggest coal producer, consumer and importer, accounting for round 
half of global coal consumption. With this the country is responsible for a huge amount of 
world energy-related carbon dioxide emissions. Similar to Britain long ago, China's industrial 
revolution has been based on coal, however, its scale and speed has been like nothing else in 
the world history - bringing with it serious environmental costs. Additionally, China's sizeable 
industrialization along with the swiftly modernizing economy helped the country become the 
world's largest power generator back in 2011. Coal and hydroelectricity continue to be the 
leading sources of the country's electricity generation and installed capacity, however, the 
country has been moving to generate more power from nuclear, renewable sources, and natural 
gas in efforts to address environmental concerns.  
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Back in March 2013, new leadership emerged in China with Xi Jinping becoming President. 
His new administration has started to develop an economic and financial reform that would 
allow to reach sustainable long-term growth. The reform agenda broad principles were 
presented at the Third Plenum, a major policy meeting held every five years, in November 
2013. In the energy sector, the government was planning to move towards more market-based 
pricing schemes. Energy efficiency and pollution-controlling measures found were prioritized 
and greater competition among energy companies stressed, coupled with increased investments 
in technically challenging upstream hydrocarbon areas and renewable energy projects (ibid, 
2015). Securing energy resources has remained a top priority for Beijing like in previous energy 
policy. This is understandable in a country that is strongly import dependent and has 1,5 billion 
of inhabitants.   
Since the formation of the energy industry in China, the relationship between China’s state-
owned energy giants and the Chinese government has been shaken by centralization and 
decentralization. During the Maoist period, China laid down ground structure for the energy 
industry that included a strong state control aiming at securing the supplies.  General direction, 
in which the industry was headed, depended on government’s taste for state controlled market 
on the one hand or a more liberal market orientation on the other, depending on the current 
political preference of different teams of politicians in charge. Fundamentally, the Chinese 
government's energy policies have been dominated by the country's growing demand for oil 
and its reliance on oil imports and the oil and gas industry has remained a strategic asset for 
the Chinese government, responsible for ensuring supplies of oil and gas, generating tax 
revenues as well as employment (Meidan, 2016, p.55). 
When it comes to the organization of the sector, the main policymaking, planning, and 
regulatory authority of the energy sector is the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC). It is a department within the State Council. Some other ministries are competent for 
particular topics related to state’s oil policy. Furthermore, the National Energy Administration 
(NEA) was established by the government in 2008 to act as the key energy regulator. The NEA, 
linked with the NDRC, has been charged, inter alia, with approving new energy projects in 
China, setting domestic wholesale energy prices and implementing the central government's 
energy policies (EIA, 2015, p.5). Besides, in 2010, China created a National Energy 
Commission. Its scope of work was to consolidate energy policies of various agencies and 
assess important energy issues.  
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Despite the fact that China has granted access to some international oil companies to 
technically challenging onshore and deep water offshore fields, both oil and natural gas 
upstream and downstream sectors are dominated by China’s national oil companies (NOCs) 
which maintain a significant influence on the sector. Back in 1980s, China established three 
major NOCs: China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China Petroleum and 
Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), 
each in charge of different areas of the oil sector.  
While CNPC and Sinopec were put in charge of most of the country's onshore upstream assets 
and the refining, distribution, petrochemicals and other downsize activities, the CNOOC was 
tasked with exploring offshore areas with potential oil and gas assets.  Through the last decades, 
the Chinese government twice reorganized state-owned oil and gas assets. First by creation of 
reorganization of three NOCs into holdings with operating daughter companies in the 
beginning of 1990s and in late 1990s by reorganizing CNPC and Sinopec into two vertically 
integrated companies, owning both upstream and downstream assets. Nowadays, CNPC is the 
biggest upstream player. It is accountable for an estimated 54 % and 77 % of  crude oil and 
natural gas output in China (Facts Global Energy, 2015). While CNPC is following a strategy  
to acquire more downstream market share and integrate its business sectors, Sinopec strives to 
capture more upstream assets and is consequently looking for success in producing oil and gas. 
Finally, CNOOC’s role, (offshore oil and gas exploration and production) has expanded due to 
growing focus on offshore areas and overseas assets. The company has emerged as a competitor 
to CNPC and Sinopec by both increasing its exploration and production expenses in the South 
China Sea (SCS) and also by becoming active in the downstream sector. It is particularly 
especially interested  in the Southern Guangdong province (EIA, 2015). It is also worth 
mentioning that over the past years additional state-owned oil firms and private companies, 
such as Sinochem Corporation, CITIC Group, and Yanchang Petroleum, have emerged, yet, 
these companies remain small. Several independent private companies have also managed to 
acquire downstream oil infrastructure (e.g. refineries), however, they could not avoid the 
regulatory limitations of the state that favored NOCs. Lastly, as already noted above, 
international oil companies got more access to offshore oil supplies and space to operate on 
technically complicated onshore gas fields. They were able to do so using production-sharing 
contracts and joint ventures. Yet, conditions of their participation on the Chinese market is 
limited since it is required for a foreign player partner to first associate with a Chinese NOC 
and only then it will be given the possibility to enter the Chinese markets. Additional 
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requirements are that a Chinese NOC must possess the majority share of a contract and retains 
the possibility to become an operator once development costs have been recovered by the 
international company (ibid, 2015). 
7.2 Territorial disputes and its implications on the exploration of energy resources  
Estimates vary as to the size of the reserves in the waters surrounding China as due to historical 
animosities and territorial disputes, mainly between China and other neighboring countries, no 
meaningful exploration and production activity has been possible.  
In the East China Sea territorial disputes between China and Japan are a reason for limited 
development of oil and gas fields. Both countries first tried to find a solution through 
negotiations in 2008. Result of negotiations was an agreement to jointly develop two gas fields 
(Chunxiao/Shirakaba and Longjing/Asurao). Already in 2009 Beijing proclaimed sovereignty 
over the fields and broke the agreement. This was the beginning of continued unilateral actions 
seeking to develop the gas fields. As a consequence, Japan started with territorial claims over 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Next escalation followed in 2012 when China installed a production 
platform and CNOOC suggested to develop several gas fields in the disputed area. A year later 
Beijing started to claim to the air space above the islands and set up the "East China Sea Air 
Defense Identification Zone” also covering the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (ibid, 2015).  
The joint exploration of hydrocarbon resources has also been complicated in the South China 
Sea also due to ongoing territorial disputes. The South China Sea, except for a critical world 
trade route, is also a potential source of hydrocarbons, particularly natural gas, and a highly 
contested area between the bordering countries (Brunei, China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
the Philippines and Vietnam). Competing claims of ownership over the sea and its resources 
are related to the ownership of islands, reefs and banks. The Declaration of Conduct signed 
between the ASEAN members in 2002 is encouraging cooperation between the countries 
bordering the South China Sea, but no common regulation was established in this regard. China 
claims the right to the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Pratas Island, and Scarborough Reef, as 
well as all surfacing and undersea features within the nine-dashed line on Chinese South China 
Sea maps. Due to increasing appetites for oil and natural gas and growing interest in the 
development of hydrocarbon resources in deep water areas, tensions have been particularly 
intensive between China and Vietnam and between China and the Philippines. China, apart 
from increasing its naval activity in the contested areas, in June 2012 issued a tender for nine 
offshore blocks in the disputed area which was overlapping several fields located within 
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Vietnam's exclusive economic zone. Beijing’s policy towards the South China Sea has 
remained focused on attempting to forge joint venture partnerships with other South China Sea 
countries to advance the exploration and development of unexploited resources. China in this 
competition doesn’t respect even multilateral framework. In July 2016 an arbitration tribunal 
constituted under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) decided in a ruling against China’s maritime claims in the “Philippines versus 
China case”. Ruling was not favorable for China and the later has rejected the ruling insisting 
that the matter should be resolved through bilateral negotiations 40. In the post-legal battle 
China accompanied with other opponents to multilateral framework in case the rulings are not 
favorable for them like Croatia in its border dispute with Slovenia, which Croatia also doesn’t 
want to obey. 
China’s energy policy challenge is how to provide physical supply at affordable prices from 
diversified sources, while also striking a balance between energy security concerns and serious 
environmental problems that China has been facing. While environmental policy can be 
managed domestically, energy security is strongly linked with good cooperation with its 
neighbors, also to better manage domestic resources across the whole big country. While China 
is counting on Russia to supply its northern region, it is more and more  reliant on Myanmar to 
satisfy fuel needs of its southwestern provinces of Guizhou, Yunnan, Sichuan, which have 
some 160 million people (Luft, 2015). These three provinces are also increasingly dependent 
on a newly designed energy corridor connecting a deep water port on the Bay of Bengal 
Kyaukphyu to Kunming, the capital city of Yunnan. The project is aimed mainly at helping 
China to avoid the vulnerable Strait of Malacca and assist in developing of its southwestern 
hinterland. A gas pipeline has been completed in 2013, and on a parallel lane pipeline for oil 
has been constructed in 2017. Therefore, still largely isolated Myanmar is increasingly gaining 
importance for China’s energy security as it offers Beijing a solution to so called “Malacca 
Dilemma” as it was named by former Chinese President Hu Jintao – China’s over-dependency 
on the Strait of Malacca, congested and politically sensitive (ibid, 2015). The new energy 
corridor is enabling China’s heartland an oil and gas supply directly from the Persian Gulf and 
Africa. Therefore, it significantly reduces its concerns of a potential US navy blockade of the 
Strait of Malacca. In case of potential additional discovery of oil and gas in Bay of Bengal the 
strategic importance of Myanmar would increase even further.  Meanwhile Myanmar has been 
                                                          
40 The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v. The People's Republic of China). 213-19, 
Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
172 
 
following a policy of soft alliance with China bandwagoning particularly in case of Western 
sanctions. Yet, due to concerns of overreliance on Beijing, Myanmar has also sought to engage 
with India, which Myanmar’s current government sees as a means to counteract its overreliance 
on China and also enhance its development and security prospects (Ramya, 2018). While 
China’s maritime forces have so far focused on securing Beijing’s interests in the South and 
the East China Seas, it is expected that the opening of Myanmar will allow for and attract more 
presence of Chinese forces in the Bay of Bengal and further in the Indian Ocean. This will 
create a new security dynamic with India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. China has 
already established footholds in all these countries, except in India which has been 
strengthening its navy to rival China (Luft, 2015). It should be also mentioned that China’s 
growing interest in the Bay of Bengal doesn’t decrease an interest in the South and East China 
Seas described above. China is increasingly interested in all matters that could be related to 
what is defined as “blue national soil.” (ibid, 2015). 
It is well mentioning that recently Chinese leaders often sentimentalize the Tang dynasty (618–
907) as a golden era of harmonious Chinese hegemony in Asia. In that time China was very 
opened to the world and this was an era of free exchange of goods and ideas coming from 
abroad via Silk Road (ibid, 2015). Apart from political power, the Tang dynasty experienced a 
strong cultural influence over neighboring states, among them Japan and Vietnam - with which, 
as we saw, relations remain increasingly strained. While it is symbolic that the capital of China 
during the Tang dynasty - the world’s most populated city of the time - was called Chang’an, 
which in classical Chinese means perpetual peace, (ibid, 2015) a Tang-style model in today’s 
context seems difficult to be reproduced.  
7.2 From internal to external dimension  
Since 2008, China’s NOCs have rapidly expanded their purchases of international oil and 
natural gas assets by the means of direct acquisitions of equity and financial loans in exchange 
for oil supplies. Main drivers for Chinese NOCs to engage in international projects and 
consequently build partnerships that are important from the strategical point of view have 
revolved around securing more oil and gas supplies, making long-term commercial investments 
and gaining technical expertise in more challenging oil and natural gas fields. Since 2008, the 
national oil companies of the PRC have acquired assets in the Middle East, North America, 
Latin America, Africa, and Asia, investing between 2011 and 2013 alone an estimated $73 
billion in overseas oil and gas assets (according to the IEA).    
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Chinese companies are present in upstream activities in more than 40 countries. One half of oil 
production consumed in China originates from the Middle East and Africa (Jiang & Ding, 
2014, p.6). Iraq, Kazakhstan, Sudan, and South Sudan are countries that have contributed to 
sizeable portions of China's overseas production. Chinese NOCs have gone abroad investing 
into overseas shale and tight gas to secure the supply but also to learn and gain experience in 
an attempt to develop these resources back at home. Since China has been magnifying imports 
of LNG, the NOCs have been seeking supply contracts. They have purchased shares in several 
upstream capacities and liquefaction terminals in the Asia-Pacific region, Canada, and the US 
(EIA, 2015).  
By the end of 2013, Chinese NOCs had secured loans in exchange for oil deals worth some 
150 billion dollars in several Asian and African countries (Jiang & Ding, 2014, p.6). Loans 
were offered for oil and gas imports at predictable prices. In a decade between 2005 and 2015 
China offered oil-for-loan deals to Russia, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, 
Angola, and Ghana. Similar gas for loan contract was signed by Turkmenistan (EIA, 2015).  
With closer integration into global markets, Chinese NOCs have been trying to adapt to global 
practices and also create modern commercial strategies. Maneuver space was always limited 
by the role of state and its control influencing the budget and appointing key personnel. 
Nevertheless, state support gradually increased and they managed to succeed also on third 
markets offering profitable deals to producers (Meidan, 2016, p.55). 
The most recent event that changed China’s energy sector occurred simultaneously with the 
drop of global oil prices. China fought with corruption and failed every time up until the arrival 
of Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. The current leadership’s steps, such as the investigations and 
appointment of technocrats on key positions in NOCs, substantially increased central 
monitoring, while also strengthening both the mandate of NOCs to improve their importance 
on the global market. Additionally, with the government’s decision to open up the energy 
market to new players, state owned NOCs had to deal with new areas in the sector like global 
refining and trading (ibid, 2016, p.19). 
China’s first steps in international oil and gas ventures could be observed in the years 1991-97. 
An insight into them explains relations between the industry and the authorities. The first 
investments abroad were more or less exploratory, as Chinese leaders regarded investments 
outside the country with caution. The interest of the regulators was to allow the NOCs to make 
first steps and gain experience on the international markets. Chinese NOCs having some joint 
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ventures with Western companies from 1970s already gathered technical know-how to feel 
sufficiently confident in their expertise to begin sharing it at the international level in 1990s 
(ibid, 2016, p.19). Gradual opening of China in 1980s, accompanied by some Chinese direct 
investments overseas in different sectors, changed an attitude of political leaders towards 
stronger international competitiveness of NOCs. This enabled to the management of NOCs to 
get a green light for their initial global ventures (ibid, 2016, p.19). Government’s support 
toward overseas acquisitions further increased in mid 1990s with China’s growing 
consumption of oil and gas which increased also the perception that oil shortages could be a 
strategic vulnerability (Ding, Akoorie, & Pavlovich, 2009, p.149). CNPC first started to 
develop its overseas investment strategy already in 1991. First activities abroad were limited 
since CNPC lacked funding and also experience. CNPC’s in successful overseas exploration 
and production projects in Canada, Thailand, Papua New Guinea, and Peru created a basis for 
other Chinese NOCs to get an approval for investments abroad. An important strategic 
investment which pleased the state leaders was CNOOC’s acquisition of almost 33 % interest 
in an Indonesian block in the Straits of Malacca in 1993, followed by an additional 7 % interest 
in 1995, positioning the company as a majority shareholder. 
Chinese party leaders had initially some reservations about the necessity of foreign direct 
investments, but when the first projects had been successfully implemented and didn’t 
negatively influence China’s image in the international community, nor did they negatively 
influence the economic growth, they were mandated to continue (Meidan, 2016, p.55, p. 20).  
In the early beginning, these investments were not presented and perceived as an instrument to 
mitigate the energy security. State hierarchy in Beijing was of an opinion that new oil 
production should focus on China’s western provinces and offshore oil. Following the sudden 
spike of Chinese crude oil imports in 1996, CNPC was in a position to argue that overseas 
investments could contribute to China’s energy security (ibid, 2016, p.22). In 1997, CNPC’s 
study on national oil security reported the need to ensure overseas oil assets (Downs, 2004). 
Thus, the idea of “going out” became supported also by party leaders.  
Another observation of the past China’s decision making process shows that decision makers 
were reluctant to rely only on markets to secure oil supplies. They supported the purchase of 
oil and gas assets abroad done by state owned oil companies following the theory that in times 
of crisis, resources possessed via NCOs could be delivered to China. From this first, more 
security of supply observation, the point of view moved towards a more competition oriented 
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one, putting an accent on the best price on global markets (Meidan, 2016, p.55, p. 54). The 
current Chinese leadership is not that much concerned about the security of supply and 
consequently the state owned companies will receive less support from the state-owned funds 
which are increasingly stretched due to the recent Belt and Road Initiative, which represents 
President Xi’s key foreign policy priority and is therefore the main beneficiary of state funds. 
The predominant view in Beijing is that China, due to its size and importance, deserves to be 
a price maker in global oil markets. Such a position implies deep and comprehensive presence 
in the global supply chain (ibid, 2016, p.55). 
7.3 Belt and Road initiative 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), presented on a map in Figure 7.1, is the most ambitious 
Chinese initiative in viewing its geographical scope and engagement of human and financial 
resources. However, it is also the least institutionalized. We could even question if it should be 
treated as a single project at all. The Chinese President, Xi Jinping, back in 2013 set out the 
broad parameters of the initiative in his two speeches: first in Kazakhstan, proposing a “Silk 
Road Economic Belt” from China through Central Asia to Europe, (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of the People’s Republic of China, 2013) and second in Indonesia when proposing a 
“21st Century Maritime Silk Road” from China via South-East Asia, South Asia and Africa to 
Europe (ASEAN-China Centre, 2013). 
After these two speeches of the party leader the Chinese Communist Party supported the idea 
of investing in infrastructure aimed to connect China with its neighbors but at the beginning 
the initiative was given little, almost no publicity in the Chinese media (Bond, 2017, p.4). 
Nevertheless, since then, the initiative, which is formerly known as “One Belt, One Road”, has 
become the signature project of President Xi, finding its place in several statements of the 
Chinese officials and attracting international partners. As presented by the 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, already 66 countries from Lithuania to Indonesia are now quoted as 
being part of the Belt and Road initiative (Wong, Booker, & Dejean, 2017, p.6). 
The idea seemed unclear when China’s government first presented this plan back in 2013. 
Seven years later the initiative became much clearer and initial enthusiasm on the West was 
replaced with skepticism since China has created new realities on the ground. In only four years 
it invested more than 25 billion USD into projects presented as BRI infrastructure and has  
plans to launch additional projects with even bigger amount of investments (Mercator Institute 
for China Studies, 2018). The BRI has become the most ambitious geo-economic project in 
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recent history encompassing nearly 70 countries and aiming to cover nations with more than 
two-thirds of the world’s population (Hillman, 2018). The plans include roads, ports, railways 
and soft infrastructure with new trade and transportation agreements, cultural component 
offering university scholarships and other people-to-people exchanges etc. (ibid, 2018).  
Figure 7.1 The Belt and Road Initiative
Source: Mercator Institute for China Studies (2018). 
Hence, the BRI became the world best-known foreign policy initiative but at the same time not 
very well understood. Apart from investments in several projects, cultural and educational 
expenditures, China spends significant resources for promotion of BRI events and for 
organization of BRI events. Consequently, BRI is becoming well recognize in China and 
worldwide: e.g. in May 2017, the BRI Forum was attended already by some 30 world leaders 
and representatives from more than hundred countries and international organizations 
(Hillman, China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later, 2018, p. 2). Those who look 
positively at the initiative are stressing that China has taken very concrete steps toward 
realizing the ambitious goals. Some are noteworthy: a Silk Road Fund with $40 billion 
provided by the Chinese government; the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) 
177 
 
established in October 2014 and topped with $100 billion of funding out of which more than a 
third also comes from China; the New Development Bank - a funding source for BRICS 
countries, which has an additional $100 billion of investment it can draw on, among others. 
Yet, some argue that these positive steps are extremely small considering the size and scope of 
BRI’s ambitions (Shapiro, 2017). 
Mystery arising from the mist of the Belt and Road Initiative is related to its unclear 
classification. Since China funds also projects in the countries far beyond nearly 70 participants 
to the BRI nobody really knows what is a BRI project. Projects in non-BRI countries share 
many of the same characteristics. The BRI was officially launched in November 2013, but 
earlier launched projects are presented as a framework of BEI as well. Thus, the BRI label 
sticks to a wide and ever-expanding list of activities (Hillman, China’s Belt and Road Initiative: 
Five Years Later, 2018, p. 3). 
It has become clear by now that the Belt and Road Initiative has become the essence of 
President Xi’s grand foreign policy agenda oriented aiming to increase China’s influence in 
the region and beyond.  Initial arguments of securing country’s trade routes, the supply of 
energy resources and exporting goods and construction facilities are all relevant but far from 
being the whole essence: 
Firstly, back in fall of 2017, the BRI was presented into the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
constitution and the CCP leadership is ensuring a financing flow into the BRI projects. BRI 
policy goals have become a strategic priority for Beijing. Even if the CCP introduced capital 
controls that limit Chinese companies’ investments abroad, the political support to BRI ensures 
channeling of funds into specific sectors and regions abroad (Eder, 2018). Yet, the 
unsustainable debt levels of many countries receiving Chinese loans have both caused concerns 
about the BRI’s financial sustainability. Therefore, the Chinese leadership apart from public 
funding in BRI countries tries to mobilize also private investments and commercial lending 
with a Chinese origin.  
Secondly, instead of initial expectations with regard to its scope - being limited to target regions 
along the historic routes on land and sea between China and Europe – the geographical scope 
of the BRI has been expanding. For instance, back in 2017 a new so-called economic passage 
through the Arctic to Europe was presented in the “Vision for Maritime Cooperation under the 
Belt and Road Initiative”. Beijing also signals its intention to expand the BRI into Latin 
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America (ibid, 2018). Thus, it becomes clear that the continuingly increasing scope of the BRI 
illustrates the fact that China is using it as a tool of its global foreign policy.  
Thirdly, contrary to what initially was announced, the BRI is no longer limited to economic 
goals. One of the sub-chapters of the “Vision for Maritime Cooperation” deals with security 
issues as one of Beijing’s priorities in international cooperation. China’s increasing 
investments and growing Chinese expat communities in risk-prone countries, convinced 
Beijing that it should take security concerns along the BRI routes in its own hands (ibid, 2018). 
For this reason, back in 2013, Beijing adopted an anti-terrorism law allowing for foreign 
missions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) units.  First action afterwards was an 
establishment of a military base in Djibouti, at the entrance to a sensitive Red Sea controlling 
transit through Suez, a key hub of the Maritime Silk Road. Consequently, several Chinese 
private companies started to rapidly develop security sector products that could potentially 
provide security to BRI projects.  
Finally, in April 2018, China unveiled its first international development cooperation agency, 
which is responsible for strategic guidelines and policies on foreign aid. It coordinates and 
reforms the foreign aid system, designs plan and overseeing its implementation. The agency is 
expected to play an important role for Chinese diplomacy and the Belt and Road Initiative 
(Xinhua, 2014). It is subordinated to China’s highest executive body, the State Council, and 
consolidates roles that had been divided between the ministries of commerce and foreign 
affairs. This event also marks China’s shift from a recipient country to a donor one (Lo, 2018).  
According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which has been 
monitoring infrastructural projects across Europe and Asia in previous years, there are some 
emerging trends with regard to the BRI which are worth to be given further consideration:  
First, according to the database, China is known for its willingness to be the biggest spender. 
Nevertheless, it is not the only significant player on the Eurasian landmass. For example, in 
Southeast Asia, Japan is outspending China in several countries. In Central Asia, the Asian 
Development Bank and other multilateral development banks (MDB) have important ongoing 
activities, while in Eastern and Central Europe, European funders remain dominant in many 
countries (Hillman, China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later, 2018, p. 3). Yet, this is 




Second, Chinese projects are more or less closed to local or international participants. 
According to the CSIS data, out of all contractors participating in Chinese-funded projects, 89 
% are Chinese companies and only 7.6 % are local companies (ibid, 2018, p.3). In contrast, out 
of the contractors participating in projects funded by the MDBs, 29 % are Chinese, 40.8 % are 
local and 30.2 % are foreign (ibid, 2018, p.3). These statistics highlight some political realities, 
namely, the fact that despite the official rhetoric presenting BRI as an open and global project, 
it remains almost entirely a China-centric project, which further strengthens the above 
mentioned argument of BRI being part of China’s grand foreign policy agenda. Additionally, 
compared to projects funded by MDBs, Chinese-funded projects are less transparent, 
particularly, at the earliest stage, which also limits the possibilities of participation for local 
and international companies.  
Furthermore, Beijing conquers a global advantageous position through using several tools to 
boost its exports. In the tool-kit are credits, infrastructure, trade agreements and state-owned 
enterprises (which often benefit from significant subsidies). This trend is especially strong in 
the construction industry, e.g. in 2017, seven of the ten largest construction companies in the 
world, by revenue, were coming from China (Engineering New Records, 2017). All these 
advantages are brought to the table by Chinese state owned companies when they negotiate for 
the deal. China uses also crediting as a powerful incentive. According to aid data, Chinese 
lending during 2000-2014 totaled 354.4 billion USD. The biggest portion of that was related 
to the transport and power sectors (Aiddata, 2017). Some three quarters of the credits had 
commercial terms but the rest were non-commercially generous. It is well known that China 
agrees to assume also risks that other lenders do not For instance, in Sri Lanka, China was 
willing to provide a 1.3 billion USD loan for a new port after MDBs rejected it (Hillman, 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later, 2018, p. 5). 
When it comes to new infrastructure, it is expected to improve the network connecting China 
with its trading partners in the long term. Yet, even if all the infrastructure is built as planned, 
barriers to trade will still remain, mostly due to different standards and regulations. Trade 
agreements could partly solve the problem and this is the reason why Beijing is trademarking 
them under the BRI banner. Yet to date, Beijing has mostly been focusing on bilateral trade 
deals. On the one hand, considering the diverse list of the countries who are part of the Belt 
and Road Initiative, a BRI-wide trade agreement remains highly unlikely. On the other hand, 
bilateral trade deals between China and individual markets, while lowering barriers, can 
potentially be a source of confusion due to complicated ruleset of regulations that companies 
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struggle to follow (ibid, 2018, p.6). For illustration, the 130 transportation deals that Beijing 
concluded with BRI participants cannot have a trade-promoting potential equal to a regional 
agreement or a truly multilateral deal (CGTN, 2017). It is not less important how Beijing uses 
its tools. It has been argued, that China’s approach is centralized, yet flexible (Hillman, 2018). 
Namely, China manages to bring all the different elements into a single deal in a centralized 
manner and while negotiating to a recipient country the offer, it interacts with all the major 
actors to present a unified front. On the contrary, the Western approach is different. Usually it 
is based on dealing separately with a wide range of actors, including those who loosely 
coordinate, others that operate independently and those who compete among themselves (CSIS 
Headquarters, 2017). China’s approach is flexible for a couple of reasons: firstly, Beijing is 
ready to work with any government (if one looks at the BRI participants it includes countries 
even with active conflicts, such as Syria or Yemen) (Hillman, 2018), secondly, China is ready 
to build and to finance while performing less strict requirements (often to the detriment of 
social and environmental safeguards); thirdly, China is flexible to negotiate payment terms – 
by being willing to accept natural resources or take equity in case loans cannot be repaid 
(Hillman, 2017, Dec.26). Thanks to this centralized and flexible approach China is often 
successful in getting deals.   
While long-term impact of the BRI is still difficult to forecast, especially, before the engaged 
capital is truly invested and projects are implemented and before transportation routes evolve 
into economic corridors, it has become clear that politically Beijing is already benefitting from 
its initiative. This can be seen via more strengthened relations with traditional partners (e.g. 
Pakistan) as well as China’s expansion westwards, via more recently established ties with 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The so-called Central and Eastern Europe-
China “16+141” framework allowed China to increase ties with the Western Balkans and with 
investment-hungry post socialist Eastern EU Member States.  
While in case of EU Member States Brussels has sufficient mechanisms to counter the 
circumvention of EU rules and standards, in case of Western Balkans the picture is more 
complicated. In the rush for funds that China promises, Western Balkans countries are 
accepting deals, which can be problematic for their progress towards EU accession and the 
Union has fewer and insufficient tools at its disposal to ensure that China respects its standards 
                                                          




in South East Europe (Wang, 2018). This is even truer, if one considers that the Energy 
Community - the organization which is in charge of extending the EU internal energy market 
rules and principles to the Western Balkans, among others - has a remarkably weaker 
enforcement procedure compared to the EU. Such situation can yield grave consequences in 
future, particularly, if we know about nine new coal-fired power plants planned by Western 
Balkan countries at present, among which, at least five (ibid, 2018) are expected to involve 
Chinese companies and funds. Chinese involvement raises serious concerns with regard to the 
compliance of planned coal power plants with the EU’s prescribed pollution control standards, 
thus, jeopardizing the region’s regulatory harmonization process with the European Union 
(ibid, 2018). While declaratively China is committed to respecting EU standards, in reality its 
regulators and banks are quite easy believing to the assurances of the governments of Western 
Balkan countries without performing an independent due diligence (ibid, 2018).  
China with the help of BRI initiative positions itself as the leader of a new form of 
globalization. BRI related rhetoric sounds familiar, but reality different.  President Xi in May 
2017 in his opening speech at the BRI Forum spoke about creation and support to the 
multilateral trading system, liberalizing investment and promoting transparent rules. As it was 
already mentioned above the BRI’s openness to local and international companies is 
increasingly questionable (Hillman, China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later, 2018, 
p. 7). Furthermore, as also mentioned above, the BRI has so far been based on the signing of 
bilateral trade agreements which brings together a diverse list of countries, many not having 
much in common (except an interest to do business with China), and is not upholding a 
multilateral trading system. (Hillman, 2018). 
Economically and politically, the BRI has not been without controversy, therefore it faces some 
short-term limitations and challenges on a longer-term. For instance, all smaller economies, 
when doing business with China, are preferring a balance more than complete alignment with 
Beijing (as in the case of Myanmar mentioned above). Despite smaller countries tend to 
diversify their economic relationships, their dependency can develop over time, as shows the 
Sri Lanka’s experience (ibid, 2018). 
Furthermore, some political impacts of the BRI have not been positive, as illustrated by the 
case of South Korea, which has initially embraced the initiative, yet, due to discrepancies 
regarding North Korea, the BRI took more of a second row approach over time (Hillman, 2017, 
Dec.13). Therefore, it is not clear that the support for the BRI can endure among other countries 
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and that it might not even turn against China in case it fails to deliver on its promises of large 
infrastructure projects, which in this case, rely too heavily on Chinese labor (instead of local 
one). It has become clear over the time that BRI projects are rarely executed on time, within 
the planned budget and with all promised benefits, even in the best business climate (Hillman, 
2018). While straight allegations that China fails to deliver on promised investments have been 
proven unfounded, we have to admit that BRI projects, particularly in more challenging 
environments and target regions, CEE being one of them, perform below expectations (Eder, 
2018). 
From the outset, the Belt and Road Initiative has been met with skepticism and concerns in the 
US, Western Europe, Japan, and India, as it raised suspicions about China’s global agenda. 
Therefore, the BRI also provoked increasingly assertive counter-initiatives, such as the 
“Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure” presented by Japan in 2015, and the “Asia-
Africa Growth Corridor” that was launched in 2017 together with India (Eder, 2018). These 
countries coupled with the Australia and United States and discussed harmonization of their 
joint efforts under the so-called “Quad” initiative, which originally represented a network with 
security connotation (ibid, 2018). The EU, on the other hand, has been working on its own 
response strategy trying to close infrastructure financing gaps in CEE countries that China 
would otherwise seek to fill by adopting in October 2020 the Communication called “An 
Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans” offering 9 billion EUR of grants for 
transport and energy infrastructure projects. 
Main reasons behind concerns and skepticism of the above mentioned countries vis-à-vis the 
BRI can be found in China’s domestic politics. While some argue that the initiative has the 
potential to bring about a new type of integration - a merger of regionalism and inter-
regionalism, which would be remarkably different compared with other integration projects 
like the EU, the ASEAN, the ECOWAS, or the EEU, (Grimmel & Giang, 2017)  consequently, 
increasing the flow of goods and people – some political decisions in Beijing are going against 
these objectives. Decisions, such as the overbearing security presence near border areas, 
increasing capital controls, which are favoring outbound investments for BRI-related projects 
and restricting inbound investments, are on the contrary suffocating commercial activity 
(Hillman, China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later, 2018, p. 8). In light of increased 
censorship back in China as well as Beijing’s propaganda outreach, the rhetoric about the 
intentions of the BRI to encourage the exchange and sharing of ideas and knowledge, seems 
(at least) contradictory. Thus, if China does not give up some control, it will be hard to convince 
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other countries to perceive BRI as a tool to improve global connectivity, as it is presented by 
Beijing (ibid, 2018, p.8). 
Chinese investment expansion, oriented also towards some EU generation, distribution and 
transmission operators, initiated a creation of a self-defense mechanism. The EU relatively 
quickly reacted with an adoption of Regulation establishing a framework for the screening of 
foreign direct investments into the Union (2019)42  (“FDI Regulation”) in March 2019. The 
FDI Regulation applies to transactions from 11 October 2020 onwards. It is for the first time 
that the EU screens foreign direct investments from third countries at EU level. The idea is 
most probably taken over from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 
which can adopt final decisions. The FDI Regulation in the EU’s environment of shared 
competences allows the final decision on FDI screening only to the EU Member States, which 
remain sovereign in the area of FDI. The focus is more on “coordination and cooperation” and 
minimum standards for national regimes. Like with many processes in the EU in the past, it 
could possibly evolve towards an increasingly harmonized and robust screening of FDI in the 
EU. Screening is limited to mechanisms on the grounds of “security or public order”. It does 
not require EU Member States that currently do not have an FDI screening mechanism to put 
such a mechanism in place. Existing or new screening mechanisms must be transparent and 
nondiscriminatory. The FDI Regulation lays down a non-exhaustive list of factors that may be 
taken into account by Member States or the Commission in deciding whether FDI is likely to 
affect security or public order. The list ranges from critical infrastructure, access to sensitive 
information or the pluralism and freedom of the media and whether the foreign investor is 
directly or indirectly controlled by third country government.  The Member State may also 
request from other Member States to provide comments or from the Commission to issue an 
opinion. The comments and the opinions need to be “duly justified”.  A Member State is not 
obliged to reflect any opinion or comment received, but it is required to give “due 
consideration” to any such comment or opinion. Ultimately, however, the FDI review decision 
remains with the Member State and is not delegated to the Commission or any other supra-
national body. The FDI Regulation introduces a unique procedure through the mechanism for 
FDI not undergoing screening. A Member State in which an FDI is planned or has even been 
completed, also if it does not have any screening mechanism, is required to provide information 
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on the transaction and to give due consideration Commission’s opinion or to comments from 
other Member State(s).   
The increased awareness of EU Member States about Chinese expansion and investments into 
critical infrastructure cooled the investment boom as can be seen in Figure 7.2. 
Figure 7.2 Value of Chinese investments into EU entities 2006-2019 (m US $)
 
Source: Ernst&Young (2019). 
 
Concerns particularly increased in April 2019 before a biannual Belt and Road Initiative 
Summit in Beijing when China succeeded to convince Italy to become the first Group of Seven 
nations to formally sign on to the initiative. This was a major victory for China and President 
Xi personally visited Rome in March 2019 to sign an agreement. One EU official said “For 
China it is a question of power projection. China is corrupting what should be a level playing 
field by offering loans that send country debts soaring and create a culture of economic 
dependency on Beijing,”. (Blanchard and Emotti, 2019). US was for years fighting with China 
in a trade war and has been consequently a particular bitter critic of the BRI, naming it an 
“infrastructure vanity project”. Jonathan Cohen, acting permanent representative of the United 
States at the United Nations, opposed to China’s attempt to get Belt and Road language into a 
resolution on Afghanistan, stating that BRI has “known problems with corruption, debt distress, 
environmental damage, and lack of transparency.” (ibid, 2019). 
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Whether the Belt and Road Initiative succeeds or fails, it has already been acknowledged that 
its vast scale and scope will have implications on other countries and regions: the world trade 
rules and financial system have been set up, defended and dominated by the West, however, a 
BRI following entirely Beijing’s agenda could shift these systems to more reflect Chinese 
interests (Hillman, China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Five Years Later, 2018, p. 9).  
In such case, several changes would occur in supply chains for goods, energy and other 
resources trade. China’s currency would become wider used. Chinese technical standards (for 
high-speed railway systems or wireless networks) would become more widely accepted and 
Chinese view on environmental and social safeguards would get an importance on a wiser scale 
(ibid, 2018, p.9). However, in any event, for the project of this magnitude to be a success, 
harmonization of infrastructure would also require harmonization of international agendas. 
Thus, if Chinese leadership’s rhetoric regarding the BRI is truthful, China would need to start 
working on a broader alignment of regulations and legal principles and rights held in high 
regard in some jurisdictions must also be harmonized in order to remove barriers to progress 
(Woolston, 2018).  
7.4 Cooperation Format 17+1 
The sub-regional economic and political cooperation format, which was created as early as 
2012, hence, predating the BRI, was made up of five EU accession candidates (Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia), eleven EU Member States (Bulgaria, 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
and Slovenia) and China itself (Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European 
Countries, 2015).43 While the 17+1 Cooperation format will receive a more detailed 
consideration in the following sub-chapter some aspects are worth pointing out already at this 
stage. 
China’s large-scale financing of railways, ports, highways and other infrastructure to better 
connect China to Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe in the framework of the 
BRI has been warmly welcomed particularly by CEE country leaders. This cannot be a surprise 
in light of the noticeable infrastructure gap evident in the CEE when compared to Western 
Europe (ibid, 2018). The cash-strapped five non-EU 17+1 countries expect to benefit in 
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particular, since China offers an alternative to unreliable financing from Russia, EU or MDBs. 
Particularly EU funds and funds from international financial institutions has be in the Balkans, 
perceived as administratively cumbersome and stringent on conditions (ibid, 2018). 
The few China-financed infrastructure projects currently underway in the region (which are all 
in the five non-EU 17+1 countries) suffer from the same problems that other BRI projects 
experience in the rest of the world, namely, the fact that Chinese loans are linked to Chinese 
companies entirely or at least in vast majority of the projects (Gaspers, 2018). Consequently, 
the capital associated with individual projects fails to deliver a lasting stimulus to local 
economies. The situation is similarly bleak in the 17+1 EU member countries, where in 
February 2017, the European Commission launched a formal investigation into the flagship 
BRI construction project in Europe, a 2.45 billion euros high-speed rail link between Belgrade 
and Budapest (ibid, 2018). Brussels has expressed doubts about the project’s compliance with 
EU public procurement rules and about the financial viability of the project.  
The 17+1 Cooperation framework, proposed by former Chinese president Hu Jintao, aims at 
intensifying economic, infrastructural and cultural cooperation between Beijing and Central 
European region.   
Back in 2011, in the aftermath of the financial crisis and sluggish EU demand, China found 
CEE countries attractive for an expansion of its trade and as an investment destination, 
particularly since more than half of the region are represented by EU Member States what 
would enable to avoid high EU’s antidumping tariffs and high import duties. (Grieger, 2017, 
p.1). China became active with its economic and financial diplomacy and the CEE countries 
were happy to accept investors that would assist them in their economic recovery. The cash-
strapped Western Balkan countries, not eligible for EU structural funds, were particularly 
interested in Chinese investments promising to improve infrastructure and transportation 
network and modernize the outdated industrial facilities and coal power plants (ibid, 2017). 
These interests, as previous years demonstrated, matched well with China’s objective to build 
a key transport network for the BRI. In the document from 2012 “Twelve Measures to promote 
friendly cooperation with CEEC” (Ministry of Foreign Affair of the People’s Republic of 
China, 2012), China suggested to expand its relations with the CEE countries with an 
international networking program, which was following the already established platforms with 
Africa, the Middle East and Latin America (Grieger, 2017, p.1). Beijing’s proposal towards the 
CEEC envisaged a China-centered institutional setup (with the Secretariat operating in Beijing) 
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that would include discussions at different political levels and cooperation in different sectors 
and topics like: trade, investment, finance, culture etc. At the same time anything potentially 
sensitive was strictly omitted, i.e. human rights, environmental protection. The involvement of 
its members happens on a voluntary basis and while some have argued that such loose and 
flexible format enables a result-oriented approach, as it will be demonstrated below, the 
mechanism has fallen short of expectations in many respects.   
7.4.1 Institutional Shortfalls 
Various coordination mechanisms were established within the 17+1 format yet due to the fact 
that they are scattered across different CEE countries the format’s institutional structure is 
inadequate. Different branches of 17+1 initiative are positioned elsewhere: Agency for the 
Promotion of Tourism and Association of Enterprises in Hungary, Contact Mechanism for 
Promotion of Investment is based in Poland, Union of Governors has a seat in the Czech 
Republic and the Logistics Coordination Centre is in Latvia (Pendrakowska, 2012). While such 
structure might balance the influence between its members, from a practical point of view, it 
obstructs coordination. A central office where data on all projects and initiatives would be 
gathered and managed is needed (ibid, 2012). 
An additional issue, is that since there is no centralized office, CEE countries are situated in a 
disadvantaged position in negotiations vis-à-vis China. In fact, formulation and promotion of 
a unified policy encompassing interests of all 16 CEE countries without a central negotiating 
body seems almost impossible. Such a central body would be helpful in balancing interests of 
all participants in an unhealthy competition running for more Chinese investments in which 
mostly Chinese participants usually win. In an environment where 16 countries rather compete 
with each other than cooperate and align to enforce their interests in a clash with Chinese it is 
hard to imagine a situation in which any deal between the 16 and Beijing wouldn’t mainly 
favor interests of China (ibid, 2012).  
This problem is complex when one looks at different layers existing within individual country’s 
relations with China. The relationship between Poland and China for example, is formed at 
four different levels: the first is the bilateral level, the second is the sub-regional level with the 
Visegrad 4 framework, the third is the China-Polish relation under the 17+1 framework and 
the fourth is the relation between China and Poland as a Member State to EU. (ibid, 2012, p.2). 
In this context, a centralized and stronger institutional framework between the CEE countries 
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would act as a means to consolidate and coordinate these different layers existing in each 
country and increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis China.  
The current situation reflects well the difference between the political cultures of China and 
the CEE countries, precisely their different approaches when it comes to respecting authority 
and means of communication. While in the CEE countries authorities within institutions are 
anticipated to publicly communicate information in an active manner in order to ensure 
transparency, create room for criticism and increase credibility, such activities are not 
characteristic to the Chinese political culture, which does not prioritize public consultation or 
individual opinions.  
Apart from institutional and structural shortfalls, the guidelines of the 17+1 annual summits, 
which represent roadmaps for cooperation, have shown uneven achievements and overall 
bilateralism has prevailed. Before assessing the results of the summits, it would be noteworthy 
to have an overview of their content.   
For example, the Bucharest summit of November 2013 and the subsequent Guidelines 
announced that the heads of government of the relevant states decided to meet annually in order 
to overlook the results of the cooperation and specify the directions of future development. 
They also agreed to elaborate the medium-term program of the 17+1 cooperation. For the field 
of economic cooperation, the Heads of States passed a decision to investor and scientific fora 
and on setting up chambers of commerce for China and the CEE countries, which could be 
joined by the member states on a voluntary basis (Xinhua , 2015). The Belgrade Summit in 
December 2014 and its Guidelines stated that parties would rely on the basic principles laid 
down in the “China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation” and would take note of the 
existing EU legislation, guidelines and policies (China-CEEC, 2015). The first large-scale 
infrastructure project was signed. This was the reconstruction of the Budapest-Belgrade 
railway line (announced at the Bucharest Summit). Furthermore, the Heads of States decided 
on setting-up of the China-CEEC Business Council in Warsaw to form the first two sectoral 
coordination centers: the China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agency in Warsaw and Beijing 
and the China-CEEC Tourism Promotion Agency in Budapest (ibid, 2015). The Summit held 
in Suzhou in November 2015 and the related Guidelines highlighted that the relationship 
between the 17+1 cooperation format and the EU would further be strengthened and in addition 
to the forms of cooperation mentioned above the China-EU Connectivity Platform was 
identified. It was also reaffirmed that developing synergies between the 17+1 Cooperation 
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mechanism, the Belt and Road Initiative, the Investment Plan for Europe and China-EU 
relations was important (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2015). 
Additionally, the participants to the summit announced strengthening of the customs clearance 
facilitation cooperation mechanism for the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line among the 
Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian, North Macedonian, and Greek Customs. The parties also 
supported the plan for the cooperation of the harbors in three seas and related industrial parks 
along with their connection with economic corridors: Adriatic, the Baltic, and the Black Sea 
(Adriatic-Baltic-Black Sea Seaport Cooperation) and also adopted the medium-term agenda 
for cooperation. The objective of the first multilateral project (Adriatic-Baltic-Black Sea 
Seaport Cooperation) is to connect members with different economic success within the EU 
and reduce the level of dependency on Russian energy, while also generating synergies with 
BRI and EU projects in these macro-regions. 
The most important result of the Riga Summit organized in November 2016 was the 
establishment of the China-CEEC Investment Cooperation Fund (The State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, 2016).   Furthermore, the parties agreed to harmonize their 
infrastructure developments with the routes of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-
T). On that summit Latvia got a seat of the China-CEEC Secretariat on Logistics Cooperation. 
The Secretariat was tasked to provide a virtual information platform. The creation of 
coordination bodies was announced: coordination body for maritime affairs with a seat in 
Poland, coordination body for transport and infrastructure with a seat in Serbia, coordination 
body with a seat in Slovenia, the one for agriculture in Bulgaria, and for energy in Romania. 
The Budapest Summit marked the fifth anniversary of the establishment of the 17+1 
Cooperation platform. The Chinese side, most probably trying to prevent increasing concerns 
that the 17+1 format has the potential to undermine the EU unity, reaffirmed the great 
importance that it dedicates to the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and its 
support towards a united, stable and prosperous Europe (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People's Republic of China, 2017). The parties reiterated once again how they are committed 
to advance the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the EU-China Agenda 
2020. This should include also activation of cooperation in the framework of the EU-China 
Connectivity Platform and in the Investment Plan for Europe, aiming to conclude an ambitious 
Agreement on Investments between the EU and China (ibid, 2017).  Lastly, the participating 
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countries positively assessed the five years of cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative with 
its implications, while also stressing on the need of creating more synergies with the latter.  
Despite the number of summits, promises, plans, and created expectations about strengthened 
mutual relations in different areas between China and the CEEC, the factual results suggest a 
different reality. Namely, China-CEEC trade was at US$56.2 billion in 2015, representing a 
little more than half of the initial US$100 billion target. It is also down from US$60.2 billion 
that was detected in 2014 (Grieger, 2017, p.1). Another disappointment is that trading between 
China and the Western Balkans is still insignificant. According to Eurostat data, all CEECs run 
a trade deficit with China. The potential between the two regions is not fully tapped, especially 
taking into account it’s high geographical and product concentration, with little product 
specialization (ibid, 2017, p.1) The Visegrad countries, accompanied with Bulgaria and 
Romania, accounted for 95.3 % of China's €1.69 billion FDI stock in 2014 (Kratz, 2016, p.9). 
It was relatively easy for China to gain strategically important assets in the region, especially 
when Western investors withdrew from the Western Balkans while the countries were in urgent 
need to privatize. An example is biggest steel plant in Serbia in Smederevo (Nicolic, 2016). 
The wave of Chinese direct investments splashed also in the energy sector. Rovinari, and KMG 
International, a coal power plant and an oil refinery, both located in Romania have ended in 
Chinese ownership (Grieger, 2017, p.2). Central European countries widely opened the door 
for Chinese investments while companies from these countries and from EU in general clash 
with several restrictions if they want to invest in China. Lack of reciprocal market access shows 
an absence of a geostrategic consideration in Central and East European countries. 
China's 17+1 initiative has faced the challenge how to accommodate various expectations and 
legal frameworks in Central and East European countries but have consolidated China's 
political influence in the region. Initiative has increased the competition among countries in 
the region for cooperation with China. Some countries are offering various incentives such as 
visa-free entry or a residence visa (Pantovic, 2016). They have stimulated the political 
alignment of some countries in the region to China's 'core interests', (Zhaoukui, 2014) among 
them territorial integrity and sovereignty (South China Sea), economic interests (market-
economy status for China) and silence on human rights issues (Grieger, 2017, p.1). Countries 
in the region didn’t succeed to articulate common strategy that would secure their or EU’s fair 
competition, level playing field and reciprocity what all would follow EU’s strategy towards 
(Grieger, 2017, p.2). 
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The current institutional framework and a series of challenges in concrete project cooperation 
put in the shade often statements of Chinese policymakers stressing the creation of synergies 
between BRI promises and 17+1 goals. Particularly is this relevant in several cases where 17+1 
projects are very similar or the same as is the case of China-Europe Land-Sea Express Passage 
that aims to link Greece, North Macedonia and Serbia. This is exactly EU’s Pan-European 
Corridor X connecting Austria and Greece. Some 17+1 projects are also competitive to other 
projects on the territory of EU. Piraeus Port in Greece, developed by China Ocean Shipping 
Company (COSCO) will almost inevitably take a portion of business of the Port of Hamburg 
or Port of Rotterdam. In such cases the idea that 16+1 format serves only to drive a wedge 
between Old Europe and Central and Eastern European Countries has its echo (Pendrakowska, 
2012, p. 2).  
The 17+1 initiative witnesses some technical barriers. Very visible is a need for Chinese trains 
to often switch gauges because of their varying width from one country to another. This creates 
a bottleneck that has an impact on profitability (Grieger, 2017, p.2). The cargo traveling 
westwards has been in constant growth, but the majority of rail containers return empty to 
China. There is not much demand for eastbound cargo (ibid, 2017, p.2). The first and only 
infrastructural project which has started being implemented - the renovation of the Budapest-
Belgrade railway line for high-speed trains with an extension through North Macedonia 
towards Chinese-operated Port of Piraeus - has been in delay due to an EU infringement 
procedure. As mentioned above it has been initiated against Hungary by the European 
Commission. 
An important issue for the further development of 17+1 initiative is trade imbalance. Existing 
trade asymmetry may potentially influence harmonious relations between China and Central 
and East European region. The fact is that economies in the region consist mainly of small and 
medium-size enterprises (SMEs) and are home to very few bigger transnational corporations. 
For the countries in the region is much more difficult for them to enter highly competitive 
Chinese market and have a success. Even larger and more established European companies 
have experienced restrictions and governmental actions against the when trying to access to the 
Chinese market. Smaller companies have even less chance.  
Also, acknowledging that exporting agricultural products to China is not a long-term solution 
for establishing mutually beneficial relations, another idea was to work towards implementing 
solutions to energy security by the means of introducing renewable sources of energy, which 
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could benefit the environment, while also limiting the dependence on imported coal and gas. 
Considering that China is a global photovoltaics leader, Beijing could potentially play a 
mutually beneficial role in this regard.  
7.4.2 Concerns of EU versus interests of China 
It is still unclear how to assess Beijing’s perception of 17+1. Is it only a more thorough 
investment strategy towards the countries involved in the initiative or is it a long-term dialogue 
program? It is still hard to interpret intentions of China in all dichotomy of challenges of EU 
policies, local conditions and individual countries’ interests, BRI challenges and of course 
Beijing’s plans. Subsequently, the format is still perceived as initiative aiming to undermine 
the EU and remains to be proven that intentions are different (ibid, 2012, p.3).  
The format has been controversial, inter alia, taking into account the concerns regarding 
activities being in conflict with EU law, norms, values, and unity (Grieger, 2017, p.1). 
Consequently, the format has been closely observed by Brussels ever since it was created 
in 2012 in light of doubts that the high-ranking collaboration could have weaken 
partnership with the EU. European diplomats perceive the 17+1 framework as one that 
will keep existing, although the intensity will probably shift to “bilateral talks”. (Barkin, 
Emmott, & Tsolova, 2018). They predict that the current 17+1 format, where Heads of 
States meet annually, could change to a biannual one. (Barkin et al., 2019). Mercator 
Institute for China Studies (MERICS) has identified potential reasons of China to tone 
down its engagement with the 17+1 initiative. The first explanation could be that China 
would rather be on good terms with the entire EU, especially since the EU’s proposal for 
an investment screening mechanism on all European level which is concentrating on 
Chinese acquisitions in Europe as well as considering that the overall success of China’s 
flagship foreign policy project – the BRI – very much relies on an overall support of the 
countries engaged (Poggetti & Weidenfeld, 2018).  
The second explanation could be that Beijing might want to name an increasing gap 
between anticipation and promises for investments and on the other hand the actual ability 
to fulfill these promises in the 17+1 framework.  For instance, leading BRI plans in the 
CEE countries, like the Belgrade-Budapest railway, are now put on hold because of 
possible infringements of the EU legislation, as mentioned above. Furthermore, the official 
Chinese data implies that approximately EUR 6.7bn of FDI had been invested into CEE 
industries (Xinhua, 2017). The investment indeed seems important, especially taking into 
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account the capacities of CEE economies, yet, comparing to the investments that Chinese 
did in Western EU Member States, the investment becomes less sizeable. To illustrate this, 
between 2000 and 2016, Chinese investment in Germany alone accounted to EUR 18.8bn 
(MERICS and Rhodium Group, 2017). In this context, it is also noteworthy that the 
investment cooperation between China and the 17+1 has not yet bear fruits, since the fund, 
created in this regard, has not yet complete any sizeable transaction.  
The final explanation identified by MERICS seems more sinister, as according to it, 
Beijing seeks to indirectly deepen divisions within Europe by the means of toning down 
its engagement in the 17+1 format. Arguably, such division can take place by several CEE 
EU Member States blaming Beijing’s change of heart on bigger EU countries, like for 
instance France and Germany, because they have been against the 17+1 format. Indeed, 
Germany has been calling on Beijing to follow a “One Europe” policy, also echoing 
China’s insistence on its partners to avoid diplomatic ties with the self-ruled Taiwan, which 
China claims as its own (Barkin et al., 2018). Hence, the final explanation argues that the 
Chinese ruling party might be leveraging the political differences that already exist 
between the CEE countries that are short on funds and other EU countries to further 
weaken the Union’s capability to locate a common political and economic approach 
towards more assertive China (Poggetti & Weidenfeld, 2018).  
In this context, it is crucial for the EU to find consensus on its approach and seek more 
harmonized politics of Member States in regard to China. It is also important for Brussels 
to spread the message among those forming opinion in the CEE and in the EU frameworks 
that as yet China has not fulfilled its grand promises of financing and investment projects 
and that Chinese operations fall far short of what the EU has already introduced and 






Initial questions of this research were: 
1) How the characteristics of internal energy supply in each of the four global superpowers 
(EU, USA, Russian Federation, People’s Republic of China) influences their foreign 
energy policy?    
With two hypotheses:  
H1a: Characteristics of energy supply in the state influencing the domestic energy policy are 
reflected mirroring the same attitude in the foreign energy policy. 
H1b: Every superpower tends to use any available strength in energy sources supply chain it 
has to impose its foreign energy policy. 
2) Which out of the three elements of energy policy (competitiveness, security of supply, 
sustainability) is most reflected in the foreign energy policy? 
With a hypothesis: 
3) H2: Characteristics of energy supply in the state influencing the energy policy are 
proportionally mirrored  in the foreign energy policy. To which extent several different 
foreign energy policy initiatives for regional cooperation could be explained with the 
theory of neofunctionalism? 
With two hypotheses: 
H3a: Haas’ theory of regional integration is still relevant in explaining the current features of 
the foreign energy policy of four global superpowers, and 
H3b:  Nye’s theory about four steps in the regional integration is applicable in the current merits 
of the EU’s foreign energy policy. 
In the thesis I presented: 
 how foreign energy policy of the four superpowers evolved, why it is designed as 
it is and how it reflects domestic energy policy and characteristics of energy 
supply in the country; 
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Energy policy is a set of decisions, usually of a national government, addressing energy sources 
generation or import, distribution, and consumption. All definitions of energy policy can be 
divided in three dimensions: competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability. The 
competitiveness dimension developed in the 1880s in the United States beginning with the 
establishment of an independent competition protection authority and imposition of a doctrine 
of essential facilities. This doctrine served first in the United States and some hundred years 
later in the EU and several other countries around the globe as the basis for anti-monopoly 
legislation, which allowed third party access and independent regulation of natural monopolies 
(infrastructure).  
The sustainability dimension first developed as a health protection policy due to the massive 
death rate caused by emissions from coal power plants in 1952 in the United Kingdom and 
later elsewhere. The sustainability dimension was strongly influenced by the transboundary 
effect of emissions from coal fired power plants that led to the adoption of the Geneva 
Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution in 1979 as a first international act of 
sustainable energy policy. In 1997, Vice President of the International Court of Justice 
Cristopher Weeramantry in a separate opinion in the case Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project 
(Slovakia vs. Hungary) laid down all principles of modern environmental law: trusteeship of 
earth resources, intergenerational rights, cohabitation of development and environmental 
conservation, respecting the land, protection of collective ownership of natural resources, using 
plant and animal species only to the extent that allows preserving their regenerative powers etc. 
Sustainable development is one of the oldest ideas in the human heritage, which was forgotten 
after the beginning of the age of colonialism and newly explored only at the verge of the 21st 
century. 
Therefore, the sustainability dimension, after the first years of attention to human health, put 
more attention on nature preservation. In the last decade, global climate change brought into 
the focus of sustainability greenhouse gas emissions. The key global policy act driving energy 
policy became the 2015 the Paris Agreement, a new legally-binding framework for an 
internationally coordinated effort to tackle climate change.   
Security of energy supply became part of geopolitics in the first half of the 20th century, 
shaping some actions and alliances in World War II. Energy security is a multidimensional 
security question – from basic competition for energy resources, too heavy reliance on a single 
supplier and its potential manipulation of that dependence, threats to energy import 
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infrastructure, to political instability in energy producing countries. The security of energy 
supply dimension is key for the energy policies of all the four global superpowers and is 
regularly a reason for new wars and political turmoil all around the world. 
Even renewable energy sources as locally available have security of supply threats due to 
supply limits of some key materials needed for wind turbines and solar power plants. The clear 
orientation of the EU, the United States in the time of the Obama and Biden administration, 
and even China, due to environmental and predominantly health related issues, towards 
decarbonization offers hope that energy policy will become less geostrategic and more 
environmentally friendly in the future. With renewable energy sources (wind, solar, hydro 
power) which are free and only request an investment into the technology for their use, we have 
even a chance that energy will be once more affordable.  
The overview of the structure of energy supply and market structure in each of the analyzed 
global superpowers shows that energy markets for oil, gas, electricity in the US and the EU are 
highly competitive and efficient. Both superpowers strive also towards sustainability and are 
continuously decreasing harmful emissions from fossil fuel power plants as well as from 
transport and other energy consuming activities. The difference between them is that the EU is 
highly import dependent (imports more than 55 % of all energy sources and the dependence is 
growing), while the US in the last 15 years changed its path from the biggest importer of energy 
sources globally into a net exporter, reaching energy self-sufficiency in 2018. This fact 
influenced the foreign policy of both. While the EU is continuously stressing multilateralism 
as an appropriate approach, the US started to use different vocabulary. Free trade was replaced 
by dominance and opposition to any cartels that would influence supply was replaced by active 
support to such associations which interfere with free trade. Some even assess Donald Trump’s 
success to keep OPEC+ (OPEC and Russia) alive during the crisis in April 2020 as his biggest 
success ever.  
The creation of EU’s foreign energy policy was slow and careful as a result of the delicate 
balance between national and supranational competences inside the EU. Energy, being an 
increasingly politicized sector, remains closely linked with state sovereignty and national 
interest. Consequently, Brussels’s efforts to shape a coherent foreign (they call it “external”) 
energy policy has proved to be increasingly challenging. Europe’s high dependence on foreign 
energy suppliers and particularly on Russia, with its contrasting vision of energy policy, has 
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been even inside the Union undermining the EU’s aspirations of introducing universal, market-
based norms in the global energy relations.  
Despite the institutional challenges, the EU managed to develop its foreign energy policy, 
particularly, by creating the European Economic Area and the Energy Community. Following 
the decreased role of multilateralism and increased role of bilateral relations in recent years, 
also the EU introduced elements of dominance into its foreign energy policy. Such is the 
amendment to the Gas Directive, expanding the EU’s internal legal framework towards third 
countries, including Energy Community Contracting Parties as participants to the single 
European energy market and annex XXVII to the Association Agreement between the EU and 
Ukraine. The EU as the biggest and relatively rich energy importer globally uses its demand 
side power in its foreign energy policy objectives. This approach goes back to its origin. 
EURATOM as one of the founding European Communities was a cartel of importers of 
uranium, which continues to function still today. The EU tried, without success, to even 
establish its own gas purchasing company (Caspian Development Corporation) and is trying to 
use its influence as an important buyer as much as possible. 
While the EU still remains supporter of multilateralism, which enables global competition, the 
US in the years under Trump administration clearly started to prefer dealing with other 
countries on a bilateral basis. This is a playing field where the US can still show its influence. 
While in the beginning of the twentieth century the US pursued a competitive access to the 
sources of energy to sustain the strong growth of its demand and secure the energy supply, the 
so-called unconventional revolution of the past decade changed Washington’s attitude towards 
its foreign energy policy. The period of constantly-increasing competition for resources has, 
thus, been replaced by the age of energy abundance, where the Trump’s US administration has 
set the objective of the United States to become energy dominant, supporting political 
interventions into the creation of prices on the oil market and moving away from 
multilateralism. Washington, even after Trump, does not seem to withdraw the objectives 
traditionally pursued by its foreign energy policy when it needs to justify its general foreign 
policy – namely when influencing their allies to diversify their energy, resources supply chains, 
using its power to penalize states or to motivate them to revise their policies by the means of 
sanctioning the oil and gas producing nations. The latter has been playing a critical role in the 
tool kit of US foreign policy, particularly in the time when the military force is difficult to 
deploy and when such deployment is increasingly questioned. The new age of energy 
abundance and an environment of well-supplied energy markets enables the US to have a better 
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leverage to ensure the collaboration of other nations when imposing sanctions multilaterally. 
Yet, importantly, now that the US decided to become energy dominant, any indication pointing 
on using American energy exports for achieving political goals could turn against the US 
interests and Washington’s ability to achieve its objectives. What changed after President 
Trump left the office is perception of the energy security. President Biden widened its meaning 
from traditional availability of sources to climate change prevention what returned US back 
into multilateral cooperation to prevent climate changes. Doctrine of energy dominance was 
officially dropped. 
Russia is one of the biggest net exporters of oil (some 10 % of global production) and gas (close 
to 20 % of global production). Despite energy abundance, Russia has heavily regulated and 
inefficient gas, oil and electricity markets. After the first attempts to privatize energy 
companies and make the sector more efficient, it went into the opposite direction by re-
nationalizing, particularly in hydrocarbons production. Among all four analyzed superpowers, 
Russia has by far the least energy efficient use of its energy resources. So far, the Russian 
government has shown reluctance with regard to implementing structural reforms in its energy 
sector and has rather been trying to adjust, react and adapt to created circumstances. Thanks to 
the high oil prices of the last decade, Russia managed to recover its economy and increase its 
geopolitical assertiveness.  
Monopoly and dominance are key drivers of Russian foreign energy policy. Russia uses its 
energy supply as a weapon, whenever possible, particularly in the gas sector where the EU’s 
dependence on gas imports from Russia gives the latter some political leverage. One such case 
in the past were oil indexed gas prices where Russia was able to use its influence in oil trade 
also in the gas sector. Heavy dependence of the Russian budget on income from hydrocarbons 
makes foreign energy policy the focal point of Russian foreign policy in general. Following 
the unfavorable combination of low oil prices, financial sanctions of the West as well as the 
rise of competition among producers, Moscow’s economic leverage was significantly reduced 
in recent years. It still tries to use its supply dominance in the gas sector through monopolizing 
delivery infrastructure (Nord Stream 2, Turkish Stream) but with less and less success. 
China is slowly liberalizing its energy markets. Its gas, coal, electricity generation, and oil 
sectors are primarily controlled by state-owned companies and do not allow much room for 
competition from non-state market participants. China in 2017 consumed 22 % of all energy 
sources globally and was by far the biggest energy consumer worldwide. It extracts and burns 
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around half of world coal production and its energy sector is heavily unsustainable. Its harmful 
emissions from power plants remain high and stable while CO2 emissions are in constant 
ascent. However, in recent years, the country has been quickly changing course towards a much 
more services-based economy and a cleaner energy mix. Its net energy imports index is 15 % 
and shows moderate dependence on import. China’s fast-growing economy and fast increase 
of energy demand has made it an important player in world energy markets.  
The Chinese energy policies have been dominated by the country's growing demand for oil and 
its reliance on oil imports. The gas and oil industry remained an asset of strategical importance 
for the Chinese authorities, since it ensures supplies of the energy sources, generates tax 
revenues and secures employment. With closer integration into global markets, Chinese state-
owned companies have been seeking to evolve commercial strategies and adapt to globally 
accepted practices, yet, the room for maneuver has always been limited by state control.  
Under the present leadership, Chinese companies have been engaged in large-scale outward 
direct investments, which were soon declared as the projects within the framework of the Belt 
and Road Initiative. While there are nearly 70 countries participating in the Belt and Road 
Initiative, its label remains vague and there is no single definition for what qualifies as a Belt 
and Road Initiative project. It seems that the initiative goes far beyond securing China’s trade 
routes and supplies of energy resources, or securing export of its industrial excess capacities to 
construction projects worldwide. The BRI became a major component of China’s grand foreign 
policy agenda aimed at increasing Chinese influence globally. This long term initiative seeks 
for more than just economic goals and has a global scope.   
The research has supported the hypothesis that characteristics of energy supply in the country 
influence the domestic energy policy and are directly reflected mirroring the same attitude in 
the foreign energy policy: striving for competition at home results in striving for competition 
on a global scale and monopoly oriented energy policy at home is reflected also in monopoly 
oriented foreign energy policy. The same goes for other two elements of energy policy as well. 




Table 8.1 Reflection of domestic energy supply in the foreign energy policy 
Hypothesis saying that every superpower tends to use any strength in energy sources supply 
chain it has to impose its foreign energy policy was also confirmed. Russia is traditionally 
bluntly using its power of a dominant supplier as a weapon to influence behavior of dependent 
consumers and also of some other suppliers. US as an importer traditionally used its market 
power in combination with military actions to support competition as a safeguard for sufficient 
supply. Practically the same moment US became net energy exporter in 2018 the foreign energy 
policy under President Trump changed from a sustainable one towards environmentally 
unsustainable and from a one searching for international competition into a one protecting 
oligopoly on a world scale. Therefore, also US started to equally bluntly use its strength of a 
dominant supplier of gas and oil in combination with other foreign policy tools, mostly 
sanctions, to discipline other suppliers (i.e. Iran, Venezuela) and design anticompetitive global 
environment. Also EU and China use their power of a huge market to impose their foreign 
policy, including foreign energy policy to exporting or transiting countries (i.e. Russia, 
Ukraine, Australia). Also EU is extensively using its dominance of purchasing market power 
of some 450 million consumers in the emerging own foreign energy policy. This is a proof that 
EU foreign energy policy exists and takes over competences from Member States slowly 
melting their national foreign energy policy. 
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All three elements of energy policy (competitiveness, security of supply, sustainability) are 
always reflected in the foreign energy policy but the intensity depends on many factors. Most 
notably we can see the difference in foreign energy policy from one day to another in US from 
the moment President Biden took over his position. From unsustainable and anti-competitive 
foreign energy policy US next day became world leader in sustainable policy at the same time 
dropping doctrine of energy dominance. Therefore, we can say that all elements of domestic 
energy policy are equally reflected in the foreign energy policy, but only if we observe foreign 
energy policy creation through a longer period.   
 to which extent different foreign energy policy initiatives for regional cooperation 
could be explained with the theory of neofunctionalism? 
Using neofunctionalist theory to explain European integration by spillover effect has proved 
its relevance also in explaining the process of creation of the EU’s foreign energy policy and 
increased role and autonomy of the European Commission in it. The EU through its Energy 
Diplomacy Action Plan in 2015, involvement of the European Commission in the trilateral gas 
talks among Russia, Ukraine and the EU, through amendments to the Gas Directive giving a 
possibility to the Commission to reject a new gas pipeline from Russia and through annex 
XXVII to the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement slowly gains its independence in designing 
the foreign energy policy what has, according to TFEU, never been intended to become a 
competence of the supranational body. I think we can clearly conclude that this is a perfect 
proof that Haas’ spillover effect continues to be relevant today and that the neofunctionalist 
theory still explains the ever deepening European integration.  
The US never participated in any economic organization that would tend to transfer sovereignty 
over energy policy to a supranational structure. The Three Seas Initiative, which has a clear 
geographic scope, has no Secretariat and no step to transfer sovereign competence has been 
made by any participant. Therefore, we cannot even begin to discuss about regional integration. 
Also NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), as a trade community, is a pure 
intergovernmental mechanism.  
Russia is apart from the EU the only superpower that launched an initiative that tends to be 
supranational - the Eurasian Economic Union. It has its court, Commission and Council, which 
resemble the EU institutions, but their competences are very limited and the scope is mostly 
related to the energy sector. Particularly in gas, the Eurasian Economic Union secures 
Gazprom’s dominance and despite presenting its legal framework as similar to the EU acquis 
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fails to introduce a level playing field among different member states. There is also an absence 
of a parliamentary dimension, which for Haas, the founder of neofunctionalism, is a key 
component to allow true regional integration. It is possible to conclude that the design of the 
Eurasian Economic Union and its gas legal framework in particular prevents the emerging of 
competition and indirectly benefits Gazprom and Russian energy sources suppliers. Despite 
the formal similarity of the EAEU with the EU, there is no spillover effect since it is an 
association of unequal partners with strong Russian leadership. 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative is an initiative to increase Chinese investments abroad and 
therefore increase Chinese influence globally. Despite Chinese politicians presenting it as 
having global benefits, it is all about Chinese interests. The Belt and Road Initiative is yet 
another form of international cooperation which is incomparable with the EU integration 
process and the neofunctionalist theory cannot be used for its explanation. Predating the Belt 
and Road Initiative, the Chinese initiated 16+1 (currently 17+1) initiative is oriented towards 
the EU Member States that entered the EU in 2004 or later and towards Western Balkan 5 
countries. This initiative has its own Secretariat, but it is weak and based in various locations 
all around the region, without any influence on the Chinese initiative. Therefore, this initiative 
of regional integration cannot be assessed through the eyes of neofunctionalism. Apart from 
formally existing secretariat (Commission) without a strong role, also other forms of elite 
socialization are missing, like European Parliament with members belonging to cross national 
political groups. 
Therefore, the only place where neofunctionalism can play a role in explaining the process of 
regional integration still remains Europe or more precisely the European Union. Haas’ theory 
of regional integration is therefore still very relevant in explaining the current features of the 
foreign energy policy of four global superpowers.  
According to Nye’s four steps of regional integration, the EU is still in a step of reduction of 
alternatives but entering the last step of externalization. Let us remind that externalization is 
about the adoption of collective common positions on all matters that represent external 
relations of a system under integration: third countries, regional disputes, and international 
negotiations.  
This step started with the launching of the idea of the Energy Union in 2015 and can be visible 
through amendments to the Gas Directive extending internal rules to a pipeline from Russia, 
through extension of competences to the European Commission to participate in the negotiating 
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process of national governments with gas and oil exporters, through common guidelines for 
energy and climate diplomacy, through imposition of subordinated position of Ukraine with 
respect to energy legislation related Annex XXVII to the Association Agreement, and through 
managing the trilateral talks between Russia, Ukraine and the EU about gas transit and supply. 
The process of externalization is ongoing and will be gradually further intensified by so called 
climate diplomacy. Article 194 (2) of TFEU (“decisions on such measures shall not affect a 
Member State's right to determine the conditions for exploiting its energy resources, its choice 
between different energy sources and the general structure of its energy supply”) intended to 
allow Member States to decide on their energy mix became through climate action almost 
irrelevant. EU institutions, primarily the European Commission as a secretariat with decisions 
supporting decarbonisation in only few years took over management and design of energy mix 
in Member States with only nuclear power still being an exemption and the last island of energy 
sovereignty of Member States. As a consequence of this internal process EU takes over also 
design of foreign energy policy from the Member States. Nye’s theory about four steps in the 
regional integration is in the current merits of the EU’s foreign energy policy entirely 
applicable. 
Dramatic climate change, unimaginable decrease in technology costs of electricity generation 
from renewables (primarily wind turbines and photovoltaics) and the EU's ambition to become 
carbon neutral by 2050 are offering an optimism that energy sources will predominantly once 
again become local. This would entirely change today’s energy policy and make it less 
geostrategic and less important. Until then, we will continue to have to deal with all three 
elements of energy policy and manage energy scarcity through an arsenal of energy policy tools 
that we have learnt in the past. 
This thesis filled the gap in the existing literature by comparing foreign energy policy 
characteristics of the four global superpowers. It also provides explanations of the reasons 
why they are such through a prism of the three core elements of energy policy (affordability, 
security of supply, and sustainability). The analysis is informed by the theory of 
neofunctionalism, while also acknowledging its limitations in explaining the foreign energy 




9 Povzetek  
 
V dizertaciji sem poskušal raziskati, kako oskrba z energijo v vsaki od štirih svetovnih velesil 
(EU, ZDA, Ruski federaciji, Ljudski republiki Kitajski) vpliva na njihovo zunanjo energetsko 
politiko,  kateri od treh elementov energetske politike (konkurenčnost, varnost oskrbe, 
trajnostnost) odraža zunanjo energetsko politiko teh držav in kako lahko različne regionalne 
iniciative iyhajajoče iz zunanje energetske politike teh držav pojasnjujemo s teorijo 
neofunkcionalizma. 
Prvo poglavje želi predstaviti neofunkcionistično teorijo kot teorijo regionalne integracije. 
Najprej analizira poskus Jeana Monneta za spodbujanje evropske integracije, ki so jo po drugi 
svetovni vojni ilustrirale Evropske skupnosti: Evropska gospodarska skupnost, Euratom in 
Evropska skupnost za jeklo in premog.  
Neofunkcionalizem je teorija, ki razlaga proces integracije na regionalni ravni glede na 
naraščajoče vzajemne gospodarske odnose med državami. Analizira sposobnost regionalnih 
organizacij za reševanje sporov in oblikovanje mednarodnih pravnih režimov, znotraj katerih 
lahko nadnacionalna tržna pravila nadomestijo nacionalne regulatorne režime. Integracijo 
pojasnjuje tudi s specializacijo elit in s pozitivnim učinkom prelitja (spill over effect), ki se 
kaže v nujnosti sodelovanja med sektorji, povezanimi s tistim sektorjem, v katerem se je 
regionalno sodelovanje prvič začelo.  
Drugo poglavje na kratko predstavlja 130 let zgodovine regulacije za zaščito konkurence na 
energetskih trgih, približno 80 let izzivov glede varnosti oskrbe in prestopa te teme v politiko 
ter približno 70 let stremljenja k trajnostnosti v sodobni energetski politiki. 
Tretje poglavje predstavlja strukturo oskrbe z energijo v vsaki od analiziranih svetovnih velesil. 
Očitno je, da so energetski trgi (nafta, plin, elektrika) v ZDA in EU zelo konkurenčni in 
učinkoviti. Velesili si prizadevata za trajnostnost in nenehno zmanjšujeta izpuste škodljivih 
emisij iz elektrarn, v prometu ter pri drugih dejavnostih. Medtem, ko je EU močno odvisna od 
uvoza (leta 2017 je uvozila več kot 55% vseh virov energije), so se ZDA v zadnjih 15 letih iz 
največjega uvoznika energetskih virov na svetu razvile v neto izvoznico in leta 2018 dosegle 
energetsko samozadostnost. 
Ruski indeks neto uvoza energije znaša -84%. Po podatkih iz leta 2014 je država ena največjih 
neto izvoznikov nafte (približno 10% svetovne proizvodnje) in plina (blizu 20% svetovne 
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proizvodnje). Leta 2018 je bila izvožena količina energije skoraj enaka tisti, ki jo je država v 
tem letu porabila. Kljub energetskemu izobilju, ima Rusija močno regulirane in neučinkovite 
trge s plinom, nafto in električno energijo. Med štirimi analiziranimi velesilami daleč najmanj 
učinkovito izrablja svoje  energetske vire. Monopol državnega podjetja Gazprom postaja vedno 
bolj vprašljiv zaradi vse manjših koristi, ki jih tako stanje prinaša Rusiji. Posledično naraščajo 
pritiski na Moskvo za reformo energetskega (zlasti plinskega) sektorja. Do zdaj je ruska vlada 
bolj ali manj odklanjala strukturne reforme in se poskušala prilagajati novim okoliščinam s 
prerazporejanjem obstoječih dohodkov.  
Kitajska počasi liberalizira svoj trg s plinom. Reforma, ki je v devetdesetih pritegnila v 
proizvodnjo električne energije nove, zasebne vlagatelje, je bila vmes že odpravljena, zasebni 
vlagatelji pa izrinjeni. Plin, premog, nafto ter proizvodnjo električne energije v glavnem 
nadzirajo državna podjetja, ki praviloma ne dopuščajo konkurence. Kitajska je leta 2017 
porabila 22% vseh svetovnih virov energije in je bila tako daleč največji porabnik energije na 
vsem svetu. Kitajska izkoplje in sežge približno polovico svetovnega premoga in je tako močno 
netrajnostno usmerjena. Količina izpustov škodljivih emisij iz elektrarn ostaja visoka in 
stabilna, emisije CO2 pa se nenehno povečujejo. Se pa Kitajska v zadnjih letih veliko bolj 
osredotoča na storitveno ekonomijo in proizvodnjo elektrike iz obnovljivih virov. Kitajski 
indeks neto uvoza energije je 15%, kar kaže na zmerno odvisnost od uvoza. 
Četrto poglavje je namenjeno analizi zunanje energetske politike EU v globalnem kontekstu 
zapletenih energetskih odnosov. Energetika je že zelo dolgo politično občutljiv sektor in je kot 
tak tesno povezan z državno suverenostjo in nacionalnimi interesi. Posledično so se bruseljska 
prizadevanja za oblikovanje skupne zunanje energetske politike, ob delitvi pristojnosti z 
državami članicami in ob upoštevanju skrbno pripravljenega kompromisa iz člena 194 Pogodbe 
o delovanju EU, izkazala za zelo zahteven in težko dosegljiv cilj. Dejstvo, da je Evropska unija 
močno odvisna od tujih dobaviteljev energije (med katerimi ima Rusija s svojo vizijo 
političnim ciljem podrejene energetske politike najpomembnejšo vlogo), dodatno omejuje 
težnje EU po uvedbi univerzalnih tržnih pravil v energetskem sektorju. Pri promociji tržnih 
pravil kot osnovi energetske politike je EU vseeno uspelo doseči nekaj napredka, zlasti z 
ustanovitvijo Evropskega gospodarskega prostora in Energetske skupnosti. V zadnjih letih, ki 
jih zaznamujeta zmanjšan pomen multilateralizma in povečan pomen bilateralnih odnosov, je 
EU začela oblikovati svojo lastno zunanjo energetsko politiko (po moji oceni od 2015 dalje) in 
takoj, tako kot druge velesile, v svojo zunanjo energetsko politiko vnesla elemente 
dominantnosti. Neofunkcionalistična teorija, ki evropsko integracijo razlaga z učinkom 
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prelitja, se je izkazala za uporabno tudi pri razlagi procesov oblikovanja zunanje energetske 
politike EU in povečane vloge in avtonomije Evropske komisije v tem procesu. Po teoriji Nye-
ja o štirih stopnjah pri oblikovanju regionalne integracije EU trenutno prehaja iz tretje stopnje 
(redukcija alternativ) v četrto (eksternalizacija). 
Peto poglavje skuša pokazati kako je ameriška energetska politika skozi zgodovino doživela 
več sprememb. ZDA so si v začetku dvajsetega stoletja, tako kot mnogo let od krize v Sueškem 
prekopu sredi 70-ih let 20.stoletja, prizadevale za konkurenco, ki naj bi omogočila ustrezen 
dostop do virov energije s ciljem, da bi ohranile sprotno zadovoljevanje svojih energetskih 
potreb. Od sredine osemdesetih let je postala ameriška energetska politika bolj večstranska, z 
vedno večjo skrbjo glede okoljskih vprašanj, vendar sta varnost oskrbe in konkurenčnosti še 
vedno na prvem mestu.  
Medtem, ko je ameriško energetsko politiko v dvajsetem stoletju vodil strah pred 
pomanjkanjem energije, je tako imenovana nekonvencionalna revolucija pri pridobivanju plina 
in nafte iz škrilavcev v drugem desetletju enaindvajsetega stoletja spremenila odnos 
Washingtona do zunanje energetske politike in močno vplivala na mednarodne trge nafte in 
plina. Obdobje nenehno rastoče skrbi glede pridobivanja energetskih virov je tako nadomestila 
doba energetske obilnosti. V dobi energetske obilnosti v ZDA si je Trumpova administracija 
zastavila cilj, da ZDA postanejo energetsko dominantne. Zaradi tega je Trumpova 
administracija začela podpirati politične posege v kreacijo cen na naftnem trgu in odmik od 
multilateralizma, ki je poprej omogočal globalno konkurenco. Kljub temu, da so ZDA dosegle 
status največje svetovne proizvajalke nafte in plina, se zdi, da Washington še vedno ne odstopa 
od ciljev, ki jih tradicionalno zasleduje s svojo zunanjo energetsko politiko: zagotavljanje zalog 
na svetovnih naftnih trgih in zmanjševanje motenj pri dobavi; spodbujanje zaveznikov, da 
diverzificirajo lastne energetske vire, kjer je bila Evropa v glavnem v središču prizadevanj 
ZDA; in s svojo močjo kaznovati države izvoznice plina in nafte ter jim ukazati, naj spremenijo 
politike, z uporabo možnosti uvedbe sankcij. Uvajanje sankcij ima vse pomembnejšo vlogo v 
ameriški zunanji politiki, saj je vedno bolj vprašljivo, kdaj, in če sploh, uporabiti vojaško silo 
za politične cilje. Nova doba obilja energije ZDA omogoča, da k uvedbi sankcij pritegnejo tudi 
druge države ter jih tako skupaj lažje uvedejo koordinirajo. Po drugi strani pa je zelo verjetno, 
da bi odločitev ZDA, da izkoristijo svoj položaj energetskega dobavitelja in začnejo izvoz 
energije uporabljati v politične namene, lahko delovala proti njihovim lastnim interesom in 
zmožnosti doseganja njihovih zunanjepolitičnih ciljev. ZDA nikoli niso sodelovale v nobeni 
gospodarski organizaciji, ki bi omogočala prenos suverenosti glede energetske politike v roke 
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neke nadnacionalne strukture in neofunkcionalizem v njihovi zunanji energetski politiki nima 
nobenega odmeva.  
Šesto poglavje, ki je posvečeno Rusiji, raziskuje, kako njena bogata baza energetskih virov 
zagotavlja davčno osnovo za državno porabo, devizne prihodke in vzvod (zlasti v primeru 
dobave plina) v mednarodnih odnosih. Zahvaljujoč visokim cenam nafte iz obdobja pred 
pandemijo COVID-19 je Rusiji uspelo obnoviti gospodarstvo in povečati svojo geopolitično 
trdnost. Zaradi izjemne odvisnosti od energetskih prihodkov za ruski državni proračun je 
neugodna kombinacija nizkih cen nafte in finančnih sankcij ZDA in EU skupaj z naraščajočo 
konkurenco v proizvodnji nafte in plina povzročila postopno zmanjševanje ruskega vpliva v 
mednarodni politiki. 
Rusija nima veliko možnosti, da bi v bližnji prihodnosti postala pomemben igralec na azijskih 
trgih. Tako se je država usmerila k širitvi in osvežitvi svojih energetskih vezi z Evropo. Kljub 
temu pa Moskva vzporedno s tem spodbuja svoj konkurenčni integracijski projekt Evroazijske 
ekonomske unije (EAEU), katerega namen je povsem nasproten cilju evropskih integracijskih 
projektov, po katerih se vsaj formalno zgleduje. S tem projektom želi Rusija, med drugim, v 
energetskem sektorju zaščiti svoj prevladujoči položaj v postsovjetskem prostoru. Kljub 
formalni podobnosti EAEU z EU tam ni mogoče pričakovati učinkov prelitja na nadnacionalni 
ravni v skladu s teorijo neofunkcionalizma, saj gre za združitev neenakopravnih partnerjev z 
močnim ruskim vodstvom, ki ne dovoljuje socializacije neke nove, nadnacionalne elite. 
Sedmo poglavje predstavlja kako je zaradi hitro rastočega gospodarstva in povečanega 
povpraševanja po energiji Kitajska povečevala vpliv na svetovnih energetskih trgih. Na 
energetsko politiko kitajske vlade je močno vplivalo vse večje povpraševanje po nafti in 
odvisnost države od uvoza le-te. Naftna in plinska industrija sta zaslužni za zagotavljanje 
oskrbe, za zadosten proračunski dohodek in tudi za delovna mesta. Kitajska državna podjetja 
skušajo svoje poslovanje prilagoditi svetovnim praksam, vendar je bil do sedaj njihov 
manevrski prostor vedno omejen z državnim nadzorom. 
Pod sedanjim vodstvom kitajska podjetja sodelujejo v mednarodnem prodoru z velikimi, 
neposrednimi naložbami. Prvi poskus takega prodora je bila iniciativa 16+1 (sedaj 17+1) [e 
pred sedanjim predsednikom Xi Jinpingom. Njegov prihod na oblast je sprožil še obsežnejšo 
iniciativo. Prosor v svetovnem merilu je bil pred kratkim zasnovan kot Iniciativa pasu in ceste 
(Belt and Road Initiative - BRI). Kljub temu, da v BRI sodeluje skoraj 70 držav, pomen 
iniciative ostaja nejasen. BRI zagotavlja zaščito kitajskih trgovskih poti in oskrbe z energijo 
208 
 
ter omogoča državi, da svoje industrijske presežke in gradbene kapacitete učinkovito izvaža po 
vsem svetu. Z BRI kitajska zunanja politika prek gospodarske diplomacije poskuša povečati 
svoj vpliv. Ta projekt je treba razumeti kot dolgoročno, globalno iniciativo, ki nima samo 
gospodarskega cilja. BRI in iniciativa 17+1 sta še dve obliki mednarodnega sodelovanja, ki sta 
neprimerljivi s postopkom vključevanja v EU in v njiju zaradi dominantnosti Kitajske ni 
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